An Analytical Study of Coupled Two-State Stochastic Resonators

The two-state model of stochastic resonance is extended to a chain of coupled two-state elements governed by the dynamics of Glauber's stochastic Ising model. Appropriate assumptions on the model parameters turn the chain into a prototype system of coupled stochastic resonators. In a weak-signal limit analytical expressions are derived for the spectral power amplification and the signal-to-noise ratio of a two-state element embedded into the chain. The effect of the coupling between the elements on both quantities is analysed and array-enhanced stochastic resonance is established for pure as well as noisy periodic signals. The coupling-induced improvement of the SNR compared to an uncoupled element is shown to be limited by a factor four which is only reached for vanishing input noise.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figure

Partisan Views of the Economy

In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on. We show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences. There is no inherent logic that places monetarists to the right of New Economists. They have different models of economic mechanism, but they need not have different political values. A conservative can be a Keynesian and a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact surprisingly rare. James Tobin, 1974,The New Economics One Decade Older, p. 62. I am greatly indebted to Peter Broer, Ben Heydra, Jos Jansen and Wilko Letterie for many helpful suggestions. Furthermore, I would like to thank an anonymous referee for his comments

Self-interest And Public Interest: The Motivations Of Political Actors

Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics showed that the public, politicians, and bureaucrats are often public spirited. But this does not invalidate public-choice theory. Public-choice theory is an ideal type, not a claim that self-interest explains all political behavior. Instead, public-choice theory is useful in creating rules and institutions that guard against the worst case, which would be universal self-interestedness in politics. In contrast, the public-interest hypothesis is neither a comprehensive explanation of political behavior nor a sound basis for institutional design

Popularity functions, partisan effects, and support in parliament

This paper analyzes the popularity of the main political entities in Portugal. Estimation results of popularity functions validate the responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment, and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting popularity levels. There is also evidence of personality effects, of popularity erosion over consecutive terms and of honeymoon effects. Finally, we found that voters' evaluations of incumbents' performance regarding unemployment is affected by their support in Parliament when an incumbent faces more opposition in Parliament, voters are less likely to hold him responsible for unemployment increases.(undefined

Cliophysics: Socio-political Reliability Theory, Polity Duration and African Political (In)stabilities

Quantification of historical sociological processes have recently gained attention among theoreticians in the effort of providing a solid theoretical understanding of the behaviors and regularities present in sociopolitical dynamics. Here we present a reliability theory of polity processes with emphases on individual political dynamics of African countries. We found that the structural properties of polity failure rates successfully capture the risk of political vulnerability and instabilities in which 87.50%, 75%, 71.43%, and 0% of the countries with monotonically increasing, unimodal, U-shaped and monotonically decreasing polity failure rates, respectively, have high level of state fragility indices. The quasi-U-shape relationship between average polity duration and regime types corroborates historical precedents and explains the stability of the autocracies and democracies.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl