Supply Chains Competition under Uncertainty Concerning Player’s Strategies and Customer Choice Behavior: A Generalized Nash Game Approach

Decision makers in a supply chain confront two main sources of uncertainty in market environment including uncertainty about customers purchasing behaviors and rival chains strategies. Focusing on competition between two supply chains, it is considered that each customer as an independent player selects products of these chains based on random utility model. Similar to quantal response equilibrium approach, we take account of customer rationality as an exogenous parameter. Moreover, it is assumed that decision makers in a supply chain can perceive an estimation of rival strategies about price and service level formulated in the model by fuzzy strategies. In the competition model, chain’s decision makers consider a subjective probability for wining each customer which is formulated by coupled constraints. These constraints connect chains strategies regarding to each customer and yield a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. Since price cutting and increasing service level are main responses to rival supply chain, after calculating optimal strategies, we show that more efficient responses depend on customer preferences

Joint Impact of CSR Policy and Market Structure on Environmental Sustainability in Supply Chains

International audienceThe integration of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Smart Manufacturing (SM) has emerged as a promising strategy for addressing carbon emissions. Governments can play a crucial role in promoting sustainable practices and environmental sustainability by implementing targeted policies and regulations. In this study, we examine the sustainability performance of competing smart supply chains that offer substitutable products under different CSR regulatory policies. Specifically, we investigate five CSR policies: Deregulation, Direct Tariff on Market, Sustainability Penalty and Credits, Direct Limitation on Sustainability, and Government Cooperative Sustainability Efforts. Using a game theoretical framework, we model and analyze the effectiveness of each CSR policy within monopoly and oligopoly market structures. Our results uncover the importance of considering the synergistic effects of market structure and CSR when designing sustainability strategies for policymakers and supply chain managers. For instance, the Direct Tariff on Market policy in the monopoly market is shown to be the preferred regulatory approach as it effectively enhances both supply chain profitability and environmental sustainability. Furthermore, the Direct Tariff on Market policy in the oligopoly market, along with the Direct Limitation on Sustainability policy in the monopoly market, results in a greater market share of sustainable products. Understanding these dynamics enables policymakers to make informed decisions that maximize the environmental benefits of CSR practices, considering varying market structures. \textcopyright 2023 The Author(s

A novel linguistic approach for multi-granular information fusion and decision-making using risk-based linguistic D numbers

The D numbers methodology is a new mathematical approach that has been developed to improve some constraints surrounding evidence theory by managing information uncertainty and incompleteness. Various studies have been conducted on developing D numbers. One of the main extensions of the D numbers methodology is linguistic D numbers, which employs linguistic terms as a set of evaluations of D numbers. In this study, linguistic D numbers are further extended to an interval-valued belief structure. Additionally, to consider the various risk scenarios of each linguistic D number, a risk-based linguistic D numbers model is presented, based on proposed interval-valued linguistic D numbers. The efficiency of the proposed model is investigated by applying it to numerical examples and considering a case study. The results show the robustness of the risk-based linguistic D numbers methodology while simultaneously applying various risk scenarios. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved

Selection of energy source and evolutionary stable strategies for power plants under financial intervention of government

Currently, many socially responsible governments adopt economic incentives and deterrents to manage environmental impacts of electricity suppliers. Considering the Stackelberg leadership of the government, the government's role in the competition of power plants in an electricity market is investigated. A one-population evolutionary game model of power plants is developed to study how their production strategy depends on tariffs levied by the government. We establish that a unique evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) for the population exists. Numerical examples demonstrate that revenue maximization and environment protection policies of the government significantly affect the production ESS of competitive power plants. The results reveal that the government can introduce a green energy source as an ESS of the competitive power plants by imposing appropriate tariffs