The time-evolution of bias

We study the evolution of the bias factor b and the mass-galaxy correlation coefficient r in a simple analytic model for galaxy formation and the gravitational growth of clustering. The model shows that b and r can be strongly time-dependent, but tend to approach unity even if galaxy formation never ends as the gravitational growth of clustering debiases the older galaxies. The presence of random fluctuations in the sites of galaxy formation relative to the mass distribution can cause large and rapidly falling bias values at high redshift.Comment: 4 pages, with 2 figures included. Typos corrected to match published ApJL version. Color figure and links at http://www.sns.ias.edu/~max/bias.html or from [email protected]

Assortative Mixing Equilibria in Social Network Games

It is known that individuals in social networks tend to exhibit homophily (a.k.a. assortative mixing) in their social ties, which implies that they prefer bonding with others of their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon? Is it that such relations are more convenient and easier to maintain? Or are there also some more tangible benefits to be gained from this collective behaviour? The current work takes a game-theoretic perspective on this phenomenon, and studies the conditions under which different assortative mixing strategies lead to equilibrium in an evolving social network. We focus on a biased preferential attachment model where the strategy of each group (e.g., political or social minority) determines the level of bias of its members toward other group members and non-members. Our first result is that if the utility function that the group attempts to maximize is the degree centrality of the group, interpreted as the sum of degrees of the group members in the network, then the only strategy achieving Nash equilibrium is a perfect homophily, which implies that cooperation with other groups is harmful to this utility function. A second, and perhaps more surprising, result is that if a reward for inter-group cooperation is added to the utility function (e.g., externally enforced by an authority as a regulation), then there are only two possible equilibria, namely, perfect homophily or perfect heterophily, and it is possible to characterize their feasibility spaces. Interestingly, these results hold regardless of the minority-majority ratio in the population. We believe that these results, as well as the game-theoretic perspective presented herein, may contribute to a better understanding of the forces that shape the groups and communities of our society

Circulating and persistent currents induced by a current magnification and Aharonov-Casher phase

We considered the circulating current induced by the current magnification and the persistent current induced by Aharonov-Casher flux. The persistent currents have directional dependence on the direct current flow, but the circulating currents have no directional dependence. Hence in the equilibrium, only the persistent current can survives on the ring. For the charge current, the persistent charge current cancelled between spin up and down states, because of the time reversal symmetry of the Hamiltonian on the ring. So there are only circulating charge currents on the ring for electrons with unpolarized spin in the nonequilibrium. However, only the persistent spin currents contributes to the spin currents for electrons with unpolarized spin.Comment: 9 pages and 4 ps figure