34 research outputs found

    Cost structure of contracting out: transaction cost theory

    No full text
    ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ํšจ์œจ์ ์ธ ์šด์˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ •์น˜์  ์••๋ ฅ๊ณผ ์žฌ์ •์ ์ธ ์ œ์•ฝ์ด ์ปค์ง์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๊ทธ ๋™์•ˆ ์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ๋…์ ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๋˜ ๊ณต๊ณต์žฌ์˜ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๊ณผ ๊ณต๊ธ‰ ๋“ฑ ์ •๋ถ€ ๊ณ ์œ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์˜ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰์— ์žˆ์–ด ์‹œ์žฅ์˜ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ์ ์ฐจ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ์˜ ํ™œ์šฉ๋„๊ฐ€ ์ปค์ ธ๊ฐ€๋Š” ์ถ”์„ธ์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ๋Š” ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์ง์ ‘์ƒ์‚ฐ์„ ๋Œ€์‹ ํ•˜์—ฌ ์„ ํƒ๋˜๋Š” ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ์˜ ๋น„์šฉ ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์ฃผ๋œ ๋ชฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ, ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ ํ™œ์šฉ์‹œ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•˜๋Š” ๋น„์šฉ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ์‹œ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•˜๋Š” ์ฃผ์š” ๋น„์šฉ๊ณผ ๊ฐ ๋น„์šฉ์„ ๊ฒฐ์ •ํ•˜๋Š” ์„ธ๋ถ€ ๋น„์šฉ ์š”์ธ๋“ค์˜ ํŒŒ์•… ๋ฐ ์ด๋“ค ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๊ฑฐ๋ž˜๋น„์šฉ์ด๋ก ์˜ ์‹œ๊ฐ์—์„œ ์ด๋ก ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ์‹œ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•˜๋Š” ์ฃผ์š” ๋น„์šฉ์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋น„์šฉ, ํƒ์ƒ‰ ๋ฐ ํ˜‘์ƒ๋น„์šฉ ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ธฐํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์  ํ–‰๋™๋น„์šฉ์„ ์ฃผ๋กœ ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ ์ด๋“ค์„ ๊ฒฐ์ •ํ•˜๋Š” ์š”์ธ์œผ๋กœ ์—…๋ฌด์˜ ๋ณต์žก์„ฑ, ๊ฒฝํ•ฉ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ์ž๋ณธ์˜ ํŠน์ •์„ฑ์„ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ๋…ผ์˜ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จ๋œ ๋น„์šฉ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์˜ ํŒŒ์•…์€ ์ •์ฑ…์ˆ˜๋‹จ์œผ๋กœ์„œ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ์ด ๊ฐ–๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์†์„ฑ์„ ๋ณด๋‹ค ์ •ํ™•ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋„๋ก ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋น„์šฉ์ ˆ๊ฐ์„ ํ†ตํ•œ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ ์ œ๊ณ  ์ˆ˜๋‹จ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์œ„ํƒ์˜ ์˜ฌ๋ฐ”๋ฅธ ์„ ํƒ์„ ๋•๋Š” ๊ธฐ์ค€์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. Contracting out has been a popular choice for the government to respond to the political pressure for efficient government and to overcome the fiscal constraints. By using contracting out, government exercises less power over the production of public good and uses more market competition. This study investigates the cost structure of contracting out by looking at the costs involved in contracting out using transaction cost theory. Production cost, search and negotiation cost and cost of opportunistic behavior are major costs that the government should pay when using contracting out. The magnitude of these costs is determined by complexity, contestability and asset specificity. Better understanding of the cost structure of contracting out will help us to make an informed decision on when to use contracting out.์ด ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 2007๋…„ ์ •๋ถ€(๊ต์œก์ธ์ ์ž์›๋ถ€)์˜ ์žฌ์›์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญํ•™์ˆ ์ง„ํฅ์žฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ๋ฐ›์•„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰๋œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ž„(KRF-2007-321-B00185)

    Organizational Experience and Public Service Motivation

    No full text
    ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ณต๋ฌด์›์˜ ์กฐ์ง๊ฒฝํ—˜๊ณผ ์—…๋ฌดํŠน์„ฑ์ด PSM์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. PSM(Public Service Motivation)์€ ๊ณต๊ณต๋ถ€๋ฌธ ํŠน์œ ์˜ ๋™๊ธฐ์š”์ธ์œผ๋กœ ๊ณต๊ณต๋ถ€๋ฌธ ์„ฑ๊ณผ์— ์˜ํ–ฅ ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์ฃผ์š” ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋กœ ์•Œ๋ ค์ ธ ์žˆ์ง€๋งŒ ๊ณต๊ณต๋ถ€๋ฌธ์˜ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋†’์ด๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ PSM์„ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฐ€์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ์˜ ์ดํ•ด๋Š” ๊ทธ ์ค‘์š”์„ฑ์— ๋น„ํ•˜์—ฌ ์•„์ง ์ถฉ๋ถ„ํ•˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ด๋Ÿฌ ํ•œ ๋ฌธ์ œ์˜์‹์„ ๊ฐ–๊ณ  ์กฐ์ง ๊ตฌ์„ฑ์›์˜ PSM์— ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์š”์ธ์„ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ ์กฐ์ง ๊ฒฝํ—˜ ๊ณผ ์—…๋ฌด ํŠน์„ฑ์ด PSM์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์—…๋ฌด๋ชจํ˜ธ์„ฑ (Job Ambiguity), ๊ฒฝํ—˜ ๋œ ์ฃผ์š” ์‹ฌ๋ฆฌ์ƒํƒœ (CPS), ์ง๋ฌด๋งŒ์กฑ๋„(Job Satisfaction)๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋œ ์กฐ์ง ๊ฒฝํ—˜ ๋ฐ ์ •์ฑ… ํ˜•์„ฑ ๊ณผ ์ง‘ํ–‰์œผ๋กœ ๊ตฌ๋ถ„๋˜๋Š” ์—…๋ฌด ํŠน์„ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์ด๋ก ์ ยท๊ฒฝํ—˜์  ๋…ผ์˜๋ฅผ ์ข…ํ•ฉํ•˜์—ฌ PSM๊ณผ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„ ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฐ€์„ค์„ ์„ค์ •ํ•˜๊ณ  415๋ช…์˜ ๊ณต๋ฌด์› ํ‘œ๋ณธ์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์‹ค์ฆ๋ถ„์„์„ ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ์กฐ์ง ๊ฒฝํ—˜๊ณผ ์—…๋ฌด ํŠน์„ฑ์ด PSM์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•˜๋Š” ์ค‘์š” ์š”์ธ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์—…๋ฌด๋ชจํ˜ธ์„ฑ์ด ๋†’์„์ˆ˜๋ก PSM์— ๋ถ€์ •์ ์ธ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์ฃผ๊ณ  ์ง๋ฌด๋งŒ์กฑ๋„๊ฐ€ ๋†’์„์ˆ˜๋ก PSM์— ๊ธ์ •์ ์ธ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๊ฒฝํ—˜๋œ ์ฃผ์š” ์‹ฌ๋ฆฌ์ƒํƒœ๊ฐ€ ๊ธ์ •์ ์ผ์ˆ˜๋ก PSM์ด ๋†’์•„์ง€๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ •์ฑ…ํ˜•์„ฑ ์—…๋ฌด๋ฅผ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์ง‘ํ–‰์—…๋ฌด๋ฅผ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๋ณด๋‹ค ๋†’์€ ์ˆ˜์ค€์˜ PSM์„ ๋ณด์ด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ๊ฒฐ๋ก ์—์„œ๋Š” ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ ์ด๋ก ์  ์ •์ฑ…์  ํ•จ์˜๋ฅผ ๋…ผ์˜ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. This study investigates the effect of organizational experience on PSM. PSM, as a distinctive motivational factor in public organization, is known as a critical factor that can boost the performance of a public organization but little is known about what organizational factors actually affect PSM. Thus, there is virtually no knowledge about how to manage PSM to boost performance. This study measures and estimates the effect of job ambiguity, critical psychological states (CPS), and job satisfaction on the PSM of public officials in Korean central and local government. The results of the analysis show that job ambiguity decreases PSM while CPS and job satisfaction increase the PSM of public officials. In addition, public officials who participate in the polic-making process have a higher PSM than those who participate in implementation. Practical and theoretical implications are also discussed at the end of the paper

    Performance-Based Personnel System and Organizational Performance: A Comparison of Public and Private Sector Employees

    No full text
    ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์„ฑ๊ณผ์ฃผ์˜ ์ธ์‚ฌ์ œ๋„๊ฐ€ ์กฐ์ง์„ฑ๊ณผ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์ด ๊ณต๊ณต์กฐ์ง๊ณผ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์กฐ์ง ๊ฐ„์— ๋‹ค๋ฅด๊ฒŒ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜๋Š”์ง€, ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์„ฑ๊ณผ์ฃผ์˜ ์ธ์‚ฌ์ œ๋„์˜ ํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ์กฐ์ง๊ตฌ์„ฑ์›์˜ ๊ณต์ •์„ฑ ์ธ์‹์— ์˜ํ•ด ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฐ›๋Š” ์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด, ๋Œ€ํ‘œ์  ์„ฑ๊ณผ์ฃผ์˜ ์ธ์‚ฌ์ œ๋„์ธ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰์ œ๋„๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ์‚ดํŽด๋ณด๊ณ ์ž ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๊ณต๋ฌด์›๊ณผ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„๋ถ€๋ฌธ ์ข…์‚ฌ์ž๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ•˜๋Š” ์ธ์‹์กฐ์‚ฌ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ตญ๋‚ด ๊ณต๊ณต๋ถ€๋ฌธ๊ณผ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„๋ถ€๋ฌธ์„ ๋™์‹œ์— ๋น„๊ต ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ธ‰์ œ๋„ํ™” ์ˆ˜์ค€๊ณผ ์กฐ์ง์„ฑ๊ณผ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„๋Š” ์˜ ๊ณต๊ณต์กฐ์ง๊ณผ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„์กฐ์ง ๊ฐ„์— ์ฐจ์ด๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด ๋•Œ ๊ณต์ •์„ฑ์ด ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์กฐ์ ˆ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋กœ ์ž‘์šฉํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ์„ ํ™•์ธํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ๊ณต๊ณต์กฐ์ง์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ œ๋„๋ฅผ ๊ณ ๋„ํ™”, ์ •๊ตํ™”ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ์กฐ์ง์„ฑ๊ณผ ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ๋ฐ˜๋“œ์‹œ ๋ฐ”๋žŒ์งํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์€ ์•„๋‹ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ œ๋„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ณต์ •์„ฑ ์ธ์‹์ด ์„ฑ๊ณผ์ฃผ์˜ ์ธ์‚ฌ์ œ๋„๊ฐ€ ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํ–ฅ์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋˜๋Š” ๋ฐ ์˜๋ฏธ ์žˆ๋Š” ์—ญํ• ์„ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ํ•จ์˜๋ฅผ ๊ฐ–๋Š”๋‹ค.This study investigates the difference in the impact of performance-based personnel systems on organizational performance between public and private sector employees in South Korea, and it also tests the moderating effects of fairness on the relationship between performance-based personnel systems and organizational performance. Using survey data, OLS regressions are performed to compare a sample of 1000 public employees with 1050 private employees. The empirical results show that there are public-private differences in the impact of performance-based systems and also indicate that perceived fairness as a moderating variable has a significant role in achieving the goal of performance-based personnel systems in the public sector
    corecore