Zen and the Art of Living Mindfully: The Health-Enhancing Potential of Zen Aesthetics

Amidst the burgeoning enthusiasm for mindfulness in the West, there is a concern that the largely secular ‘de-contextualized’ way in which it is being harnessed is denuding it of its potential to improve health and well-being. As such, efforts are underway to ‘re-contextualize’ mindfulness, explicitly drawing on the wider framework of Buddhist ideas and practices in which it was initially developed. This paper aims to contribute to this, doing so by focusing on Zen Buddhism, and in particular on Zen aesthetic principles. The article concentrates on the seven principles identified by Hisamatsu (1971) in his classic text Zen and the Fine Arts: kanso (simplicity); fukinsei (asymmetry); koko (austere sublimity); shizen (naturalness); daisuzoku (freedom from routine); sei-jaku (tranquillity); and yūgen (profound grace). The presence of these principles in works of art is seen as reflecting and communicating insights that are central to Buddhism, such as non-attachment. Moreover, these principles do not only apply to the creation and appreciation of art, but have clear applications for treating health-related issues, and improving quality of life more generally. This paper makes the case that embodying these principles in their lives can help people enhance their psychosomatic well-being, and come to a truer understanding of the essence of mindful living

Finding the spiritual in the secular: a meta-analysis of changes in spirituality following secular mindfulness-based programs

Objectives: Spirituality has historically been a neglected aspect of people’s lives within a healthcare context. Previous meta-analyses of the effect of mindfulness-based programs (MBPs) on spirituality have been limited by the small number of includable studies that were available at the time, by not comparing MBPs to active controls, and by not investigating whether effects continue to be observed at follow-up. Therefore, the current systematic review and meta-analysis aimed to more comprehensively examine whether, and to what extent, secular MBPs increase spirituality, and to identify moderators of any observed effects. Methods: Random effects meta-analyses were conducted on 13 controlled trials of MBPs measuring spirituality that were identified by a systematic search of PsycInfo and Medline. Results: At post-intervention, MBPs increased spirituality compared to both passive and active controls (passive: g = 0.52, 95% C.I.: 0.35 to 0.68; active: g = 0.34, 95% C.I.: 0.14 to 0.54), and effects continued to be observed at follow-up (passive: g = 0.32, 95% C.I.: 0.09 to 0.55; active: g = 0.44, 95% C.I.: 0.18 to 0.71). For passive controls at post-intervention, cancer samples showed a significantly larger pooled effect than the non-cancer ones (cancer: g = 0.75, 95% C.I.: 0.52 to 0.98; non-cancer: g = 0.38, 95% C.I.: 0.20 to 0.56; χ2(1) = 6.14, p = .01), but moderation analysis was not possible at follow-up or for active controls. Study quality was not significantly associated with effect size. Conclusions: Secular MBPs appear to increase spirituality, these effects endure beyond the end of the MBP and they cannot wholly be attributed to non-specific therapeutic factors. Limitations are discussed

Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis

Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction. Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition