Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination

This paper selectively surveys the recent literature on price discrimination. The focus is on three aspects of pricing decisions: the information about customers available to firms; the instruments firms can use in the design of their tariffs; and the ability of firms to commit to their pricing plans. Developments in marketing technology mean that firms often have access to more information about individual customers than was previously the case. The use of this information might be restricted by public policy towards customer privacy. Where it is not restricted, firms may be unable to commit to the use they make of the information. With monopoly supply, an increased ability to engage in price discrimination will boost profit unless the firm cannot commit to its pricing policy. With competition, the effects of price discrimination on profit, consumer surplus and overall welfare depend on the kinds of information and/or instruments available to firms. The paper investigates the circumstances in which price discrimination causes all prices (and hence profit) to fall

Development of low temperature battery

Self-contained low temperature battery system consisting of a magnesium anode, potassium thiocyanate-ammonia electrolyte and a cathode composed of a mixture of sulfur, carbon, and mercuric sulfate operates for at least seventy-two hours within a discharge temperature range of plus 20 degrees C to minus 90 degrees C

Regulation, competition, and liberalization

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policies

Conditioning prices on search behaviour

We consider a market in which �firms can partially observe each consumer's search behavior in the market. In our main model, a �firm knows whether a consumer is visiting it for the �first time or whether she is returning after a previous visit. Firms have an incentive to offer a lower price on a �first visit than a return visit, so that new consumers are offered a "buy-now" discount. The ability to offer such discounts acts to raise all prices in the market. If �firms cannot commit to their buy-later price, in many cases �firms make "exploding" offers, and consumers never return to a previously sampled �rm. Likewise, if �firms must charge the same price to all consumers, regardless of search history, we show that they sometimes have the incentive to make exploding offers. We also consider other ways in which �firms could use information about search behaviour to determine their prices

Prominence and consumer search

This paper examines the implications of “prominence” in search markets. We model prominence by supposing that the prominent firm will be sampled first by all consumers. If there are no systematic quality differences among firms, we find that the prominent firm will charge a lower price than its non-prominent rivals. The impact of making a firm prominent is that it will typically lead to higher industry profit but lower consumer surplus and welfare. The model is extended by introducing heterogeneous product qualities, in which case the firm with the highest-quality product has the greatest incentive to become prominent, and making it prominent will boost industry profit, consumer surplus and welfare