7 research outputs found
์ด๋์์ฒด์ ๊ธฐ(1938-45๋ ) ์กฐ์ ์ด๋ ๋ถ์ ๋ ธ๋ฌด์์ฃผํ์ ์ฑ ์ด์๊ณผ ์ฌํ์ ๋ถ๋ฐฐ์ฒด๊ณ: ์ผ๋ณธ์ง์๋น๋ฃ(์ฃผ) ๊ณ์ด์ฌ๋ฅผ ์ค์ฌ์ผ๋ก
In Joseon, where the imbalance between housing supply and demand intensified during
the General Mobilization System period, there were measures to promote the housing
stability of workers that contributed to the expansion of productive capacity. In 1940,
the Japanese Government-General of Korea began supplying large amounts of
low-interest funds for the construction of workerโs houses. The target was an important
company closely related to the conduct of the war. The housing policies for workers,
however, could not fulfill their roles fully in the deformed structure of fund
management. The basic funds were forced a drastic retrenchment by the Exchequer,
which has the final decision on imperial fiscal investment and financing. The remaining
amounts were used to purchase the bonds of the Joseon Housing Corporation, which is
in charge of solving universal housing problems. As a result, the supply of worker
housing funds gradually became nominal. And the plans to build a company house
prepared by many corporations went down the drain. The affiliates of Japan Nitrogenous
Fertilizer Company, which received a majority of the funds or more among preferential
loans to very few companies, managed their company houses in a highly biased manner
toward certain social classes and ethnic groups. They built company houses about 50%
of the newly hired workers, and most of them were allotted to high-ranking managers
and supervisors instead of low-ranking productive manpower. Especially none of them
were assigned to Joseon workers. The housing instability of Joseon workers during the
General Mobilization System period was completely ignored by both the Japanese
Government-General of Korea and companies
Synthesis and application of cellulose derivatives containing ฮฒ-cyclodextrin
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ผ๋ฌธ(๋ฐ์ฌ)--์์ธ๋ํ๊ต ๋ํ์ :์ฌ์ ๊ณ ๋ถ์๊ณตํ๊ณผ,1995.Docto