47 research outputs found

    Dynamics of the Agrarian Class Politics and Special Economic Zones Settlement of Local India

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(์„์‚ฌ)--์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› :์‚ฌํšŒ๊ณผํ•™๋Œ€ํ•™ ์ •์น˜์™ธ๊ตํ•™๋ถ€(์ •์น˜ํ•™์ „๊ณต),2020. 2. ์ž„๊ฒฝํ›ˆ.Do nation-states converge as neoliberal regimes due to globalization? About that, Marxists would say, Yes, indeed. In this research, however, I argue even if neoliberal hegemony is a formidable phenomenon, it does not necessarily result in convergence of economies without considering peculiarities of each nation/sub-state. Special Economic Zones(SEZs) of India are notable examples. During the 1990s, the central government led by the Congress Party discarded its socialistic mixed-economy by neoliberal reforms and highly encouraged regional bodies to settle SEZs as crucial tools for capital inflow. However, only some states followed the direction precisely. Among remaining others, several regions even do not consider SEZs while some others encounter serious popular discontents which entirely demoralize pro-SEZs policy implementations. To analyze the varieties of SEZs settlement, I presume dynamics of class politics of each region matter that is usually disregarded by researchers. First, each class has a central tendency of economic preferences. Rural classes of India are by far the most significant in that, it is their land that is supposed to be acquired by SEZs developers. Second, their relative political power is a decisive factor for determining the settlement. Therefore, regions having numerically dominant classes deeming land as inalienable or vulnerable to sustenance farming will expect much a slower expansion of SEZ due to resistance over land acquisitions. By contrast, in regions with independent landowners running commercial agriculture as dominant classes, discontent to land acquisitions will be less severe. They tend to view land as transactional assets and developers are able to offer sufficient compensation and incentives in exchange for acquisitions. To verify my hypothesis, I chose Bihar, Kerala, and West Bengal among Indias 29 states and Union Territories in accordance with the historical comparative analysis. From the analysis, I found out both 1) land reforms and 2) green revolution are significant variables transforming rural class relations. I term green revolution as state-led projects aimed at the transition from sustenance farming into an acceleration of, agrarian production through a series of technical innovations like seeds of a high-yielding variety[HYV], pesticides, chemical fertilizers which ultimately lead to commercialization, diversification and self-sufficient agriculture. First, as Bihar failed to achieve both, landowners and tenants are still bounded by sustenance farming/moral economy and they perceive any land acquisitions as non-sense. By contrast, Kerala achieved both and the commercialized farmers are not antagonists of SEZs. In the middle, when West Bengals communists successfully dispelled feudalism by land reforms, they distorted green revolution projects by rampant clientelism and careless decentralization. Consequently, only a small number of rich farmers coexisted with the landless, impoverished farmers and agricultural laborers. In this situation, West Bengals SEZ projects have had marginal support and there have never been any notifications for SEZs since the 2010s.์ตœ๊ทผ์˜ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ™” ํ˜„์ƒ์€ ๊ฐ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ์‹ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜์ฒด์ œ๋กœ ์ˆ˜๋ ดํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€? ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ํ•™ํŒŒ๋“ค ์ค‘ ํŠนํžˆ ๋งˆ๋ฅดํฌ์Šค์ฃผ์˜์ž๋“ค์€ ๊ทธ๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ ๋ฏฟ์–ด ์˜์‹ฌ์น˜ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค. ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ „์ง€๊ตฌ์  ์‹ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜ ํ—ค๊ฒŒ๋ชจ๋‹ˆ๋ฅผ ๊ฒฐ์ฝ” ๋ฌด์‹œํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†์ง€๋งŒ, ๊ฐ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€/์ง€์—ญ์˜ ํŠน์ˆ˜์„ฑ์— ๊ด€๊ณ„์—†์ด ์ผ๋ฐฉ์  ์ˆ˜๋ ด์„ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ ๋ณด์ง€ ์•Š๋Š”๋‹ค. ์ธ๋„ ๊ณตํ™”๊ตญ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œํŠน๊ตฌ์„ค์น˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌํ•˜๋‹ค. 1990๋…„๋Œ€ ์ธ๋„ ์ค‘์•™์ •๋ถ€์™€ ์ง‘๊ถŒ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ์˜ํšŒ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์‹ ํ˜ผํ•ฉ์ฒด์ œ๋ฅผ ๊ณผ๊ฐํžˆ ํฌ๊ธฐํ•˜๋ฉฐ ๊ธ‰์†ํ•œ ์‹ ์ž์œ ์ฃผ์˜ ๊ฐœํ˜์„ ์‹œํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ง€์†์ ์ธ ์ž๋ณธ์œ ์ž…์„ ์œ„ํ•ด ์ง€๋ฐฉ ์ •๋ถ€์—๊ฒŒ ๊ฒฝ์ œํŠน๊ตฌ ์„ค์น˜๋ฅผ ํ˜„์žฌ๊นŒ์ง€ ๊ถŒ์žฅํ•ด์˜ค๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿผ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌ, ์ธ๋„ ๋‚ด ์ผ๋ถ€ ์ง€์—ญ๋“ค๋งŒ ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์„ ์ถฉ์‹คํžˆ ๋”ฐ๋ฅด๊ณ  ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๋‚˜๋จธ์ง€์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ 1) ์„ค์น˜ ์ž์ฒด๋ฅผ ์•„์˜ˆ ๊ณ ๋ฏผํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๋Š” ์ง€์—ญ๊ณผ, 2) ๊ฒฝ์ œํŠน๊ตฌ๊ฐ€ ์‹ฌ๊ฐํ•œ ๋Œ€์ค‘์˜ ๋ฐ˜๋ฐœ์„ ๋ถˆ๋Ÿฌ์™€ ์ขŒ์ ˆ์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์šฐ๋“ค๋กœ ๋ถ„ํ™”ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ฒฝ์ œํŠน๊ตฌ ์„ค์น˜์˜ ์ง€์—ญ์  ๋‹ค์–‘์„ฑ์„ ์—ฐ๊ตฌํ•˜๋ ค, ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ฐ ์ง€์—ญ์˜ ํŠน์ˆ˜ํ•œ ๊ณ„๊ธ‰์ •์น˜์˜ ๋™ํ•™์ด ์ค‘์š”ํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฐ€์ •์„ ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋จผ์ €, ์ง€์—ญ ๋‚ด ๊ฐ ๊ณ„๊ธ‰์€ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ •์ฑ…์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฐœ๋ณ„์  ์„ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์ธ๋‹ค. ๋ฌด์—‡๋ณด๋‹ค ๋†์ดŒ์ง€์—ญ ๊ณ„๊ธ‰ ๊ตฌ์กฐ๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜์ธ๋ฐ ์ด๋Š” ์ด๋“ค์˜ ํ† ์ง€๊ฐ€ ๊ฒฐ๊ตญ ๊ฒฝ์ œํŠน๊ตฌ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ์— ํ™œ์šฉ๋˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๊ฐ ๊ณ„๊ธ‰์˜ ์ƒ๋Œ€์  ์ •์น˜์  ์˜ํ–ฅ๋ ฅ์ด ํŠน๊ตฌ ์„ค์น˜์˜ ํ–ฅ๋ฐฉ์„ ๊ฒฐ์ •ํ•œ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์—ฌ๊ธด๋‹ค. ์ฆ‰, ํ† ์ง€ ์ž์ฒด๋ฅผ ์–‘๋„๊ฐ€ ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ ํ•˜๋‹ค๊ณ  ์••๋„์  ๊ตฌ์„ฑ์›๋“ค์ด ์ธ์‹ํ•˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜ ๋น„์ƒ์—…์  ๋†์—…์„ ํŠน์ง•์œผ๋กœ ํ•˜๋Š” ์ง€์—ญ์€ ํ† ์ง€ ๊ฑฐ๋ž˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ €ํ•ญ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฒฝ์ œํŠน๊ตฌ ์„ค์น˜๊ฐ€ ์–ด๋ ค์šธ ์ˆ˜๋ฐ–์— ์—†๋‹ค. ๋Œ€์กฐ์ ์œผ๋กœ, ์ž์˜๋†๋“ค์˜ ์ƒ์—…์  ๋†์—…์ด ๋ฐœ๋‹ฌํ•œ ์ง€์—ญ์€ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ฌธ์ œ์—์„œ ์ž์œ ๋กญ๋‹ค. ์™œ๋ƒ๋ฉด ์ด๋“ค์€ ๋Œ€์ฒด์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ† ์ง€๋ฅผ ๊ฑฐ๋ž˜ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ์ž์‚ฐ์œผ๋กœ ์—ฌ๊ธฐ๋ฉฐ, ํ•ฉ๋ฆฌ์ ์ธ ๋ณด์ƒ์ด ํ† ์ง€ ํš๋“์„ ์œ ๋„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๊ฐ€์„ค์„ ์ž…์ฆํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด, ํ•„์ž๋Š” ์ธ๋„์˜ ์ง€์—ญ๋“ค ์ค‘ ๋น„ํ•˜๋ฅด(Bihar), ์ผ€๋ž„๋ผ(Kerala), ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์„œ๋ฒต๊ณจ(West Bengal)์ฃผ(ๅทž)๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋กœ ์„ ์ •ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„์„ ์ง„ํ–‰ํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ํ•„์ž๋Š” 1) ํ† ์ง€ ๊ฐœํ˜๊ณผ, 2) ๋…น์ƒ‰ํ˜๋ช…์ด ๋†์ดŒ์˜ ๊ณ„๊ธ‰๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ๋ณ€ํ™”์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๊ฒฐ์ •์  ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋“ค์ด๋ผ ์„ค์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋…์ž๋“ค์˜ ์ดํ•ด๋ฅผ ๋•๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋…น์ƒ‰ํ˜๋ช…์ด๋ž€, ๋น„์ƒ์—…์  ๋†์—…์„ ๋‹ค๋ณ€ํ™”๋œ ์ƒ์—…์  ๋†์—…์œผ๋กœ ๋ณ€ํ™”์‹œํ‚ค๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ฃผ๋„ ํ”„๋กœ์ ํŠธ ์ผ์ฒด์ด๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋Š” ๊ฐœ๋Ÿ‰์ข…์ž, ๋†์•ฝ, ํ™”ํ•™๋น„๋ฃŒ๋“ฑ ์ตœ์‹  ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๊ณผ ์žฌ๋ฃŒ๋“ค์„ ๋†๋ฏผ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ํˆฌ์ž…ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋จผ์ €, ๋น„ํ•˜๋ฅด๋Š” ํ† ์ง€๊ฐœํ˜๊ณผ ๋…น์ƒ‰ํ˜๋ช…์— ๋‘˜๋‹ค ์™„์ „ํžˆ ์‹คํŒจํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ž˜์„œ ์ „๊ทผ๋Œ€์  ์ง€์ฃผ/์†Œ์ž‘ ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ๋น„์ƒ์—…์  ๋†์—…๊ณผ ํ•จ๊ป˜ ๋†์ดŒ์ง€์—ญ์—์„œ ์ง€์†๋˜์—ˆ๊ณ , ์ด๋“ค์€ ์—ญ๋‚ด ํŠน๊ตฌ ์„ค์น˜๋ฅผ ๋ง‰๋Š” ์ฃผ์š” ์ง‘๋‹จ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณ€๋ชจํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฐ˜๋Œ€๋กœ ์ผ€๋ž„๋ผ๋Š” ํ† ์ง€๊ฐœํ˜/๋…น์ƒ‰ํ˜๋ช…์„ ์„ฑ๊ณต์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ด๋ค˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— ํŠน๊ตฌ ์„ค์น˜์— ํฐ ์ €ํ•ญ์ด ์—†์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์„œ๋ฒต๊ณจ์˜ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋Š” ์ฃผ๋ชฉํ•  ๋งŒ ํ•œ๋ฐ, ์ด๋Š” ์ง‘๊ถŒ ๊ณต์‚ฐ๋‹น์ด ํ† ์ง€๊ฐœํ˜์œผ๋กœ ๋ด‰๊ฑด์  ์ž”์žฌ๋ฅผ ์ฒญ์‚ฐํ•œ ๋ฐ˜๋ฉด, ๋…น์ƒ‰ํ˜๋ช…์„ ์ •์น˜์  ํ›„์›์ฃผ์˜์™€, ๋ถ€์ฃผ์˜ํ•œ ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”๋กœ ์™œ๊ณก์‹œ์ผฐ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ๊ฒฐ๋ก ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์†Œ์ˆ˜ ๋ถ€๋†๋“ค ๋งŒ์ด ์ƒ์—… ์ž‘๋ฌผ์„ ์žฌ๋ฐฐํ•˜๋Š” ์ž์˜๋†๋“ค๋กœ ๋ณ€๋ชจํ–ˆ๊ณ , ์ด๋“ค์€ ๋Œ€๋‹ค์ˆ˜์˜ ๋นˆ๋†, ์†Œ์ž‘๋†, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ž„๋…ธ๋™์ž๋“ค๊ณผ ๊ณต์กดํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋งฅ๋ฝ์—์„œ ๊ณต์‚ฐ์ฃผ์˜์ž๋“ค์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œํŠน๊ตฌ ์„ค์น˜ ์‹œ๋„๋Š” ํ›„์ž์˜ ์‹ฌํ•œ ์ €ํ•ญ๊ณผ ๋ด‰๊ธฐ๋“ค์„ ์•ผ๊ธฐํ–ˆ๊ณ , ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ 2010๋…„ ์ดํ›„ ์„ค์น˜ ์‹œ๋„ ์ž์ฒด๊ฐ€ ์ค‘๋‹จ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค.Chapter 1. Introduction & Research Background.1 Chapter 2. Literature Review.11 2.1. Do Locational Advantages Matter That Much?.11 2.2. Marxist Perspectives on Indias SEZs settlement.16 Chapter 3. Research Design.24 3.1. Class Politics in the Political Economy of India.24 3.2. Policy Preferences of Classes.25 3.3. Hypothesis & Methodology.32 3.4. Brief Profiles of Bihar, Kerala, and West Bengal.43 Chapter 4. No Change at All: Bihar.46 4.1. Historical Background: The Zamindar System of Bihar.46 4.2. The First Critical Juncture: Land Reform Bypassed Bihar.48 4.3. The Second Critical Juncture: Green Revolution Failed.56 4.4. The Political Economy of SEZs Settlement in Bihar.60 Chapter 5. Political Costs of the Unsolved Land Questions: West Bengal.70 5.1. Historical Background: Zamindars and Zotedars.71 5.2. The First Critical Juncture: Land Reforms.74 5.3. Why Green Revolution Aggravated Rural Inequality?.80 5.4. The Political Economy of SEZs Settlement: Why Severe Unrest?.90 Chapter 6. We Are Willing to Sell Our Land: Kerala.99 6.1. Historical Background: Feudalism Also Dominated Kerala.103 6.2. Land Reforms as the First Critical Juncture.106 6.3. Even Green Revolution Was Successful in Kerala.112 6.4. The Political Economy of SEZs settlement: Why Less Unrest?.118 Chapter 7. Conclusion.126 Chapter 8. Bibliography.130 8.1. Book and Peer-reviewed Journals.130 8.2. Other Materials.136 Chapter 9. Abstract in Korean.140Maste

    Activities of Peace Corps in Korea and its Characteristics

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (์„์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ์ธ๋ฌธ๋Œ€ํ•™ ๊ตญ์‚ฌํ•™๊ณผ, 2019. 2. ์ •์šฉ์šฑ.Since the end of World War II, the United States exercised immense economic and military influence in the rehabilitation and development of Korea. Within such context, Peace Corps Korea program functioned as a window for American influence to penetrate in Korean sociocultural spheres from the mid-1960s to early-1980s. As a part of the larger context of foreign aid and Cold War culture, this thesis narrates the inception of Peace Corps in 1961, the implementation of Peace Corps Korea program in 1966, and the withdrawal of the Korean program in 1981. This thesis also extracts meanings of Cultural Cold War from the United States foreign policies in Korea by elucidating on the logic for and against implementations of Peace Corps Korea program and the implications of the Peace Corps Korea program to the United States-Korea relations. Drawing from sources obtained from the National Archives, USC Peace Corps Collections, and the Korean government, this thesis argues that peace advocated by the Peace Corps embodied a fabricated representation of the American Foreign Policyโ€”a unilateral peace. Peace Corps was founded under the Kennedy Administration to assist the United States in Third World aid and propaganda. Peace Corps aimed at two objectives: first, to recover from the tainted depiction of American activities abroad in the Third World stirred by the Ugly American discoursesecond, to contain Soviet influence into the Third World by expanding the cultural and psychological branch of the modernization theory in the Cold War. In the early years, Peace Corps denied its connections to US foreign policy with the appropriation of concept of peace from the Soviets as advocates of world peace and promote friendship. However, it was clear that Peace Corps programs functioned within and reciprocated the bilateral framework of the Cold War. The State Department designed the Peace Corps to dismantle the Ugly American discourse in the Third World under the guise of foreign aid and development. While the genesis of the Korean program did not correspond with the developmental tendencies of other Peace Corps programs, it did irrevocably replicate a colloquial tendency of the Cold War. That is, in Cold War, anti-communist agenda would dictate the cultural products in the free world. Such tendencies emerged, too, in the Peace Corps negotiations and the Korea program, effectively consolidating the United States-Korea diplomatic relations. The series of negotiation revealed that the establishment of the Korean program stemmed from the agreement to send Korean troops to Indochina in aid to the American troops. In the 1st negotiation talk to dispatch Peace Corps in Korea, the United States prioritized nations in Latin America and Africa. Coupled with undergoing erratic political circumstances after the coup dรฉtat on May 16 1960 in Korea, the United States postponed any further talks indefinitely. The suspension of negotiation had crippled the initial propagandizing effects surrounding the potential Peace Corps program in Korea, but its publicity regained its strength when Korea accepted the American call for deployment in Indochina in 1964~1965. In short, the United States agreed to activate a Peace Corps program in Korea after the 2nd negotiation talk in 1965 as a form of repayment for the deployment to Vietnam and as a symbolic gesture in the consolidation of the US-Korea anti-communist alliance in East Asia. Peace Corps program in Korea also functioned within the frames of Cultural Cold War. English education and public health programs occupied the heaviest flow of workforce and funds in the Korea program, but results were transitional and experimental at best. As ambitious as the objectives, the Korea program did not produce much significant physical changes in the Korean society. However, the Korea program did produce a different outcome than other Peace Corps programs. In the Third World, the anti-communist agenda tended to dictate the products of Cultural Cold War. The US-Korea Peace Corps negotiations followed such tendency and displayed amplified political effects in the US-Korea diplomatic relations. The last chapter examines the how changes in the form and progress of the program affected the volunteers cognition of themselves and Peace Corps activities in Korea. After the Korean program launched on diplomatic basis, Peace Corps faced various limitations in Korea. On the policy level, Peace Corps sought to abdicate volunteers from any political involvement from the late 1960s and forced the image of a quiet and docile volunteer. In the field, the volunteers clashed with Koreans due to cultural differences and lack of communication in various levels and forms. In turn, the volunteers challenged the existence of Peace Corps itself and converged on an organized critique of the American influence abroad. The disfranchisement of any political association only aggravated the mismanagement of Peace Corps programs and its Volunteers. As Peace Corps grew political and hierarchical, the program had reached an impasse, forcing Peace Corps to withdraw from Korea in 1981. Although Peace Corps program was designed to dismantle the Ugly American discourse in the Third World, as evident in the Korean case, the program proved otherwise. Peace Corps program in Korea not only exposed the dichotomy between policy intent and on-site experience but also proved that peace advocated by Peace Corps would prove to be a fragmented rhetorical representation of the American global imperative. Peace Corps programs in the Third World tended to emphasize rhetorical and moral victory in the their work. The Korea program also reflected the general tendencies of Peace Corps activities but lacked the developmental justification in Korea. This thesis concludes that Peace Corps Korea was a byproduct of the consolidation of the United States-Korea relations in the 1960s, an inconspicuous representation of American foreign policy.๋ณธ๊ณ ๋Š” ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ(Peace Corps)์ด ํ•œ๊ตญ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ์— ์ด๋ฅด๋Š” ๊ณผ์ •๊ณผ ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ ํ™œ๋™ ๋‚ด์šฉ์„ ๊ณ ์ฐฐํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๊ด€์ ์€ 1960๋…„๋Œ€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ๋Œ€ํ•œ์ •์ฑ…์ด ๋‚ดํฌํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฌธํ™” ๋ƒ‰์ „(Cultural Cold War)์  ํŠน์„ฑ์„ ์‚ดํŽด๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ๊ณ ์˜ ๋ถ„์„๋Œ€์ƒ ์‹œ๊ธฐ๋Š” 1961๋…„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ 1981๋…„๊นŒ์ง€๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์€ ํ•œ๊ตญ์ „์Ÿ ์ดํ›„ ํ•œ๊ตญ์˜ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ ๊ณผ์ •์—์„œ ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์ ยท๊ฒฝ์ œ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ง€๋Œ€ํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์ณค๋Š”๋ฐ, ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ(Peace Corps Korea)์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ์‚ฌํšŒยท๋ฌธํ™”์  ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์‚ดํŽด ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ฃผ์š” ํ†ต๋กœ์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ณธ๊ณ ๋Š” ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์กฐ์ง๊ณผ ํ™œ๋™์˜ ์ „์ฒด์ƒ์„ ํ•ด๋ช…ํ•˜๊ณ , ํŠนํžˆ ์™œ ํ•œ๊ตญ์ด ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ์„ ๊ฐ„์ฒญํ–ˆ๋Š”์ง€, ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ์ด ํ•œ๋ฏธ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์–ด๋–ค ์˜๋ฏธ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ–๋Š”์ง€, ํ•œ๊ตญ์— ํˆฌ์ž…๋œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ธ ๋‹จ์›๋“ค์˜ ํ™œ๋™๊ณผ ์ธ์‹์€ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ ์ „ํ›„๋กœ ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ๊ฒช์—ˆ๋Š”์ง€ ์‚ดํŽด๋ณธ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ ์ผ€๋„ค๋”” ํ–‰์ •๋ถ€ ํ•˜์—์„œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ๋ƒ‰์ „์ „๋žต์˜ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ํ•œ ์ถ•์„ ์ด๋ฃจ๋Š” ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„ ์›์กฐ ๋ฐ ์„ ์ „๊ธฐ๊ตฌ๋กœ ์ถœ๋ฒ”ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์€ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํ™œ๋™์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ๋‘ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋ฅผ ์ด๋ฃจ๊ณ ์ž ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ฒซ์งธ, ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์€ ์–ด๊ธ€๋ฆฌ ์•„๋ฉ”๋ฆฌ์นธ์œผ๋กœ ๋Œ€ํ‘œ๋˜๋Š” ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„์˜ ๋น„์šฐํ˜ธ์ ์ธ ๋Œ€๋ฏธ์ธ์‹์„ ์ „ํ™˜์‹œํ‚ค๊ณ ์ž ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ด ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„์— ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ํ™œ๋™์— ์šฐํ˜ธ์ ์ธ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์„ ์กฐ์„ฑํ•  ํ•„์š”์„ฑ์ด ๊ฐ•์กฐ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ, ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์€ ์†Œ๋น„์—ํŠธ ๋ธ”๋ก์˜ ํ™•์žฅ์„ ๊ฒฌ์ œํ•˜๊ณ ์ž ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„์— ์นจํˆฌํ•˜์—ฌ ์†Œ๋น„์—ํŠธ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ๋ชจ๋ธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ญํ•  ๋ฏธ๊ตญ๋ฐœ ๊ทผ๋Œ€ํ™”๋ก ์˜ ๋ฌธํ™”ยท์‹ฌ๋ฆฌ์  ์—ญํ• ์„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜๋Š” ํ•„์—ฐ์ ์ธ ์ „๋žต๊ธฐ๊ด€์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค. ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜ ์ง„์˜์ด ์„ ์ ํ–ˆ๋˜ ํ‰ํ™” ๋‹ด๋ก ์„ ๋‹จ์ฒด๋ช…๊ณผ ๋‹จ์ฒด ๋ชฉํ‘œ์„ค์ •์— ์ „์œ ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ทจ์‚ฌ์„ ํƒ์„ ํ–ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ ์ดˆ์ฐฝ๊ธฐ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ–ˆ๋˜ ์„ธ๊ณ„ํ‰ํ™”์™€ ์šฐํ˜ธ๊ด€๊ณ„ ์ฆ์ง„์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๋น„(้ž)๋ƒ‰์ „์ ์ธ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋ฅผ ๋‚ด์„ธ์›Œ ๋ƒ‰์ „์  ๋„๊ตฌ๋กœ ์ธ์‹๋˜๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฑฐ๋ถ€ํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ๋„ ๋ƒ‰์ „์  ํ”„๋ ˆ์ž„์—์„œ ํ™œ๋™์„ ๊ฐœ์‹œํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํ•œ๊ตญ์—์„œ ํ™œ๋™๋„ ๋ƒ‰์ „์  ์„ฑ๊ฒฉ์„ ๊ฐ•ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋“œ๋Ÿฌ๋ƒˆ๋‹ค. ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ ์˜์–ด๊ต์œก๊ณผ ๊ณต์ค‘๋ณด๊ฑด ๋ถ„์•ผ์— ์น˜์ค‘ํ–ˆ์œผ๋‚˜ ํ™œ๋™์ด ๊ฐ€์ ธ๋‹ค์ฃผ๋Š” ๋ฌผ์งˆ์ ์ธ ํšจ๊ณผ๋ณด๋‹ค ํ•œ๋ฏธ๊ด€๊ณ„์˜ ์™ธ๊ต์  ์ƒ์ง•ํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ๋” ๋ถ€๊ฐ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์‹ค์ œ ํ™œ๋™์€ ๊ณผ๋„๊ธฐ์ ์ด๋ฉฐ ์‹œ์šด์ „์ ์ธ ์„ฑ๊ฒฉ์„ ๋ ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ 1961~1962๋…„์˜ 1์ฐจ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ๊ต์„ญ์—์„œ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋กœ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ๊ณผ ํ™œ๋™์„ ์šฐ์„ ์‹œํ•˜๊ณ  5ยท16 ์ฟ ๋ฐํƒ€ ์ดํ›„ ํ•œ๋ฐ˜๋„์˜ ๋ถˆ์•ˆ์ •ํ•œ ์ •์„ธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์œ ๋ณด์ ์ธ ์ž…์žฅ์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ์ด ๋ณด๋ฅ˜๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ดˆ๊ธฐ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์ด ํ•œ๊ตญ์—์„œ ๊ฐ€์กŒ๋˜ ์„ ์ „ํšจ๊ณผ๋Š” 1์ฐจ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ๊ต์„ญ์ด ๋ณด๋ฅ˜๋˜๋ฉด์„œ ์•ฝํ•ด์กŒ์ง€๋งŒ, 1964~1965๋…„ ํ•œ๊ตญ ์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘์š”์ฒญ์„ ์ˆ˜๋ฝํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ ๋ฐ˜๊ณต ์ œํœด๋ฅผ ๊ฐ•ํ™”ํ•˜๋Š” ํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ํšŒ๋ณตํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์š”์ปจ๋Œ€, ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ์€ 1964๋…„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋ณธ๊ฒฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ธ๋„์ฐจ์ด๋‚˜ ๊ฐœ์ž…์„ ๊ฐœ์‹œํ•œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ํŒŒ๋ณ‘์š”์ฒญ์— ์‘ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ๊ณผ ๋ฐ˜๊ณต์ œํœด๋ฅผ ๋งบ์€ ํ•œ๊ตญ ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์ถฉ์‹คํ•œ ํ˜‘์กฐ์— ๋ณด๋‹ตํ•˜๋Š” ์ฐจ์›์—์„œ ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์กŒ๋‹ค. ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ ๋‹จ์›๋“ค์€ ์‚ฌ์—…์ด ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๋ฉด์„œ ํ™œ๋™์— ํ•œ๊ณ„์— ์ง๋ฉดํ–ˆ๊ณ  ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ๊ณผ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ๋Œ€์™ธ์ •์ฑ… ์ „๋ฐ˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์กฐ์ง์ ์ธ ๋น„ํŒ์„ ์ด์–ด๊ฐ”๋‹ค. ์ด๋“ค์€ ๋ฌธํ™”์  ์ฐจ์ด, ์˜์‚ฌ์†Œํ†ต์˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋กœ ํ™œ๋™ ๋‚ด๋‚ด ์ž์‹ ์˜ ์ธ์ข…๊ณผ ์  ๋”์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ฒ”์œ„์˜ ๋ฐ˜๋ฏธ ํ˜„์ƒ์„ ๊ฒฝํ—˜ํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ ํ•œ๊ตญ ์‚ฌํšŒ์™€ ๊ฐˆ๋“ฑํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ 1960๋…„๋Œ€ ๋ง๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋‹จ์›๋“ค์˜ ์ •์น˜์  ํ‘œํ˜„์„ ์ง์ ‘์ ์œผ๋กœ ์–ต์••ํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ ์กฐ์šฉํ•˜๋ฉฐ ์ˆœ์ข…์ ์ธ ๋‹จ์› ์ƒ์„ ๊ฐ•์š”ํ–ˆ๊ณ , ํ’€๋ฟŒ๋ฆฌ ์ •์‹ ๊ณผ ์ƒ๋ฐ˜๋˜๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ˜์˜ํ•˜์—ฌ ์œ„๊ณ„ํ™”ยท์ •์น˜ํ™”๋˜์–ด๊ฐ”๋‹ค. ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํ™œ๋™์€ ๋‹จ์›๋“ค๋ฟ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์„œ์šธ๋ณธ๋ถ€ยทํ•œ๊ตญ ์ •๋ถ€ ๊ฐ„์˜ ์šด์˜๋ฌธ์ œ๋กœ ๋‚œ๊ด€์— ๋ด‰์ฐฉํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜์–ด ๊ฒฐ๊ตญ 1981๋…„์— ์ฒ ์ˆ˜ํ•˜๋ฉฐ ์ข…๊ฒฐ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„์—์„œ ์ฆ์‹๋˜๋Š” ์–ด๊ธ€๋ฆฌ ์•„๋ฉ”๋ฆฌ์นธ ๋‹ด๋ก ์„ ํ•ด์ฒดํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ๋˜์—ˆ์œผ๋‚˜, ํ•œ๊ตญ์—์„œ์˜ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋Š” ์‹ค์ œ ๋‹จ์›๋“ค์˜ ํ™œ๋™์ด ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์˜ ๋Œ€์™ธํ™œ๋™๋ฟ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„ ์‚ฌํšŒ์˜ ๋ถ€์ •์ ์ธ ์ธ์‹์„ ์žฌ์ƒ์‚ฐํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์ด ์ œ์ฐฝํ•˜๋Š” ํ‰ํ™”๊ฐ€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ๋Œ€์™ธ์ •์ฑ…์— ์˜ํ•ด ๊ฒฐ์ •๋˜๋Š” ์ˆ˜์‚ฌ์  ํ‘œํ˜„์— ๋ถˆ๊ณผํ–ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์‹ค์ œ ํ™œ๋™๊ณผ ํ™œ๋™๊ตฌ์ƒ์ด ๊ฒฉ์ฐจ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์˜€๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋‹ค. ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์€ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์ œ3์„ธ๊ณ„์—์„œ๋„ ์œ ์‚ฌํ•œ ํ™œ๋™์„ ํŽผ์ณค๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ 1966๋…„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ 1981๋…„๊นŒ์ง€์˜ ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํ™œ๋™์€ 1960๋…„๋Œ€ ํ•œ๋ฏธ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ•ํ™”๋˜๋Š” ๋งฅ๋ฝ ์†์—์„œ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ–ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ํŠน์ง•์„ ๊ฐ–๋Š”๋‹ค.๋จธ๋ฆฌ๋ง ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 1 ไธ€. ๋ฏธ๊ตญ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์„ฑ๋ฆฝ (1961.3.1) 1. ํ‰ํ™”๋ฅผ ๋‘˜๋Ÿฌ์‹ผ ๋ฏธ์†Œ ๋Œ€๊ฒฐ ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 9 2. ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์„ค๋ฆฝ๊ณผ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ํ‰ํ™” ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 16 ไบŒ. ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ ํŒŒํ•œ ํ˜‘์ƒ์˜ ์ „๊ฐœ๊ณผ์ • (1961.3~1966.9) 1. 1์ฐจ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌํ˜‘์ƒ์˜ ๊ฒฐ๋ ฌ๊ณผ ํ•œ๋ฏธ๊ด€๊ณ„์˜ ์žฌ๊ณ  ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 24 2. 2์ฐจ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌํ˜‘์ƒ์—์„œ ๋ฐ•์ •ํฌ-์กด์Šจ์˜ ์ œํœด ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 37 ไธ‰. ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํ™œ๋™๊ณผ ๊ทธ ๊ท€๊ฒฐ (1966.9~1981.7) 1. ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ์˜ ํŒŒ๊ฒฌ๊ณผ ์„ค์น˜ ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 44 2. ์˜์–ด๊ต์œก ๋ฐ ๊ณต์ค‘๋ณด๊ฑด๊ด€๋ฆฌ ํ™œ๋™ ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 53 3. ์ฃผํ•œ ๋ฏธ ํ‰ํ™”๋ด‰์‚ฌ๋‹จ ๋‹จ์›๋“ค์˜ ์ธ์‹ ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 66 ๋งบ์Œ๋ง ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 82 ์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 88 ๋ถ€๋ก ยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยทยท 97 AbstractMaste

    A Study on the Application of the Cost Estimation on the Bills

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