57 research outputs found
A formação acadĂȘmica e a ciĂȘncia: ampliando o debate sobre o mestrado profissional
Achieving Subsidiary Integration in International Innovation by Managerial âToolsâ
Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Strong Reciprocity theorists claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms that eliminate incentives to free ride, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. There is little doubt that costly punishment raises cooperation in laboratory conditions. Its efficacy in the field however is controversial. I distinguish two interpretations of experimental results, and show that the wide interpretation endorsed by Strong Reciprocity theorists is unsupported by ethnographic evidence on decentralised punishment and by historical evidence on common pool institutions. The institutions that spontaneously evolve to solve dilemmas of cooperation typically exploit low-cost mechanisms, turning finite games into indefinitely repeated ones and eliminating the cost of sanctioning
Educational leadership and global crises; reimagining planetary futures through social practice
Modes of power and the re-conceptualization of elites
The idea of the elite having a legitimate usage in sociological research is discussed
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