What is the Role of Imagination in Emotion?

Over the last forty years most scholars have viewed emotion as some type of evaluative propositional attitude, usually identified as belief or judgment, which is often accompanied by physiological sensations and feelings. Historically, the role of imagination in emotions has been ignored, or when it has been mentioned, has not been sufficiently explored. In this essay I challenge the prevalent cognitivist view, and I argue that often times imagination through its medium of mental pictures can better explain our emotional experiences. In particular, I examine a case of irrational fear and a case of humiliation where the requisite evaluative beliefs are missing, and I show that even though mental pictures are non- propositional, as they don’t require concepts for their realization, they are in a better position to explain emotions that lack an evaluative propositional attitude such as belief or judgment. Given that mental pictures, like propositional attitudes, are intrinsically intentional and representational, they are also able to account for the intentionality of the emotion, and, as a result, they can identify it as the kind of emotion it is

Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions

Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, and some may or may not portray actual objects aptly. Yet, unlike propositional attitudes, mental pictures do not allow for objective criteria by which one can judge that a certain picture is an apt portrait of someone or something

What Do We Mean by 'Forgiveness?': Some Answers from the Ancient Greeks

There seems to be confusion and disagreement among scholars about the meaning of interpersonal forgiveness. In this essay we shall venture to clarify the meaning of forgiveness by examining various literary works. In particular, we shall discuss instances of forgiveness from Homer’s The Iliad, Euripides’ Hippolytus, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and we shall focus on the changes that the concept of forgiveness has gone through throughout the centuries, in the hope of being able to understand, and therefore, of being able to use more accurately, contemporary notions of forgiveness. We shall also explore the relationship between forgiveness and concepts that are closely associated with it, such as anger/resentment, hurt, clemency, desert/merit, excuse, etc

Is Forgiveness a Good Thing?

While most scholars focus on the advantages of forgiveness, the negative effects of hasty forgiveness have been largely neglected in the literature. In this essay I shall argue that in certain contexts granting forgiveness to a wrongdoer could be morally questionable, and sometimes it could even be morally wrong. Following Aristotle’s view of emotion, and, in particular, his notion of virtuous anger, I shall claim that appropriate, righteous anger is instrumental for justice, and, as a result, inappropriate, or imprudent forgiveness could be an impediment to justice, or even a license for the continuation of injustice

The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism

Section III of part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise entitled “Of the ancient philosophy” has been virtually ignored by most Hume scholars. Although philosophers seem to concentrate on sections II and VI of part IV and pay little or no attention to section III, the latter section is paramount in showing how serious Hume's skepticism is, and how Hume's philosophy, contrary to his intention, is far removed from "the sentiments of the vulgar". In this paper I shall first explore Hume's view on ancient philosophy as it is presented in section III, and I shall particularly focus on his discussion of identity and simplicity of bodies. Second, I shall argue that Hume's account of identity and simplicity in terms of qualities is at best unsatisfactory. Finally, I shall try to show that Hume's advice to hold a "moderate" skepticism cannot be taken seriously. On the contrary, Hume seems to hold an "extravagant" skepticism, since he claims that there is a contradiction between our most fundamental natural beliefs, as well as between our natural beliefs and philosophical reasoning