Global three-parameter model for neutrino oscillations using Lorentz violation

A model of neutrino oscillations is presented that has only three degrees of freedom and is consistent with existing data. The model is a subset of the renormalizable sector of the Standard-Model Extension (SME), and it offers an alternative to the standard three-neutrino massive model. All classes of neutrino data are described, including solar, reactor, atmospheric, and LSND oscillations. The disappearance of solar neutrinos is obtained without matter-enhanced oscillations. Quantitative predictions are offered for the ongoing MiniBooNE experiment and for the future experiments OscSNS, NOvA, and T2K.Comment: 12 pages REVTe

Tests of Lorentz violation in muon antineutrino to electron antineutrino oscillations

A recently developed Standard-Model Extension (SME) formalism for neutrino oscillations that includes Lorentz and CPT violation is used to analyze the sidereal time variation of the neutrino event excess measured by the Liquid Scintillator Neutrino Detector (LSND) experiment. The LSND experiment, performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory, observed an excess, consistent with neutrino oscillations, of ${\bar\nu}_e$ in a beam of ${\bar\nu}_\mu$. It is determined that the LSND oscillation signal is consistent with no sidereal variation. However, there are several combinations of SME coefficients that describe the LSND data; both with and without sidereal variations. The scale of Lorentz and CPT violation extracted from the LSND data is of order $10^{-19}$ GeV for the SME coefficients $a_L$ and $E \times c_L$. This solution for Lorentz and CPT violating neutrino oscillations may be tested by other short baseline neutrino oscillation experiments, such as the MiniBooNE experiment.Comment: 10 pages, 10 figures, 2 tables, uses revtex4 replaced with version to be published in Physical Review D, 11 pages, 11 figures, 2 tables, uses revtex

Examination of criticality accident alarm coverage on the operating floors of Buildings X-333, X-330, and X-326 at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Revision 1

The diffusion cascade processing equipment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) is located in Buildings X-333, X-330, and X-326. These buildings were referred to as the cascade buildings. Because enriched uranium operations are performed within the cascade buildings, the potential for a criticality accident in these buildings exists. A Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is in place to alarm in the event of a criticality accident. The CAAS is required to be designed to immediately detect the minimum accident-of-concern. A minimum accident-of-concern in an area with nominal shielding delivers the equivalent of an absorbed dose rate in free air of 20 rads per minute at a distance of 2 meters from the reacting material [Am86]. This report summarizes the analysis that was performed to evaluate the CAAS response to selected minimum accidents-of-concern on the operating floor of the cascade buildings. Selection of potential accident locations was based, in part, on the maximum distance to the closest CAAS detector. The other factor in selecting potential accident locations for analysis was the amount of intervening shielding between the accident location and CAAS detector. If the CAAS was predicted to alarm under conditions of significant shielding, then the system presumably would alarm in response to all accidents greater than the minimum accident-of-concern, at closer distances, and with less shielding

Determination of the response function for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant criticality accident alarm system neutron detectors

Neutron-sensitive radiation detectors are used in the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant`s (PORTS) criticality accident alarm system (CAAS). The CAAS is composed of numerous detectors, electronics, and logic units. It uses a telemetry system to sound building evacuation horns and to provide remote alarm status in a central control facility. The ANSI Standard for a CAAS uses a free-in-air dose rate to define the detection criteria for a minimum accident-of-concern. Previously, the free-in-air absorbed dose rate from neutrons was used for determining the areal coverge of criticality detection within PORTS buildings handling fissile materials. However, the free-in-air dose rate does not accurately reflect the response of the neutron detectors in use at PORTS. Because the cost of placing additional CAAS detectors in areas of questionable coverage (based on a free-in-air absorbed dose rate) is high, the actual response function for the CAAS neutron detectors was determined. This report, which is organized into three major sections, discusses how the actual response function for the PORTS CAAS neutron detectors was determined. The CAAS neutron detectors are described in Section 2. The model of the detector system developed to facilitate calculation of the response function is discussed in Section 3. The results of the calculations, including confirmatory measurements with neutron sources, are given in Section 4

Search for π0→νμνˉμ\pi^0 \to \nu_{\mu}\bar\nu_{\mu} Decay in LSND

We observe a net beam-excess of $8.7 \pm 6.3$ (stat) $\pm 2.4$ (syst) events, above 160 MeV, resulting from the charged-current reaction of $\nu_{\mu}$ and/or $\bar\nu_{\mu}$ on C and H in the LSND detector. No beam related muon background is expected in this energy regime. Within an analysis framework of $\pi^0 \to \nu_{\mu}\bar\nu_{\mu}$, we set a direct upper limit for this branching ratio of $\Gamma(\pi^0 \to \nu_\mu \bar\nu_\mu) / \Gamma(\pi^0 \to all) < 1.6 \times 10^{-6}$ at 90% confidence level.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure