Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification

This article constructs a rational choice model of the intergenerational transmission of party identification. At a given time, identification with a party is the estimate of average future benefits from candidates of that party. Experienced voters constantly update this expectation using political events since the last realignment to predict the future in accordance with Bayes Rule. New voters, however, have no experience of their own. In Bayesian terms, they need prior beliefs. It turns out that under certain specified conditions, these young voters should rationally choose to employ parental experience to help orient themselves to politics. The resulting model predicts several well–known features of political socialization, including the strong correlation between parents' and children's partisanship, the greater partisan independence of young voters, and the tendency of partisan alignments to decay.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45492/1/11109_2004_Article_455216.pd

Social psychology, demographic variables, and linear regression: Breaking the iron triangle in voting research

A previous paper showed that a simple prospective model of voting and party identification subsumed much of the social-psychological and retrospective voting literatures, in the sense that it rigorously implied their key findings and added many new ones as well. This paper extends the argument by showing that the same prospective voting model has drastic implications for conventional statistical specifications in voting research. First, linear models should be discarded in favor of a particular nonlinear specification. Second, demographics should be dropped from the list of independent variables.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45484/1/11109_2004_Article_BF00991978.pd

`Representing and Being Represented in Turn’ - A Symposium on Hélène Landemore’s "Open Democracy"

Hélene Landemore’s Open Democracy challenges today’s democracies to meet their legitimacy deficits by opening up a wide array of participatory opportunities, from enhanced forms of direct democracy, to internet crowdsourcing, to representation through random selection to a citizens’ assembly: “representing and being represented in turn” (p. xvii).  Her aim: to replace citizen consent with citizen power.  The critics advance both praise and misgivings.  Joshua Cohen asks if Landemore's innovations are best understood as supplements or alternatives to the current system. Daniele Cammack argues for the significance of open mass meetings as well as smaller representative bodies. Peter Stone considers citizens’ assemblies inadequate for popular sovereignty.  Christopher Achen warns of problems in accurate representation, through both self-selection into the lottery and domination in the discussion. Ethan Lieb argues that particular innovations are useful only in some contexts, and that in each citizens should learn their appropriate role responsibilities. Landemore responds by agreeing, clarifying and rebutting

Who's Cueing Whom? Mass-elite linkages and the future of European integration

The 2005 French and Dutch referendum campaigns were characterized by an alleged disconnect between pro-European political elites and Eurosceptic masses. Past evidence regarding elite-mass linkages in the context of European integration has been conflicting. Whereas some scholars argue that political elites respond to the changing preferences of their electorates, others suggest that party elites cue the mass public through a process of information and persuasion. We contend that these conflicting results stem from the reciprocal nature of elite-mass linkages and estimate a series of dynamic simultaneous equations models to account for this reverse causation. Using Euro-barometer and expert survey data from 1984-2002, we find evidence of a dual-process model, whereby party elites both respond to and shape the views of their supporters. We also find that the strength of these results is contingent on several factors, including the type of electoral system, intra-party dissent and voter characteristics. Copyright © 2007 Sage Publications

Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes

If voters are fully rational and have negligible cognition costs, ballot layout should not affect election outcomes. In this paper, we explore deviations from rational voting using quasi-random variation in candidate name placement on ballots from the 2003 California Recall Election. We find that the voteshares of minor candidates almost double when their names are adjacent to the names of major candidates on a ballot. Voteshare gains are largest in precincts with high percentages of Democratic, Hispanic, low-income, non-English speaking, poorly educated, or young voters. A major candidate that attracts a disproportionate share of voters from these types of precincts faces a systematic electoral disadvantage. If the Republican frontrunner Arnold Schwarzenegger and Democratic frontrunner Cruz Bustamante had been in a tie, adjacency misvoting would have given Schwarzenegger an edge of 0.06% of the voteshare. This gain in voteshare exceeds the margins of victory in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election and the 2004 Washington Gubernatorial Election. We explore which voting technology platforms and brands mitigate misvoting

Modeling International Diffusion: Inferential Benefits and Methodological Challenges, with an Application to International Tax Competition

Although scholars recognize that time-series-cross-section data typically correlate across both time and space, they tend to model temporal dependence directly, often by lags of dependent variables, but to address spatial interdependence solely as a nuisance to be “corrected” by FGLS or to which to be “robust” in standard-error estimation (by PCSE). We explore the inferential benefits and methodological challenges of directly modeling international diffusion, one form of spatial dependence. To this end, we first identify two substantive classes of modern comparative-and-international-political-economy (C&IPE) theoretical models—(context-conditional) open-economy comparative political-economy (CPE) models and international political-economy (IPE) models, which imply diffusion (along with predecessors, closed-economy CPE and orthogonal open-economy CPE)—and then we evaluate the relative performance of three estimators—non-spatial OLS, spatial OLS, and spatial 2SLS—for analyzing empirical models corresponding to these two modern alternative theoretical visions from spatially interdependent data. Finally, we offer a substantive application of the spatial 2SLS approach in what we call a spatial error-correction model of international tax competition.Obwohl Wissenschaftler wissen, dass Zeitreihenquerschnittsdaten sowohl über die Zeit als auch über den Raum korreliert sind, neigen sie dazu, die zeitliche Abhängigkeit direkt zu modellieren, z. B. durch Zeitabstände der abhängigen Variablen. Die räumliche Abhängigkeit jedoch wird als ein Ärgernis angesehen, welches durch FGLS ‚korrigiert’ wird oder ‚robust’ gemacht wird in Standard- Abweichungs-Schätzungen (durch PCSE). Wir untersuchen methodologische Herausforderungen und die Nutzen für Schlussfolgerungen aus einer direkten Modellierung internationaler Diffusion als einer Form der räumlichen Abhängigkeit. Zu diesem Zweck identifizieren wir zuerst zwei inhaltliche Hauptklassen theoretischer Modelle der modernen ‚Vergleichenden und Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie“, nämlich Modelle der (kontextbezogenen) Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie Offener Volkwirtschaften und Modelle der Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie. Diese bilden Diffusion ab, ebenso wie die Vorläufermodelle der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie geschlossener Volkswirtschaften und gegensätzlich offener Volkswirtschaften. Zweitens bewerten wir die relative Performanz von drei Schätzern – nicht-räumliche OLS, räumliche OLS und räumliche 2SLS. Schließlich wenden wir den Ansatz des räumlichen 2SLS in einem von uns so genannten ‚Spatial Error Correction’-Modell des internationalen Steuerwettbewerbs an