“Matching Auctions” for Hostile Takeovers: A Model with Endogenous Target

In this paper we analyze incentives for a potential entrant to get into an oligopolistic Cournot-like market by taking over one of the incumbents and we derive the conditions under which the hostile merger is possible and profitable. The key-feature is that the target of the takeover is endogenously determined and this is also the main difference with respect to the previous literature on this topic. Actually, the main objective of our analysis is that of determining why and how the buyer chooses as target this firm rather than that one. The takeover game is modeled as a “matching auction” in which the potential entrant has to make a first and final offer and the other bidders are asked to match this offer. We find different types of SPNE depending upon the values of the parameters. Whenever entry takes place it reduces incumbents' profits and raises consumers' welfare at the same time.Takeovers; Matching Auctions; Mergers; SPNE

An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion

The main object of this paper is the study of tax evasion from a theoretical point of view. We construct a simple two-player model in order to analyze the interaction between the taxpayer and the IRS and the main tool we use is game theory. We derive equilibrium solutions for the static game and we also provide some interesting comparative statics results. Then, we develop a dynamic game over an infinite number of periods. We show and comment two different kinds of long-run equlibria.Tax Evasion; Policy; Game Theory;

Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions

I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a discouragement effect : the higher the winning bid in the current round is, the less aggressive the bids of the remaining bidders in the next round. Moreover, because they experience a loss in each round in which they fail to obtain an object, bidders are willing to pay a premium in order to win sooner rather than later. This desire to win earlier leads prices to decline in equilibrium. I also show how various disclosure policies regarding the outcome of earlier auctions affect equilibrium bids, and that sequential and simultaneous auctions are neither bidder-payoff equivalent nor revenue equivalent

A Non-Covalent Antibody Complex for the Delivery of anti-cancer drugs

Antibody drug conjugates (ADCs), which are obtained by coupling a potent cytotoxic agent to a monoclonal antibody (mAb), are traditionally bound in a random way to lysine or cysteine residues, with the final product's heterogeneity having an important impact on their activity, characterization, and manufacturing. A new antibody drug delivery system (ADS) based on a non-covalent linkage between a Fc-binding protein, in this case Protein A or Protein G, and a mAb was investigated in the effort to achieve greater homogeneity and to create a versatile and adaptable drug delivery system. Recombinant staphylococcal Protein A and streptococcal Protein G were chemically PEGylated at the N-terminus with a 5 kDa and a 20 kDa PEG, respectively, yielding two monoconjugates with a mass of 48 50 and 48 45 kDa. Circular dichroism studies showed that both conjugates preserved secondary structures of the protein, and isothermal titration calorimetry experiments demonstrated that their affinity for mAb was approximately 107 M-1. Upon complexation with a mAb (Trastuzumab or Rituximab), in vitro flow-cytometry analysis of the new ADSs showed high selectivity for the specific antigen expressing cells. In addition, the ADS complex based on Trastuzumab and Protein G, conjugated with a heterobifunctional 20 kDa PEG carrying the toxin Tubulysin A, had a marked cytotoxic effect on the cancer cell line overexpressing the HER2/neu receptor, thus supporting its application in cancer therapy

Hidden relationships between metalloproteins unveiled by structural comparison of their metal sites

Metalloproteins account for a substantial fraction of all proteins. They incorporate metal atoms, which are required for their structure and/or function. Here we describe a new computational protocol to systematically compare and classify metal-binding sites on the basis of their structural similarity. These sites are extracted from the MetalPDB database of minimal functional sites (MFSs) in metal-binding biological macromolecules. Structural similarity is measured by the scoring function of the available MetalS(2) program. Hierarchical clustering was used to organize MFSs into clusters, for each of which a representative MFS was identified. The comparison of all representative MFSs provided a thorough structure-based classification of the sites analyzed. As examples, the application of the proposed computational protocol to all heme-binding proteins and zinc-binding proteins of known structure highlighted the existence of structural subtypes, validated known evolutionary links and shed new light on the occurrence of similar sites in systems at different evolutionary distances. The present approach thus makes available an innovative viewpoint on metalloproteins, where the functionally crucial metal sites effectively lead the discovery of structural and functional relationships in a largely protein-independent manner

“Matching Auctions” for Hostile Takeovers: A Model with Endogenous Target

In this paper we analyze incentives for a potential entrant to get into an oligopolistic Cournot-like market by taking over one of the incumbents and we derive the conditions under which the hostile merger is possible and profitable. The key-feature is that the target of the takeover is endogenously determined and this is also the main difference with respect to the previous literature on this topic. Actually, the main objective of our analysis is that of determining why and how the buyer chooses as target this firm rather than that one. The takeover game is modeled as a “matching auction” in which the potential entrant has to make a first and final offer and the other bidders are asked to match this offer. We find different types of SPNE depending upon the values of the parameters. Whenever entry takes place it reduces incumbents' profits and raises consumers' welfare at the same time

“Matching Auctions” for Hostile Takeovers: A Model with Endogenous Target

In this paper we analyze incentives for a potential entrant to get into an oligopolistic Cournot-like market by taking over one of the incumbents and we derive the conditions under which the hostile merger is possible and profitable. The key-feature is that the target of the takeover is endogenously determined and this is also the main difference with respect to the previous literature on this topic. Actually, the main objective of our analysis is that of determining why and how the buyer chooses as target this firm rather than that one. The takeover game is modeled as a “matching auction” in which the potential entrant has to make a first and final offer and the other bidders are asked to match this offer. We find different types of SPNE depending upon the values of the parameters. Whenever entry takes place it reduces incumbents' profits and raises consumers' welfare at the same time

An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion

The main object of this paper is the study of tax evasion from a theoretical point of view. We construct a simple two-player model in order to analyze the interaction between the taxpayer and the IRS and the main tool we use is game theory. We derive equilibrium solutions for the static game and we also provide some interesting comparative statics results. Then, we develop a dynamic game over an infinite number of periods. We show and comment two different kinds of long-run equlibria