A Simple Test of Private Information in the Insurance Markets with Heterogeneous Insurance Demand

A positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk can be an indicator for private information in insurance markets. However, this test fails if agents have heterogeneous risk attitudes. We propose a new test that conditions on unobserved types of individuals who differ in their risks preferences. This makes it possible to detect asymmetric information without direct evidence of private information - even if agents have heterogeneous risk attitudes. We apply our technique to the market for long-term care insurance. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) provide direct evidence for the existence of private information in this market. At the same time they fail to find a positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk. Our method indicates the existence of private information, without using direct evidence of private information. Our methodology is applicable to other insurance markets and markets where proxies for private information are not available.

Wage bargaining with direct competition and heterogeneous access to vacancies

Abstract Agents with a richer set of opportunities to trade should be able to demand better terms of trade. For instance, workers who are otherwise equally-qualified may differ in their access to vacancies, e.g. because their social networks are larger or smaller. We present a model of search and matching in which multiple workers may be matched to the same vacancy, and workers compete directly in the wage bargining process. Workers with greater access have a higher dynamic outside option and demand higher wages. They are therefore unsuccessful candidates in some matches; this latter outcome is not possible in existing models based on Nash bargaining to determine wages. In particular, when markets are tight and the expected length of a position is short, workers with better access to opportunities will remain unemployed longer than those with less access

The Cost of Business Cycles for Unskilled Workers

This paper reconsiders the cost of business cycles under incomplete markets. Primarily, we focus on the heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles among agents with different skill levels. Unskilled workers are subject to a much larger risk of unemployment during recessions than are skilled workers. Moreover, unskilled workers earn less income, which limits their ability to self-insure. We examine how this heterogeneity in unemployment risk and income translates into heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles. We set up a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets, in which there is heterogeneity in skills, employment status, asset holding, and the discount factor. We find that the welfare cost of business cycles for unskilled workers is substantially higher than that for skilled workers

Education, Self-Selection, and Intergenerational Transmission of Abilities

This article shows that the relationships between earnings and college education across generations can be explained by the intergenerational transmission of two distinct abilities and subsequent self‐selection of educational attainment. It is not necessary to invoke credit constraints. The model offers a way to reconcile the predictions of economic theory with empirical results that stress the importance of ability transmission across generations and question the importance of credit constraints for determining college attendance.

The evolution of wages over the lifecycle: insights from intergenerational connections

This article uses intergenerational information to improve our understanding of lifecycle wage dynamics. I present a simple statistical model that relates the wages of workers at different points in their lifecycle to the earnings of their parents. I decompose cross-sectional variance of wages into a permanent component related to parental background, a permanent component unrelated to parental background, and a transitory component. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) suggests that intergenerational relationships are stronger when measured later in the lifecycle of the son. This implies that the permanent parent-related component is increasingly important for wage determination as workers grow older. This is not consistent with wage evolution through persistent random shocks. Rather, it is consistent with human capital models and learning models of wage evolution.

Education, Self-Selection and Intergenerational Transmission of Abilities

This paper shows that the relationships between earnings and college education across generations can be largely explained by the transmission of abilities. Notably, the positive relationship between the earnings of fathers and college attendance of sons does not require a role for credit constraints. Intergenerational relationships make it possible to infer the potential earnings of a person for different levels of education. I find that the average return to college is substantially below the difference in average earnings of workers with and without a college education. I consider an intergenerational self-selection model of education. Two distinct abilities are transmitted from parents to their children. One ability is useful in occupations that are obtained after receiving a college education; the other ability is utilized in occupations that do not require prior college training. The members of each generation decide whether to attend college in order to maximize their lifetime earnings. Using a simulated method of moments approach, I estimate the structural parameters of the model with data from the PSID. I am able to estimate the parameters of the model without the assumption made by Willis and Rosen (1979) that parental features affect the educational choice of a son, but are not correlated with unobserved determinants of the son’s earnings. I obtain a positive correlation between skills used by college and high school educated workers, and I counter their finding of no ability bias.Return to education, intergenerational

Adalbert Mayer Collection 1909-1992

This collection consists of vital documents pertaining to Adalbert (Bob) Mayer and his mother Jeta (Harriet) Mayer of Berlin, documenting their immigration to the US, and some aspects of their post-World War II lives. Specifically there is a birth certificate for Adalbert Mäyer given in Schöneberg (1909); a law degree for Adalbert Mäyer, issued by Universität zu Köln (1933); World War II era immigration and naturalization documents for the Mayers including German passport, full of stamps, for Adalbert Mayer (1937-1946); a photocopy of Harriet Mayer's death certificate (1959); marriage certificates for Adalbert Mayer to Conne Conn (1969); birth certificate for Adalbert Mayer issued by Berlin registry office (1972); US passport for Adalbert Mayer (1985); death certificate for Adalbert Mayer (1992).Dr. jur. Adalbert (Bob) Mayer was born 1909 in Berlin, Germany, to Dr. med. Hermann Mayer and his wife Jeta Kagan. He studied law at the University of Köln, where he graduated in 1933. He eventually immigrated to the U.S. and died in 1992Adalbert (Bob) Mayer was the donor's cousinProcessed for digitizationdigitize

MIR S BOGOM PREKO POMIRENJA S CRKVOM

U novom Redu pokore ističe se kao posebna prednost eklezijalni vid obnovljenog slavlja pokore. Crkva sudjeluje očitije na djelu pomirenja s Bogom. To dolazi do izražaja u zajedničkim slavljenjima, a posebno u formuli odrješenja, prema kojoj se odrješenje daje "po službi Crkve"

MIR S BOGOM PREKO POMIRENJA S CRKVOM

U novom Redu pokore ističe se kao posebna prednost eklezijalni vid obnovljenog slavlja pokore. Crkva sudjeluje očitije na djelu pomirenja s Bogom. To dolazi do izražaja u zajedničkim slavljenjima, a posebno u formuli odrješenja, prema kojoj se odrješenje daje "po službi Crkve"