Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls

Since the famous Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 transfer fees for football players after moving to another club have become suspect as they are considered as an obstacle to the free movement of workers. However, in an unrestricted market free migration from football players will be Pareto efficient under special circumstances only. This paper shows that transfer fees can correct inefficient migration flows from small to large football leagues. Home-grown rules that prescribe that a certain proportion of the roster of players should be trained within the club are very blunt devices for restoring efficiency, and perform worse than transfer fee systems.football transfers, migration equilibrium, social welfare

Inequality, trust and growth: An experimental study

In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow.In each period, players choose to sabotage, to co-operate, or to play best response.Sabotage harms social output and growth.Mutual co-operation maximises both.The property rights to social output are distributed unequally.Extent and skew of inequality are varied. Empirical studies indicate a negative impact of inequality on trust and growth. We observe equilibrium play in most cases.There is also substantial co-operation, but little sabotage.Our exogenous variations of inequality are neutral to growth, neither negatively correlated to co-operation, nor positively correlated to sabotage.public goods;game theory

Too Many Migrants, Too Few Services: A Model of Decision-making on Immigration and Integration with Cultural Distance

In this paper we model the demand for immigrants as a trade-off native voters face between having services, produced by unskilled and non-assimilated immigrants, and experiencing disutility due to the immigrant workers having a culture different from the native culture. Immigrants decide whether to integrate into the native culture. If they don’t, they produce services. Assimilated immigrants take on skilled jobs. At the political level natives choose the number of immigrants that can be allowed, given some fixed price for services. We show that, at the assumed price, it is never optimal for natives to have equilibrium or unemployment in the service sector. Market forces then lead to higher service prices, implying that the initially allowed number of immigrants is too large.

Do Permit Allocations Matter?

In the standard setting a system of tradable permits is effective and cost-efficient in attaining the policy objective of pollution reduction. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal system/constitution with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, under various institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.tradable permits, fiscal federalism

Tradable Emission Permits in a Federal System

A system of tradable permits in the standard setting is effective in attaining the policy objective with regard to pollution reduction at the least cost. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal state with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of the system, under different institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.tradable permits, trade bans, fiscal federalism

Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth

A new line of theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the pivotal role of fair institutions for growth.We present a model, a laboratory experiment, and a simple cross-country regression supporting this view.We model an economy with an unequal distribution of property rights, in which individuals can free-ride or cooperate.Experimentally we observe a dramatic drop in cooperation (and growth), when inequality is increased by a selfserving dictator.No such effect is observed when the inequality is increased by a fair procedure.Our regression analysis provides basic macroeconomic support for the adverse growth effect of the interaction between the degree and the genesis of inequality.We conclude that economies giving equal opportunities to all are not likely to suffer retarded growth due to inequality in the way economies with self-serving dictators will.economic growth;inequality;corruption;public goods

Tradable emission permits in a federal system

A system of tradable permits in the standard setting is effective in attaining the policy objective with regard to pollution reduction at the least cost. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal state with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of the system, under different institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permitstradable permits, trade bans, fiscal federalism.

The International Spillover Effects of Pension Reform

This paper explores how pension reforms in countries with PAYG schemes affect countries with funded systems. We use a two-country two-period overlapping-generations model, where the countries only differ in their pension systems. We distinguish between the case where a reform potentially leads to a Pareto improvement in the PAYG country, and where this is impossible. In the latter case the funded country shares both in the costs and the benefits of the reform. However, if a Pareto-improving pension reform is feasible in the PAYG country, a Pareto improvement in the funded country is not guaranteed.international spillover effects, pension reform

Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth

A new line of theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the pivotal role of fair institutions for growth. We present a model, a laboratory experiment, and a simple cross-country regression supporting this view. We model an economy with an unequal distribution of property rights, in which individuals can free-ride or cooperate. Experimentally we observe a dramatic drop in cooperation (and growth), when inequality is increased by a selfserving dictator. No such effect is observed when the inequality is increased by a fair procedure. Our regression analysis provides basic macroeconomic support for the adverse growth effect of the interaction between the degree and the genesis of inequality. We conclude that economies giving equal opportunities to all are not likely to suffer retarded growth due to inequality in the way economies with self-serving dictators will.inequality, corruption, weak institutions, growth, intentions, dynamic public goods

Antibiotica: wondermiddel of total loss?

Rede, In verkorte vorm uitgesproken ter gelegenheid van het aanvaarden van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar met als leeropdracht Inwendige geneeskunde in het bijzonder infectieziekten aan het Erasmus MC, faculteit van de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op 21 september 201