Manipulable objects, affordances and action

In the presentation I will suggest that the function of concepts in presence of objects consists in activating online simulations that support interaction with objects (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997). This might be true also when concepts are mediated by words. I will also suggest that concepts are not only patterns of potential actions but are flexible and elicit different motor programs depending on the situation at hand. More specifically, I will briefly review some Artificial Life simulations showing that the visual presentation of objects incorporates motor information and potentiates the affordances associated with objects (for a brief review see Parisi, Borghi, Di Ferdinando & Tsiotas, 2005). In addition, I will describe behavioural evidence on object manipulability. I will describe experiments showing the effects of a visual prime on the processing of pictures and words referring to manipulable objects (Borghi, Bonfiglioli, Lugli, Ricciardelli, Rubichi, Nicoletti, 2005; Oggianu & Borghi, in prep.). In addition, I will report experimental evidence obtained in compatibility tasks and in property verification tasks with manipulable objects referred to by words (Borghi, 2004; Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak, 2004). This evidence suggests that concepts automatically activate motor information concerning simple interactions with their referents, as those involved in reaching and in grasping objects. However, in order to elicit a specific motor program it appears that the visual or verbal stimuli should be preceded by a motor training aimed to improve the similarity between the perceived stimuli and the performed actions (Hommel, M\ufcsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001)

Manipulable objects, affordances and action

In the presentation I will suggest that the function of concepts in presence of objects consists in activating online simulations that support interaction with objects (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997). This might be true also when concepts are mediated by words. I will also suggest that concepts are not only patterns of potential actions but are flexible and elicit different motor programs depending on the situation at hand. More specifically, I will briefly review some Artificial Life simulations showing that the visual presentation of objects incorporates motor information and potentiates the affordances associated with objects (for a brief review see Parisi, Borghi, Di Ferdinando & Tsiotas, 2005). In addition, I will describe behavioural evidence on object manipulability. I will describe experiments showing the effects of a visual prime on the processing of pictures and words referring to manipulable objects (Borghi, Bonfiglioli, Lugli, Ricciardelli, Rubichi, Nicoletti, 2005; Oggianu & Borghi, in prep.). In addition, I will report experimental evidence obtained in compatibility tasks and in property verification tasks with manipulable objects referred to by words (Borghi, 2004; Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak, 2004). This evidence suggests that concepts automatically activate motor information concerning simple interactions with their referents, as those involved in reaching and in grasping objects. However, in order to elicit a specific motor program it appears that the visual or verbal stimuli should be preceded by a motor training aimed to improve the similarity between the perceived stimuli and the performed actions (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001)

Object concepts and mental images

The paper focuses on mental imagery and concepts. First we discuss the possible reasons why the propositional view of representation was so successful among cognitive scientists interested in concepts. Then a novel perspective, the embodied view, is presented. Differently from the classic cognitivist view, this perspective acknowledges the importance of perceptual and motor imagery for concepts. According to the embodied perspective concepts are not given by propositional, abstract and amodal symbols but are grounded in sensorimotor processes. Neural and behavioral evidence favouring this perspective is presented. The paper discusses the continuity, but also the differences, between the imagery view and the embodied view of conceptual representation