Time averages, recurrence and transience in the stochastic replicator dynamics

We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and Nash equilibria of a suitably modified game. Furthermore, a sufficient condition for transience is given in terms of mixed equilibria and definiteness of the payoff matrix. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic stability of pure equilibria.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP577 the Annals of Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Mobility and asymmetry effects in one-dimensional rock-paper-scissors games

As the behavior of a system composed of cyclically competing species is strongly influenced by the presence of fluctuations, it is of interest to study cyclic dominance in low dimensions where these effects are the most prominent. We here discuss rock-paper-scissors games on a one-dimensional lattice where the interaction rates and the mobility can be species dependent. Allowing only single site occupation, we realize mobility by exchanging individuals of different species. When the interaction and swapping rates are symmetric, a strongly enhanced swapping rate yields an increased mixing of the species, leading to a mean-field like coexistence even in one-dimensional systems. This coexistence is transient when the rates are asymmetric, and eventually only one species will survive. Interestingly, in our spatial games the dominating species can differ from the species that would dominate in the corresponding nonspatial model. We identify different regimes in the parameter space and construct the corresponding dynamical phase diagram.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures, to appear in Physical Review

Enhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks

We study the effect of clustering on the organization of cooperation, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma on scale-free networks with a tunable value of clustering. We find that a high value of the clustering coefficient produces an overall enhancement of cooperation in the network, even for a very high temptation to defect. On the other hand, high clustering homogeneizes the process of invasion of degree classes by defectors, decreasing the chances of survival of low densities of cooperator strategists in the network.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure

Panama "Barro Blancho" case report

The case study report presents the results of the Barro Blanco case study by combining and elaborating on information and data collected during a pre-study report and data and insights gathered during field research. It analyzes the case study according to international human rights standards and applicable institutional safeguards. It also investigates to which extent public owners/shareholders of development banks can be heal responsible for the implementation of climate projects

The Dynamics of Asymmetric Games

A game dynamical analysis of a simple asymmetric game (two roles with two alternatives each) shows that an interesting class of "semi-stable" heteroclinic cycles leading to a highly unpredictable behavior can occur in a robust way. Biological examples related to conflicts over ownership and parental investment are analyzed

Resonance bifurcations from robust homoclinic cycles

We present two calculations for a class of robust homoclinic cycles with symmetry Z_n x Z_2^n, for which the sufficient conditions for asymptotic stability given by Krupa and Melbourne are not optimal. Firstly, we compute optimal conditions for asymptotic stability using transition matrix techniques which make explicit use of the geometry of the group action. Secondly, through an explicit computation of the global parts of the Poincare map near the cycle we show that, generically, the resonance bifurcations from the cycles are supercritical: a unique branch of asymptotically stable period orbits emerges from the resonance bifurcation and exists for coefficient values where the cycle has lost stability. This calculation is the first to explicitly compute the criticality of a resonance bifurcation, and answers a conjecture of Field and Swift in a particular limiting case. Moreover, we are able to obtain an asymptotically-correct analytic expression for the period of the bifurcating orbit, with no adjustable parameters, which has not proved possible previously. We show that the asymptotic analysis compares very favourably with numerical results.Comment: 24 pages, 3 figures, submitted to Nonlinearit

Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive $w$ players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative $w$ the opposite holds. Setting $w$ equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e. setting $w$ positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of $w$ facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of $w$ effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation

We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players $\mu$ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In addition, players characterized with the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant opponents of the same kind with probability $p$, thus introducing shortcut connections among the distinguished. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to sustain cooperation throughout the whole range of the temptation to defect. Remarkably, we observe that as the temptation to defect increases the optimal $\mu$ decreases, and moreover, only minute values of $p$ warrant the best promotion of cooperation. Our study thus indicates that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a defection prone environment.Comment: 6 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games

We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.Comment: 5 two-column pages, 3 figure