THE WAIT-AND-SEE OPTION IN ASCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS

Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An important notion of fairness is envy-freeness: No player wishes to switch the portion of the cake received with another player's portion. Despite intense efforts in the past, it is still an open question whether there is a \emph{finite bounded} envy-free cake-cutting protocol for an arbitrary number of players, and even for four players. We introduce the notion of degree of guaranteed envy-freeness (DGEF) as a measure of how good a cake-cutting protocol can approximate the ideal of envy-freeness while keeping the protocol finite bounded (trading being disregarded). We propose a new finite bounded proportional protocol for any number n \geq 3 of players, and show that this protocol has a DGEF of 1 + \lceil (n^2)/2 \rceil. This is the currently best DGEF among known finite bounded cake-cutting protocols for an arbitrary number of players. We will make the case that improving the DGEF even further is a tough challenge, and determine, for comparison, the DGEF of selected known finite bounded cake-cutting protocols.Comment: 37 pages, 4 figure

Multiagent Negotiation for Fair and Unbiased Resource Allocation

This paper proposes a novel solution for the n agent cake cutting (resource allocation) problem. We propose a negotiation protocol for dividing a resource among n agents and then provide an algorithm for allotting portions of the resource. We prove that this protocol can enable distribution of the resource among n agents in a fair manner. The protocol enables agents to choose portions based on their internal utility function, which they do not have to reveal. In addition to being fair, the protocol has desirable features such as being unbiased and verifiable while allocating resources. In the case where the resource is two-dimensional (a circular cake) and uniform, it is shown that each agent can get close to l/n of the whole resource

A Discrete and Bounded Envy-free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer science, mathematics, and economics. Although, the elegant Selfridge-Conway envy-free protocol for three agents has been known since 1960, it has been a major open problem for the last fifty years to obtain a bounded envy-free protocol for more than three agents. We propose a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for four agents

Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations

We study the problem of computing maximin share allocations, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of n agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of an agent is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she is allowed to partition the goods in any way she prefers, into n bundles, and then receive her least desirable bundle. The objective then is to find a partition, where each agent is guaranteed her maximin share. Such allocations do not always exist, hence we resort to approximation algorithms. Our main result is a 2/3-approximation that runs in polynomial time for any number of agents and goods. This improves upon the algorithm of Procaccia and Wang (2014), which is also a 2/3-approximation but runs in polynomial time only for a constant number of agents. To achieve this, we redesign certain parts of the algorithm in Procaccia and Wang (2014), exploiting the construction of carefully selected matchings in a bipartite graph representation of the problem. Furthermore, motivated by the apparent difficulty in establishing lower bounds, we undertake a probabilistic analysis. We prove that in randomly generated instances, maximin share allocations exist with high probability. This can be seen as a justification of previously reported experimental evidence. Finally, we provide further positive results for two special cases arising from previous works. The first is the intriguing case of three agents, where we provide an improved 7/8-approximation. The second case is when all item values belong to {0, 1, 2}, where we obtain an exact algorith

Knaster's problem for (Z2)k(Z_2)^k-symmetric subsets of the sphere S2k−1S^{2^k-1}

We prove a Knaster-type result for orbits of the group $(Z_2)^k$ in $S^{2^k-1}$, calculating the Euler class obstruction. Among the consequences are: a result about inscribing skew crosspolytopes in hypersurfaces in $\mathbb R^{2^k}$, and a result about equipartition of a measures in $\mathbb R^{2^k}$ by $(Z_2)^{k+1}$-symmetric convex fans

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with additive valuation functions and our purpose is twofold. First, our main result provides a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to the players. Our characterization reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthful mechanisms, showing that they can be decomposed into two components: a selection part where players pick their best subset among prespecified choices determined by the mechanism, and an exchange part where players are offered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. In the remaining paper, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mechanisms with fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness, (indicatively, maximin share guarantees and envy-freeness up to one item) and provide tight bounds for their approximability. Our work settles some of the open problems in this agenda, and we conclude by discussing possible extensions to more players.Comment: To appear in the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC '17

The Role of Pressure in Inverse Design for Assembly

Isotropic pairwise interactions that promote the self assembly of complex particle morphologies have been discovered by inverse design strategies derived from the molecular coarse-graining literature. While such approaches provide an avenue to reproduce structural correlations, thermodynamic quantities such as the pressure have typically not been considered in self-assembly applications. In this work, we demonstrate that relative entropy optimization can be used to discover potentials that self-assemble into targeted cluster morphologies with a prescribed pressure when the iterative simulations are performed in the isothermal-isobaric ensemble. By tuning the pressure in the optimization, we generate a family of simple pair potentials that all self-assemble the same structure. Selecting an appropriate simulation ensemble to control the thermodynamic properties of interest is a general design strategy that could also be used to discover interaction potentials that self-assemble structures having, for example, a specified chemical potential.Comment: 29 pages, 8 figure

The Fairness Challenge in Computer Networks

In this paper, the concept of fairness in computer networks is investigated. We motivate the need of examining fairness issues by providing example future application scenarios where fairness support is needed in order to experience sufficient service quality. Fairness definitions from political science and their application to computer networks are described and a state-of-the-art overview of research activities in fairness, from issues such a queue management and tcp-friendliness to issues like fairness in layered multi-rate multicast scenarios, is given. We contribute with this paper to the ongoing research activities by defining the fairness challenge with the purpose of helping direct future investigations to with spots on the map of research in fairness

Data Mining and Machine Learning in Astronomy

We review the current state of data mining and machine learning in astronomy. 'Data Mining' can have a somewhat mixed connotation from the point of view of a researcher in this field. If used correctly, it can be a powerful approach, holding the potential to fully exploit the exponentially increasing amount of available data, promising great scientific advance. However, if misused, it can be little more than the black-box application of complex computing algorithms that may give little physical insight, and provide questionable results. Here, we give an overview of the entire data mining process, from data collection through to the interpretation of results. We cover common machine learning algorithms, such as artificial neural networks and support vector machines, applications from a broad range of astronomy, emphasizing those where data mining techniques directly resulted in improved science, and important current and future directions, including probability density functions, parallel algorithms, petascale computing, and the time domain. We conclude that, so long as one carefully selects an appropriate algorithm, and is guided by the astronomical problem at hand, data mining can be very much the powerful tool, and not the questionable black box.Comment: Published in IJMPD. 61 pages, uses ws-ijmpd.cls. Several extra figures, some minor additions to the tex