INTEREST GROUPS, VETO POINTS AND ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT

In this paper we examine the effects of interest group pressure and the structure of political institutions on infrastructure deployment by state-owned electric utilities in a panel of 78 countries during the period 1970 – 1994. We consider two factors that jointly influence the rate of infrastructure deployment: (1) the extent to which the consumer base consists of industrial consumers, which are capable of exerting discipline on political actors whose competing incentives are to construct economically inefficient “white elephants” to satisfy the demands of concentrated geographic interests, labor unions and construction firms; and (2) veto points in formal policymaking structures that constrain political actors, thereby reducing these actors’ sensitivity to interest group demands. A higher fraction of industrial customers provides political actors with stronger incentives for discipline, reducing the deployment of white elephants and thus the infrastructure growth rate, ceteris paribus. Veto points reduce political actors’ sensitivity to interest group demands in general and thus moderate the relationship between industrial interest group pressure and the rate of infrastructure deployment.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40097/3/wp711.pd

INTEREST GROUPS, VETO POINTS AND ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT

In this paper we examine the effects of interest group pressure and the structure of political institutions on infrastructure deployment by state-owned electric utilities in a panel of 78 countries during the period 1970 – 1994. We consider two factors that jointly influence the rate of infrastructure deployment: (1) the extent to which the consumer base consists of industrial consumers, which are capable of exerting discipline on political actors whose competing incentives are to construct economically inefficient “white elephants” to satisfy the demands of concentrated geographic interests, labor unions and construction firms; and (2) veto points in formal policymaking structures that constrain political actors, thereby reducing these actors’ sensitivity to interest group demands. A higher fraction of industrial customers provides political actors with stronger incentives for discipline, reducing the deployment of white elephants and thus the infrastructure growth rate, ceteris paribus. Veto points reduce political actors’ sensitivity to interest group demands in general and thus moderate the relationship between industrial interest group pressure and the rate of infrastructure deployment.Electricity, Institutional Environment, Investment, Regulation, interest group, state owned enterprise

Resistance to multilateral influence on reform : the political backlash against private infrastructure investments

Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries'adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance.National Governance,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,ICT Policy and Strategies,Politics and Government,Governance Indicators

Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Change in Emergent Institutions: The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments

We offer a simple model of policymaking emphasizing socialization and limits on human cognition to explicate mechanisms of change in emergent (as opposed to established) institutions. Emergent institutions are more susceptible to change, and their opponents may use frames or existing reference points to illustrate inconsistency with prevailing notions of legitimacy. Broader institutional structures and specific organizational characteristics moderate pressure for change. This perspective has novel implications for strategy and policy design.

Entanglement between an electron and a nuclear spin 1/2

We report on the preparation and detection of entangled states between an electron spin 1/2 and a nuclear spin 1/2 in a molecular single crystal. These were created by applying pulses at ESR (9.5 GHz) and NMR (28 MHz) frequencies. Entanglement was detected by using a special entanglement detector sequence based on a unitary back transformation including phase rotation.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure

The Interaction of Federal Equitable Remedies with State Sovereignty—Puget Sound Gillnetters Association v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977)

The Washington Supreme Court held in Puget Sound Gillnetters Association v. Moos that the State Director of Fisheries did not have authority to issue regulations required by a federal court order guaranteeing treaty Indians the opportunity to catch specific percentages of various salmon runs. After attempting to act in the face of conflicting interpretations of his powers, the Director eventually bowed to the state court\u27s determination and refused to promulgate the regulations. To implement its order, the federal court assumed control of the Washington salmon fisheries. This conflict between the federal and state court decisions raises two general questions. The first involves the validity of state-imposed limitations on the power of state officers which interfere with the enforcement and protection of federal rights. The second involves the scope of the federal judiciary\u27s power to order state officers to perform affirmative acts

American species of the genus Sceliphron klug: the Spruce Gall louse (\u3cem\u3eChermes abietis\u3c/em\u3e L.) ; the host of Ablerus clisiocampae Ashmead

The first paper is a systematic treatront of the Arerican species of the genus Scellihron Klug. The first part of the paper is devoted to a detailed study of the external anatomy and male genitalia, followed by tables showing the position of this genus in the superfarrily Fihecoidea. This in turn is followed by a key to the Arerican species included in the genua, and redescriptiors of the different species

Back to the Future: Use of Percentage Fee Arrangements in Common Fund Litigation

The premise of this Article is that common fund litigation will be most efficiently and beneficially prosecuted if attorney fees are awarded under a methodology that makes parallel the interests of counsel in the fee award and of the class in the recovery. The Article examines the historical uses of the percentage fee, the development of and problems with, hourly based methods of computing fees, and the renewed trend toward the use of percentage fee awards. It concludes that, unlike hourly based methodologies, percentage fee arrangements align the interests of counsel with the interests of both the class and the judicial system. The judicial return to percentage fee arrangements is a good idea that will result in prompt, efficient, and economic disposition of class action litigation

International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999

Why do some countries adopt market-oriented reforms such as deregulation, privatization and liberalization of competition in their infrastructure industries while others do not? Why did the pace of adoption accelerate in the 1990s? Building on neo-institutional theory in sociology, we argue that the domestic adoption of market-oriented reforms is strongly influenced by international pressures of coercion and emulation. We find robust support for these arguments with an event-history analysis of the determinants of reform in the telecommunications and electricity sectors of as many as 205 countries and territories between 1977 and 1999. Our results also suggest that the coercive effect of multilateral lending from the IMF, the World Bank or Regional Development Banks is increasing over time, a finding that is consistent with anecdotal evidence that multilateral organizations have broadened the scope of the “conditionality” terms specifying market-oriented reforms imposed on borrowing countries. We discuss the possibility that, by pressuring countries into policy reform, cross-national coercion and emulation may not produce ideal outcomes.Privatization, deregulation, liberalization, infrastructure, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Multileral Institutions, Development, Reform, Globalization, Adoption, International