42 research outputs found

    Institutional boundaries and the challenges of aligning science advice and policy dynamics: the UK and Canada in the time of COVID-19

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    This comparison of institutions of science advice during COVID-19 between the Westminster systems of England/UK and Ontario/Canada focuses on the role of science in informing public policy in two central components of the response to the pandemic: the adoption of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and the procuring of vaccines. It compares and contrasts established and purpose-built bodies with varying degrees of independence from the political executive, and shows how each attempted to manage the tensions between scientific and governmental logics of accountability as they negotiated the boundary between science and policy. It uses the comparison to suggest potential lessons about the relative merits and drawbacks of different institutional arrangements for science advice to governments in an emergency

    CEO Compensation and Hospital Financial Performance

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    Growing interest in pay-for-performance and the level of CEO pay raises questions about the link between performance and compensation in the health sector. This study compares the compensation of non-profit hospital Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in Ontario, Canada to the three longest reported and most used measures of hospital financial performance. Our sample consisted of 132 CEOs from 92 hospitals between 1999 and 2006. Unbalanced panel data were analyzed using fixed effects regression. Results suggest that CEO compensation was largely unrelated to hospital financial performance. Inflation-adjusted salaries appeared to increase over time independent of hospital performance, and hospital size was positively correlated with CEO compensation. The apparent upward trend in salary despite some declines in financial performance challenges the fundamental assumption underlying this paper, that is, financial performance is likely linked to CEO compensation in Ontario. Further research is needed to understand long-term performance related to compensation incentives

    Standardising Costs or Standardising Care? Qualitative Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact of a Hospital Funding Reform in Ontario, Canada

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    Background  Since 2011, the Government of Ontario, Canada, has phased in hospital funding reforms hoping to encourage standardised, evidence-based clinical care processes to both improve patient outcomes and reduce system costs. One aspect of the reform – quality-based procedures (QBPs) – replaced some of each hospital’s global budget with a pre-set price per episode of care for patients with specific diagnoses or procedures. The QBP initiative included publication and dissemination of a handbook for each of these diagnoses or procedures, developed by an expert technical group. Each handbook was intended to guide hospitals in reducing inappropriate variation in patient care and cost by specifying an evidence-based episode of care pathway. We explored whether, how and why hospitals implemented these episode of care pathways in response to this initiative. Methods  We interviewed key informants at three levels in the healthcare system, namely individuals who conceived and designed the QBP policy, individuals and organisations supporting QBP adoption, and leaders in five case-study hospitals responsible for QBP implementation. Analysis involved an inductive approach, incorporating framework analysis to generate descriptive and explanatory themes from data. Results  The 46 key informants described variable implementation of best practice episode of care pathways across QBPs and across hospitals. Handbooks outlining evidence-based clinical pathways did not address specific barriers to change for different QBPs nor differences in hospitals’ capacity to manage change. Hospitals sometimes found it easier to focus on containing and standardising costs of care than on implementing standardised care processes that adhered to best clinical practices. Conclusion  Implementation of QBPs in Ontario’s hospitals depended on the interplay between three factors, namely complexity of changes required, internal capacity for organisational change, and availability and appropriateness of targeted external facilitators and supports to manage change. Variation in these factors across QBPs and hospitals suggests the need for more tailored and flexible implementation supports designed to fit all elements of the policy, rather than one-size-fits-all handbooks alone. Without such supports, hospitals may enact quick fixes aimed mainly at preserving budgets, rather than pursue evidence- and value-based changes in care management. Overestimating hospitals’ change management capacity increases the risk of implementation failure

    Qualitative Analysis of the Dynamics of Policy Design and Implementation in Hospital Funding Reform

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    Background  As in many health care systems, some Canadian jurisdictions have begun shifting away from global hospital budgets. Payment for episodes of care has begun to be implemented. Starting in 2012, the Province of Ontario implemented hospital funding reforms comprising three elements: Global Budgets; Health Based Allocation Method (HBAM); and Quality-Based Procedures (QBP). This evaluation focuses on implementation of QBPs, a procedure/diagnosis-specific funding approach involving a pre-set price per episode of care coupled with best practice clinical pathways. We examined whether or not there was consensus in understanding of the program theory underpinning QBPs and how this may have influenced full and effective implementation of this innovative funding model. Methods  We undertook a formative evaluation of QBP implementation. We used an embedded case study method and in-depth, one-on-one, semi-structured, telephone interviews with key informants at three levels of the health care system: Designers (those who designed the QBP policy); Adoption Supporters (organizations and individuals supporting adoption of QBPs); and Hospital Implementers (those responsible for QBP implementation in hospitals). Thematic analysis involved an inductive approach, incorporating Framework analysis to generate descriptive and explanatory themes that emerged from the data. Results  Five main findings emerged from our research: (1) Unbeknownst to most key informants, there was neither consistency nor clarity over time among QBP designers in their understanding of the original goal(s) for hospital funding reform; (2) Prior to implementation, the intended hospital funding mechanism transitioned from ABF to QBPs, but most key informants were either unaware of the transition or believe it was intentional; (3) Perception of the primary goal(s) of the policy reform continues to vary within and across all levels of key informants; (4) Four years into implementation, the QBP funding mechanism remains misunderstood; and (5) Ongoing differences in understanding of QBP goals and funding mechanism have created challenges with implementation and difficulties in measuring success. Conclusions  Policy drift and policy layering affected both the goal and the mechanism of action of hospital funding reform. Lack of early specification in both policy goals and hospital funding mechanism exposed the reform to reactive changes that did not reflect initial intentions. Several challenges further exacerbated implementation of complex hospital funding reforms, including a prolonged implementation schedule, turnover of key staff, and inconsistent messaging over time. These factors altered the trajectory of the hospital funding reforms and created confusion amongst those responsible for implementation. Enacting changes to hospital funding policy through a process that is transparent, collaborative, and intentional may increase the likelihood of achieving intended effects

    Selecting effective incentive structures in health care: A decision framework to support health care purchasers in finding the right incentives to drive performance

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    <p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The Ontario health care system is devolving planning and funding authority to community based organizations and moving from steering through rules and regulations to steering on performance. As part of this transformation, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) are interested in using incentives as a strategy to ensure alignment – that is, health service providers' goals are in accord with the goals of the health system. The objective of the study was to develop a decision framework to assist policymakers in choosing and designing effective incentive systems.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>The first part of the study was an extensive review of the literature to identify incentives models that are used in the various health care systems and their effectiveness. The second part was the development of policy principles to ensure that the used incentive models are congruent with the values of the Ontario health care system. The principles were developed by reviewing the Ontario policy documents and through discussions with policymakers. The validation of the principles and the suggested incentive models for use in Ontario took place at two meetings. The first meeting was with experts from the research and policy community, the second with senior policymakers from the MOHLTC. Based on the outcome of those two meetings, the researchers built a decision framework for incentives. The framework was send to the participants of both meetings and four additional experts for validation.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>We identified several models that have proven, with a varying degree of evidence, to be effective in changing or enabling a health provider's performance. Overall, the literature suggests that there is no single best approach to create incentives yet and the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve results depends on a number of contextual elements. After assessing the initial set of incentive models on their congruence with the four policy principles we defined nine incentive models to be appropriate for use in Ontario and potentially other health care systems that want to introduce incentives to improve performance. Subsequently, the models were incorporated in the resulting decision framework.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The design of an incentive must reflect the values and goals of the health care system, be well matched to the performance objectives and reflect a range of contextual factors that can influence the effectiveness of even well-designed incentives. As a consequence, a single policy recommendation around incentives is inappropriate. The decision framework provides health care policymakers and purchasers with a tool to support the selection of an incentive model that is the most appropriate to improve the targeted performance.</p

    Cost-effectiveness studies on cervical cancer

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    Cost-effectiveness analyses are an important source of information for the design and evaluation of policies to reduce cervical cancer. This paper describes the recommendations of a panel on cost-effectiveness studies convened as part of the International Consensus Conference on the Fight Against Cervical Cancer. Recommendations for cost-effectiveness studies include: (1) the use of reference case methods to support comparisons across studies, (2) the use of a consistent standard of evidence on the clinical effectiveness of different screening strategies, (3) further research into the costs and effectiveness of different screening and treatment strategies for cervical cancer, (4) further research into screening and treatment strategies in a wide range of countries, (5) easily accessible and detailed descriptions of the methods and supplementary analyses underlying published studies, (6) greater use of newly developed models of cervical cancer, and (7) greater revelation of potential conflict of interest by researchers
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