Gasoline prices jump up on Mondays: An outcome of aggressive competition?

This paper examines Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station-specific observations from March 2003 to March 2006. Whereas studies that have analyzed similar price cycles in other countries find support for the Edgeworth cycle theory (Maskin and Tirole, 1988), we demonstrate that Norwegian gasoline price cycles involve a form of coordinated behavior. Retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern, where retail outlets all over Norway simultaneously increase their prices to the same level every Monday at noon. Consequently, the sharp price increase is tied to time rather than the current price level. The gasoline companies’ headquarters publish a recommended price that de facto is a RPM arrangement towards the retail outlets. The vertical arrangement is industry-wide adopted, and is used to coordinate the time and the level for retail price increases among the big four gasoline companies. Monday changed from being the low-price day to becoming the high-price day almost ‘overnight’ in April 2004, and we empirically establish that the change corresponds to a significant jump in the gross margin.Gasoline Prices; Resale Price Maintenance

Do Slotting Allowances Harm Retail Competition?

Slotting allowances are fees paid by manufacturers to get access to retailers’ shelf space. Both in the USA and Europe, the use of slotting allowances has attracted attention in the general press as well as among policy makers and economists. One school of thought claims that slotting allowances are efficiency enhancing, while another school of thought maintains that slotting allowances are used in an anti-competitive manner. In this paper, we argue that this controversy is partially caused by inadequate assumptions of how the retail market is structured and organized. Using a formal model, we show that there are good reasons to expect anti-competitive effects of slotting allowances. We further point out that competition authorities tend to use an unsatisfactory basis for comparison when analyzing welfare consequences of slotting allowances.slotting allowances, retail competition, anti-trust policy

Mergers and Partial Ownership.

In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the pro…tability of a partial ownership arrangement and …nd that partial ownership arrangements can be more profiable for the acquiring and acquired firm because they can result in a greater dampening of competition. We also derive comparative statics on the prices of the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, and the outside firms. In a dual context, we show that a cross-majority owner may have incentives to sell a fraction of the shares in one of the firms he controls to a silent investor who is outside the industry. Aggregate ex post operating profit in the two firms controlled by the cross-majority shareholder then increases, such that both the cross-majority shareholder and the silent investor will be better o¤ with than without the partial divestiture.Media economics; Mergers; Corporate Control; Financial Control

Mergers and Partial Ownership

In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger between two firms (one firm fully acquires another) and the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement between the same two firms in which the acquiring firm obtains corporate control over the pricing decisions of the acquired firm. We find that joint profit can be higher in the latter case because it may result in a greater dampening of competition with respect to an outside competitor. We also derive comparative statics on the prices of the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, and the outside firm and use them to explain puzzling features of the pay-TV markets in Norway and Sweden.Media economics; Mergers; Corporate Control; Financial Control

Mergers and Partial Ownership

In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement and find that partial ownership arrangements can be more profitable for the acquiring and acquired firm because they can result in a greater dampening of competition. We also derive comparative statics on the prices of the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, and the outside firms. In a dual context, we show that a cross-majority owner may have incentives to sell a fraction of the shares in one of the firms he controls to a silent investor who is outside the industry. Aggregate ex post operating profit in the two firms controlled by the cross-majority shareholder then increases, such that both the cross-majority shareholder and the silent investor will be better off with than without the partial divestiture.media economics, mergers, corporate control, financial control

Magnetization noise in magnetoelectronic nanostructures

By scattering theory we show that spin current noise in normal electric conductors in contact with nanoscale ferromagnets increases the magnetization noise by means of a fluctuating spin-transfer torque. Johnson-Nyquist noise in the spin current is related to the increased Gilbert damping due to spin pumping, in accordance with the fluctuation-dissipation theorem. Spin current shot noise in the presence of an applied bias is the dominant contribution to the magnetization noise at low temperatures.Comment: 4 pages, 1 figur

Hotelling competition with multi-purchasing

We analyze a Hotelling model where consumers either buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both (multi-purchase). The firms’ pricing strategies turn out to be fundamentally different if some consumers multi-purchase compared to if all single-purchase. Prices are strategic complements under single-purchase, and increase with quality. In a multi-purchase regime, in contrast, prices are strategically independent because firms then act monopolistically by pricing the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. Furthermore, prices can decrease with quality due to overlapping characteristics. Higher preference heterogeneity increases prices and profits in equilibrium with single-purchase, but decreases them with multi-purchase.Multi-purchase; incremental pricing; content competition

Foreclosure in contests

We consider a contest in which one firm is a favourite as it initially has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, we consider the possibility that the favourite transfers the source of its advantage wholly or partially to a subset of rival firms. The result of this may be foreclosure of those firms that do not receive the cost reduction. We present conditions under which this transfer will be expected to occur, and show that the dominant firm will prefer to grant some rivals the maximum cost reduction even if a partial transfer can be made. Furthermore we consider the welfare properties of excluding some rivals. Applications include lobbying, patent races and access to essential infrastructure.Foreclosure; contest

Hotelling Competition with Multi-Purchasing: Time Magazine, Newsweek, or both?

Equilibrium prices behave quite differently if consumers single-purchase (buy either Time Magazine or Newsweek) or if some consumers multi-purchase (buy both). Prices are strategic complements under single-purchase, and increase with magazine quality. In a multi-purchase regime prices are strategically independent because firms then act monopolistically by pricing the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. Furthermore, prices can decrease with magazine quality due to overlapping content. Higher preference heterogeneity increases prices and profits in equilibrium with single-purchase, but decreases them with multi-purchase. We determine when each regime holds, and present a detailed reaction function analysis which applies more generally to duopoly pricing.magazine competition, multi-purchase, incremental pricing, content competition

Vertical control and price cycles in gasoline retailing

We examine Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station-specific observations from 2003 to 2006. The big four gasoline companies use an industry-wide adopted vertical restraint (labeled price support) to move price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters of the big four companies. Retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern, where retail outlets all over Norway simultaneously (without knowing their rivals’ prices) increase their prices to the same level every Monday around noon. The price level on Mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the gasoline companies’ headquarters