Is the brain a quantum computer

Abstract We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms

Models of Scientific Explanation

Explanation of why things happen is one of humans ’ most important cognitive operations. In everyday life, people are continually generating explanations of why other people behave the way they do, why they get sick, why computers or cars are not working properly, and of many other puzzling occurrences. More systematically, scientists develop theories to provide general explanations of physical phenomena such as why objects fall to earth, chemical phenomena such as why elements combine, biological phenomena such as why species evolve, medical phenomena such as why organisms develop diseases, and psychological phenomena such as why people sometimes make mental errors. This chapter reviews computational models of the cognitive processes that underlie these kinds of explanations of why events happen. It is not concerned with another sense of explanation that just means clarification, as when someone explains the U. S. constitution. The focus will be on scientific explanations, but more mundane examples will occasionally be used, on the grounds that the cognitive processes for explaining why events happen are much the same in everyday life and in science, although scientific explanations tend tobe more systematic and rigorous than everyday ones. In addition to providing a concise review of previous computational models of explanation, this chapter describes a new neural network model that shows how explanations can be performed by multimodal distributed representations

Why Losses Loom Larger than Gains: Modeling Neural Mechanisms of Cognitive-Affective Interaction

We present a biologically realistic spiking neural model that provides a broad-ranging mechanistic description of the human reward system. We introduce a novel conception of the role of affective arousal in stimulus valuation, and describe a dopamine-serotonin opponency in reward prediction error that influences both cognitive planning and emotional state. The model provides a neurological explanation of loss aversion in humans, and suggests particular mechanisms by which serotonin influences affective appraisal and risky behavior. Specific empirical predictions of the model include a correlation between amygdala serotonin receptor concentration and loss sensitivity, as well as specialized impairments resulting from several disconnection disorders. Our results provide a basis for further exploration of the neuroscientific foundations of economics, decision making and social cognition

Is the Brain a Quantum Computer?

We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms

Is the Brain a Quantum Computer?

We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms