Incentives for Quality through Endogenous Routing

We study how rework routing together with wage and piece rate compensation can strengthen incentives for quality. Traditionally, rework is assigned back to the agent who generates the defect (in a self routing scheme) or to another agent dedicated to rework (in a dedicated routing scheme). In contrast, a novel cross routing scheme allocates rework to a parallel agent performing both new jobs and rework. The agent who passes quality inspection or completes rework receives the piece rate paid per job. We compare the incentives of these rework allocation schemes in a principal-agent model with embedded quality control and routing in a multi-class queueing network. We show that conventional self routing of rework can never induce first-best effort. Dedicated routing and cross routing, however, strengthen incentives for quality by imposing an implicit punishment for quality failure. In addition, cross routing leads to workload allocation externalities and a prisoner’s dilemma, thereby creating highest incentives for quality. Firm profitability depends on capacity levels, revenues, and quality costs. With ample capacity, dedicated routing and cross routing both achieve first-best profit rate, while self routing does not. With limited capacity, cross routing generates the highest profit rate when appraisal, internal failure, or external failure costs are high, while self routing performs best when gross margins are high. When the number of agents increases, the incentive power of cross routing reduces monotonically and approaches that of dedicated routing.queueing networks; routing; Nash equilibrium; quality control; piece rate; epsilon equilibrium.

Analytic solution of Markovian epidemics without re-infections on heterogeneous networks

Most epidemic processes on networks can be modelled by a compartmental model, that specifies the spread of a disease in a population. The corresponding compartmental graph describes how the viral state of the nodes (individuals) changes from one compartment to another. If the compartmental graph does not contain directed cycles (e.g. the famous SIR model satisfies this property), then we provide an analytic, closed-form solution of the continuous-time Markovian compartmental model on heterogeneous networks. The eigenvalues of the Markovian process are related to cut sets in the contact graph between nodes with different viral states. We illustrate our finding by analytically solving the continuous-time Markovian SI and SIR processes on heterogeneous networks. We show that analytic extensions to e.g. non-Markovian dynamics, temporal networks, simplicial contagion and more advanced compartmental models are possible. Our exact and explicit formula contains sums over all paths between two states in the SIR Markov graph, which prevents the computation of the exact solution for arbitrary large graphs.Comment: 33 pages, 26 figure

Incentives for quality through endogenous routing / Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu; Jan A. Van

We study how rework routing together with wage and piece rate compensation can strengthen incentives for quality. Traditionally, rework is assigned back to the agent who generates the defect (in a self routing scheme) or to another agent dedicated to rework (in a dedicated routing scheme). In contrast, a novel cross routing scheme allocates rework to a parallel agent performing both new jobs and rework. The agent who passes quality inspection or completes rework receives the piece rate paid per job. We compare the incentives of these rework allocation schemes in a principal-agent model with embedded quality control and routing in a multi-class queueing network. We show that conventional self routing of rework can never induce first-best effort. Dedicated routing and cross routing, however, strengthen incentives for quality by imposing an implicit punishment for quality failure. In addition, cross routing leads to workload allocation externalities and a prisoner’s dilemma, thereby creating highest incentives for quality. Firm profitability depends on capacity levels, revenues, and quality costs. With ample capacity, dedicated routing and cross routing both achieve first-best profit rate, while self routing does not. With limited capacity, cross routing generates the highest profit rate when appraisal, internal failure, or external failure costs are high, while self routing performs best when gross margins are high. When the number of agents increases, the incentive power of cross routing reduces monotonically and approaches that of dedicated routing

Effective graph resistance

AbstractThis paper studies an interesting graph measure that we call the effective graph resistance. The notion of effective graph resistance is derived from the field of electric circuit analysis where it is defined as the accumulated effective resistance between all pairs of vertices. The objective of the paper is twofold. First, we survey known formulae of the effective graph resistance and derive other representations as well. The derivation of new expressions is based on the analysis of the associated random walk on the graph and applies tools from Markov chain theory. This approach results in a new method to approximate the effective graph resistance. A second objective of this paper concerns the optimisation of the effective graph resistance for graphs with given number of vertices and diameter, and for optimal edge addition. A set of analytical results is described, as well as results obtained by exhaustive search. One of the foremost applications of the effective graph resistance we have in mind, is the analysis of robustness-related problems. However, with our discussion of this informative graph measure we hope to open up a wealth of possibilities of applying the effective graph resistance to all kinds of networks problems