Study of Hg vacancies in (Hg,Cd)Te after THM growth and post-growth annealing by positron annihilation

Positron lifetime measurements have been performed to study vacancy defects in Hg0.78Cd0.22Te. Post-growth annealing under various Hg vapour pressure conditions have been used to create a well-defined number of Hg vacancies. The sensitivity range of the positron annihilation method was found to be 1015 < cHgvac<1018 cm-3. The obtained experience has been used to investigate THM-grown single crystals. The measured longitudinal and radial dependence of the vacancy concentration can be explained by the temperature profile in the grown (Hg,Cd)Te ingots

Study of Hg vacancies in (Hg,Cd)Te after THM growth and post-growth annealing by positron annihilation

Positron lifetime measurements have been performed to study vacancy defects in Hg0.78Cd0.22Te. Post-growth annealing under various Hg vapour pressure conditions have been used to create a well-defined number of Hg vacancies. The sensitivity range of the positron annihilation method was found to be 1015 < cHgvac<1018 cm-3. The obtained experience has been used to investigate THM-grown single crystals. The measured longitudinal and radial dependence of the vacancy concentration can be explained by the temperature profile in the grown (Hg,Cd)Te ingots

Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?

We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975-2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in established OECD democracies nor in other months. The effect is larger in democracies with many poor and uneducated voters, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and in East-Asia and the Pacific. We argue that the election month monetary expansion is related to systemic vote buying which requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before elections. The finely timed increase in M1 is consistent with this; is inconsistent with a monetary cycle aimed at creating an election time boom; and it cannot be, fully, accounted for by alternative explanations

Fostering support for non-democratic rule? Controlled political liberalization and popular support for non-democratic regimes

When the Cold War ended, many non-democratic regimes across the globe embarked on a course of controlled political liberalization, hoping to stabilize their autocratic rule by mitigating popular demands for democratization and increasing regime legitimacy. But does this strategy actually work? This article uses multi-level analyses to examine how the degree of political liberalization affects regime support in non-democratic political systems and to ascertain which mechanisms underlie this effect. Drawing on aggregate measures of political liberalization and comparative survey data from four regional survey projects and 31 non-democracies, the study's results indicate that the degree of liberalization has no decisively positive effect on regime support, suggesting controlled political liberalization might not be an effective legitimizing strategy after all.Nach Ende des Kalten Krieges haben viele nicht-demokratische Regime weltweit einen Kurs der begrenzten politischen Öffnung eingeschlagen, um öffentliche Forderungen nach Demokratisierung zu entschärfen und auf diese Weise die Legitimität ihrer autokratischen Herrschaft zu erhöhen. Doch ist diese Strategie tatsächlich effektiv? Der Beitrag verwendet Mehrebenenanalysen, um zu untersuchen wie der Grad an politischer Öffnung die Regimerunterstützung in nicht-demokratischen politischen Systemen beeinflusst. Auf Basis von Aggregatmaßen zur politischen Öffnung und Individualdaten aus vier regionalen Umfrageprojekten und 31 Autokratien kann kein klarer positiver Effekt des Grads der politischen Öffnung auf die Regimeunterstützung nachgewiesen werden, was eine begrenzte politische Öffnung als wenig effektive Legitimationsstrategie erscheinen lässt