40 research outputs found
Ideational movements: Developmental patterns
Item does not contain fulltextIdeational movements involve forms of collective, self-reflective and primarily internally motivated judgment development. I show how we can reconstruct their qualitatively different developmental stages in terms of the related, successive sets of judgment criteria. Furthermore, the resulting patterns of judgment criteria can be formulated and made precisely comparable, in a logic of development. This is illustrated by analyses of the movements of French Impressionism in painting, meta-ethics in moral philosophy, and Generative grammar in linguistics. I suggest that the number of possible moves and steps in ideational movements is limited, and that there may be a basic structure common to their developmental patterns
Logic of artistic development. The case of Mondrian
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64651.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)In this article I show how we can give a formal representation and analysis of evolutions in artistic style, using the work of the painter Mondrian as an example. Capitalising on the idea that radical change in thought implies related changes in judgement criteria, we can in a ''logic of development'' specify the relations within, and between, those different sets of artistic judgement criteria that are considered typical of successive stages in artistic development. I discuss some of the problems involved in dealing with post-conventional thinking and judgement. Then I propose five major steps in Mondrian's artistic quest, showing how it is different-and how different it is-from other kinds of (e.g. moral or aesthetic) judgement development. Whereas many kinds of conceptual development lead to (various types of) criterion expansion, this form of entirely postconventional development goes in the opposite direction of a most stringent criterion reduction
Kohlberg and Freud: A reconstruction of emergent moralities
In this contribution we propose a comparative reconstruction of Kohlberg's and Freud's theories of moral development. We concentrate not on the developmental processes and their driving forces, but on the emerging conceptions of morality according to both theories. Each of the developmental stages is characterized in terms of the different sets of criteria typically constituting the changing (implicit) rationale for moral judgement and action. These criteria are represented according to the 'logic of development' published earlier in this journal (van Haaften, 1998), which makes it possible precisely to describe the relations between the criteria within and through the successive stages in both theories. We also make some suggestions about stages preceding and following those that Freud explicitly mentions. Our reconstruction may serve as a first step towards a more exact comparison, and eventually perhaps partial integration, of different theories of moral developmen