“We ought to eat in order to work, not vice versa”: MacIntyre, practices, and the best work for humankind.

This paper draws a distinction between ‘right MacIntyreans’ who are relatively optimistic that MacIntyre’s vision of ethics can be realised in capitalist society, and ‘left MacIntyreans’ who are sceptical about this possibility, and aims to show that the ‘left MacIntyrean’ position is a promising perspective available to business ethicists. It does so by arguing for a distinction between ‘community-focused’ practices and ‘excellence-focused’ practices. The latter concept fulfils the promise of practices to provide us with an understanding of the best work for humankind and highlights the affinities between MacIntyre’s concept of a practice and Marx’s conception of good work as free, creative activity. The paper concludes with a suggestion that we reflect on the best forms of work so that we can strive to ensure the very best activities, those most consonant with our flourishing, one day become available to all

The Real Entity Theory and the Primary Interest of the Firm: Equilibrium Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Common Good Theory

According to the entity theory, the firm is a real person interested in survival and growth quantitatively and qualitatively. However, the literature is often vague and ambiguous for what concern the conditions to achieve for the survival and growth, as well as the modalities through which find the right compromise between continuity (or long-term profitability) and social function (or sociality) of the firm. This chapter wants to contribute to the theories that consider the firm as a real entity, proposing the concept of ‘primary interest of the firm’, which includes the conditions that allow firms to survive and grow, as well as to serve the common good of their stakeholders and society. The primary interest concept is multidimensional and derives from the intersection of three theories: equilibrium theory, stakeholder theory and common good theory

Equal pay as a precondition of justice?

Equality is typically presumed to be an end of justice, however, in this chapter, we argue that it is better understood as a condition of justice. Our argument draws on the Just World Fallacy, the phenomenon of people mistakenly believing fortuitous patterns of reward or harm to be reflective of justice. This phenomenon can undermine relationships of equality even where differences in reward or harm are ostensibly deserved. If everyone received equal pay, then the propensity for people to defer to the more successful or derogate the less successful would be diminished, and thus there would be greater scope for people to enter into the sorts of relationships of equal respect and regard that just communities require