The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance: Submarket Effects

Rutherford et al. (2001) develop and empirically test a model that analyzes the effect the type of listing contract, either exclusive agency (EA) or exclusive right to sell (ERTS), has on the performance of the agent/broker. This paper extends the work of Rutherford et al. (2001) and looks at differences between housing submarkets delineated by price. The results show a selling price discount associated with both broker-effected and owner-effected sales for lower-priced houses with EA contracts. For higher-priced houses, there is no price advantage to an EA-listing if the broker achieves the sale, but if the owner sells the house, there is a modest price premium associated with the sale. The primary implication of the results is that owners of lower-priced houses should be wary of alternative listing arrangements, namely exclusive agency contracts.

Mobility and Optimal Tenure Choice

Cataloged from PDF version of article.In this paper, we offer a dynamic model of the optimal tenure behavior of an individual who faces the possibility of moving multiple times during his lifetime. We also investigate the lifetime effects of such factors as income tax, property tax, transaction costs, and mortgage rates on the household's tenure choice. The agents in the model utilize a genetic algorithm, a probabilistic search approach, to determine their optimal lifetime tenure choice path. The agents are forward looking in that they anticipate such possible events as changes in jobs, marital status, household size, or dissatisfaction with current residence. Our results suggest several housing policy implications and explain some of the empirical findings in the literature. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved