The evolution of altruism

Ever since Darwin published On The Origin of Species in 1859, the evolution of altruism has been a perennial paradox for evolutionary biologists. In this review, I will discuss three evolutionary paths to altruism – genetic relatedness, reciprocity, and group selection – and examine very recent work that uses social network modeling to help us better understand the evolution of altruism

Human Nonindependent Mate Choice: Is Model Female Attractiveness Everything?

Following two decades of research on non-human animals, there has recently been increased interest in human nonindependent mate choice, namely the ways in which choosing women incorporate information about a man's past or present romantic partners ('model females') into their own assessment of the male. Experimental studies using static facial images have generally found that men receive higher desirability ratings from female raters when presented with attractive (compared to unattractive) model females. This phenomenon has a straightforward evolutionary explanation: the fact that female mate value is more dependent on physical attractiveness compared to male mate value. Furthermore, due to assortative mating for attractiveness, men who are paired with attractive women are more likely to be of high mate value themselves. Here, we also examine the possible relevance of model female cues other than attractiveness (personality and behavioral traits) by presenting video recordings of model females to a set of female raters. The results confirm that the model female's attractiveness is the primary cue. Contrary to some earlier findings in the human and nonhuman literature, we found no evidence that female raters prefer partners of slightly older model females. We conclude by suggesting some promising variations on the present experimental design

Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure

We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures; added figures and revised tex

Synchronization in Complex Systems Following the Decision Based Queuing Process: The Rhythmic Applause as a Test Case

Living communities can be considered as complex systems, thus a fertile ground for studies related to their statistics and dynamics. In this study we revisit the case of the rhythmic applause by utilizing the model proposed by V\'azquez et al. [A. V\'azquez et al., Phys. Rev. E 73, 036127 (2006)] augmented with two contradicted {\it driving forces}, namely: {\it Individuality} and {\it Companionship}. To that extend, after performing computer simulations with a large number of oscillators we propose an explanation on the following open questions (a) why synchronization occurs suddenly, and b) why synchronization is observed when the clapping period ($T_c$) is $1.5 \cdot T_s < T_c < 2.0 \cdot T_s$ ($T_s$ is the mean self period of the spectators) and is lost after a time. Moreover, based on the model, a weak preferential attachment principle is proposed which can produce complex networks obeying power law in the distribution of number edges per node with exponent greater than 3.Comment: 16 pages, 5 figure

Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games

Cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies represents a most intriguing puzzle to scientists in various disciplines. Here we present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to rock--scissors--paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies cooperate, defect and loner i.e. those unwilling to participate in the public enterprise. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatio-temporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two- and three-strategy states which are either in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior and enables cooperators to persist at substantial levels.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figure

Adaptation and enslavement in endosymbiont-host associations

The evolutionary persistence of symbiotic associations is a puzzle. Adaptation should eliminate cooperative traits if it is possible to enjoy the advantages of cooperation without reciprocating - a facet of cooperation known in game theory as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Despite this barrier, symbioses are widespread, and may have been necessary for the evolution of complex life. The discovery of strategies such as tit-for-tat has been presented as a general solution to the problem of cooperation. However, this only holds for within-species cooperation, where a single strategy will come to dominate the population. In a symbiotic association each species may have a different strategy, and the theoretical analysis of the single species problem is no guide to the outcome. We present basic analysis of two-species cooperation and show that a species with a fast adaptation rate is enslaved by a slowly evolving one. Paradoxically, the rapidly evolving species becomes highly cooperative, whereas the slowly evolving one gives little in return. This helps understand the occurrence of endosymbioses where the host benefits, but the symbionts appear to gain little from the association.Comment: v2: Correction made to equations 5 & 6 v3: Revised version accepted in Phys. Rev. E; New figure adde

Chaos and crises in a model for cooperative hunting: A symbolic dynamics approach

In this work we investigate the population dynamics of cooperative hunting extending the McCann and Yodzis model for a three-species food chain system with a predator, a prey, and a resource species. The new model considers that a given fraction sigma of predators cooperates in prey's hunting, while the rest of the population 1-sigma hunts without cooperation. We use the theory of symbolic dynamics to study the topological entropy and the parameter space ordering of the kneading sequences associated with one-dimensional maps that reproduce significant aspects of the dynamics of the species under several degrees of cooperative hunting. Our model also allows us to investigate the so-called deterministic extinction via chaotic crisis and transient chaos in the framework of cooperative hunting. The symbolic sequences allow us to identify a critical boundary in the parameter spaces (K, C-0) and (K, sigma) which separates two scenarios: (i) all-species coexistence and (ii) predator's extinction via chaotic crisis. We show that the crisis value of the carrying capacity K-c decreases at increasing sigma, indicating that predator's populations with high degree of cooperative hunting are more sensitive to the chaotic crises. We also show that the control method of Dhamala and Lai [Phys. Rev. E 59, 1646 (1999)] can sustain the chaotic behavior after the crisis for systems with cooperative hunting. We finally analyze and quantify the inner structure of the target regions obtained with this control method for wider parameter values beyond the crisis, showing a power law dependence of the extinction transients on such critical parameters

Cooperation and the evolution of intelligence

The high levels of intelligence seen in humans, other primates, certain cetaceans and birds remain a major puzzle for evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. It has long been held that social interactions provide the selection pressures necessary for the evolution of advanced cognitive abilities (the ‘social intelligence hypothesis’), and in recent years decision-making in the context of cooperative social interactions has been conjectured to be of particular importance. Here we use an artificial neural network model to show that selection for efficient decision-making in cooperative dilemmas can give rise to selection pressures for greater cognitive abilities, and that intelligent strategies can themselves select for greater intelligence, leading to a Machiavellian arms race. Our results provide mechanistic support for the social intelligence hypothesis, highlight the potential importance of cooperative behaviour in the evolution of intelligence and may help us to explain the distribution of cooperation with intelligence across taxa

Comparative Approaches to Studying Strategy: Towards an Evolutionary Account of Primate Decision Making

How do primates, humans included, deal with novel problems that arise in interactions with other group members? Despite much research regarding how animals and humans solve social problems, few studies have utilized comparable procedures, outcomes, or measures across different species. Thus, it is difficult to piece together the evolution of decision making, including the roots from which human economic decision making emerged. Recently, a comparative body of decision making research has emerged, relying largely on the methodology of experimental economics in order to address these questions in a cross-species fashion. Experimental economics is an ideal method of inquiry for this approach. It is a well-developed method for distilling complex decision making involving multiple conspecifics whose decisions are contingent upon one another into a series of simple decision choices. This allows these decisions to be compared across species and contexts. In particular, our group has used this approach to investigate coordination in New World monkeys, Old World monkeys, and great apes (including humans), using identical methods. We find that in some cases there are remarkable continuities of outcome, as when some pairs in all species solved a coordination game, the Assurance game. On the other hand, we also find that these similarities in outcomes are likely driven by differences in underlying cognitive mechanisms. New World monkeys required exogenous information about their partners’ choices in order to solve the task, indicating that they were using a matching strategy. Old World monkeys, on the other hand, solved the task without exogenous cues, leading to investigations into what mechanisms may be underpinning their responses (e.g., reward maximization, strategy formation, etc.). Great apes showed a strong experience effect, with cognitively enriched apes following what appears to be a strategy. Finally, humans were able to solve the task with or without exogenous cues. However, when given the chance to do so, they incorporated an additional mechanism unavailable to the other primates - language - to coordinate outcomes with their partner. We discuss how these results inform not only comparative psychology, but also evolutionary psychology, as they provide an understanding of the evolution of human economic behavior, and the evolution of decision making more broadly

Live to cheat another day: bacterial dormancy facilitates the social exploitation of beta-lactamases

The breakdown of antibiotics by β-lactamases may be cooperative, since resistant cells can detoxify their environment and facilitate the growth of susceptible neighbours. However, previous studies of this phenomenon have used artificial bacterial vectors or engineered bacteria to increase the secretion of β-lactamases from cells. Here, we investigated whether a broad-spectrum β-lactamase gene carried by a naturally occurring plasmid (pCT) is cooperative under a range of conditions. In ordinary batch culture on solid media, there was little or no evidence that resistant bacteria could protect susceptible cells from ampicillin, although resistant colonies could locally detoxify this growth medium. However, when susceptible cells were inoculated at high densities, late-appearing phenotypically susceptible bacteria grew in the vicinity of resistant colonies. We infer that persisters, cells that have survived antibiotics by undergoing a period of dormancy, founded these satellite colonies. The number of persister colonies was positively correlated with the density of resistant colonies and increased as antibiotic concentrations decreased. We argue that detoxification can be cooperative under a limited range of conditions: if the toxins are bacteriostatic rather than bacteridical; or if susceptible cells invade communities after resistant bacteria; or if dormancy allows susceptible cells to avoid bactericides. Resistance and tolerance were previously thought to be independent solutions for surviving antibiotics. Here, we show that these are interacting strategies: the presence of bacteria adopting one solution can have substantial effects on the fitness of their neighbours