Stochastic Approximation to Understand Simple Simulation Models

This paper illustrates how a deterministic approximation of a stochastic process can be usefully applied to analyse the dynamics of many simple simulation models. To demonstrate the type of results that can be obtained using this approximation, we present two illustrative examples which are meant to serve as methodological references for researchers exploring this area. Finally, we prove some convergence results for simulations of a family of evolutionary games, namely, intra-population imitation models in n-player games with arbitrary payoffs.Ministerio de Educación (JC2009- 00263), Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010: CSD2010-00034, DPI2010-16920

Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games

This paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types.� It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium.� It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stability.Bayesian games, Monotone strategies, Index theory, Stability, Uniequeness, Regularity

Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games

Markov game, Supermodularity, Two-stage game, Linear-quadatric game, Adjustment costs, Learning curve, Network effects, C73,