5 research outputs found
Governance Structure, Firm Performance, and Strategic Change in Chinese Firms
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Όλ¬Έ (λ°μ¬)-- μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ κ²½μλν κ²½μνκ³Ό, 2017. 8. λ°μ² μ.Corporate governance has become a major research topic in modern strategic management research. Since the concept of 'corporate governance' emerged in the process of solving the agency problem caused by the special relationship between 'ownership' and 'management', it has created a wide and broad range of research areas: control mechanisms (e.g., agency theory and stewardship theory) based on the attitudes and characteristics of principal governance agents and the causal relationship with various corporate performance variables. In particular, since the proliferation of globalization and free trade began in the late 20th century, it has spurred the movement toward governance improvements by increasing the necessity for individual countries and enterprises to form their corporate governance to meet international standards.
China is no exception to this trend. As the influence of Chinese enterprises increases, the improvement of their governance in line with international standards has become their major challenge. The Chinese government finalized the "Equity Division Reform" at the end of 2006, beginning with the amendment of the and the at a Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in September 1999. As a result, the government-centered unitary structure, "ownership-management," has been separated, and an institutional basis close to international standards has been established.
Therefore, we have presumed that the Equity Division Reform' has a great influence on the improvement of the governance of the listed enterprises in China. In the study, we have focused on verifying the causal relationship between corporate governance characteristics and firm performance and strategic variables in Chinese enterprises after the reform. First, in Study 1, we have explored the relationship between the characteristics of corporate principal management' agents and corporate financial performance. We have sampled listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs) in China in a period of corporate governance stabilization from 2007 to 2015. Among the corporate governance variables, we have postulated the characteristics of the principal management' agents (BOD and CEO) as independent variables to analyze their effects on the financial performance. The earlier studies on enterprises in China were not enough to identify the longitudinal relationship between principal management' agents in corporate governance and financial performance. Therefore, we have made an attempt to fill the gap. In addition, we have focused on enhancing the differentiation of research by considering 'political connections' as one of the main characteristics of principal management agents and examining the causal relationship with the dependent variable.
In Study 2, only listed state-owned enterprises in China are subject to the study, and they are classified into the categories (state-owned share and state-owned legal person share) with legal and institutional grounds to identify the causal relationship between the characteristics of corporate governance and the strategic change. In the study, the following have been taken into account: So far, there has been very little research on the relationship between corporate governance and strategic change in Chinese enterprises. Even if the scope of this study is extended beyond China, there is a need for a study on the relationship between the 'ownership' holders and the strategic change to consider the characteristics of 'ownership' holders because the governance factors are concentrated on the principal management agents. Among the state-owned enterprises listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), we have finally selected 270 firms observable for nine years from 2007 to 2015 and have used a fixed effect model to analyze them.
In Studies 1 and 2 mentioned above, there are the following implications. The causal relationship of each corporate governance factor with the corporate performance and strategies have been analyzed from the existing contractual viewpoint. In addition, the behavioral approach to principal governance agents and the institutional and environmental uniqueness embraced by Chinese enterprises have been considered.GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1
STUDY1: THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ONFIRM PERFORMANCE IN CHINESE ENTERPRISES 4
ABSTRACT 5
INTRODUCTION 7
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 13
Definition of Corporate Governance and its Relationship with the financial performance 13
Uniqueness of Corporate Governance in China 15
HYPOTHESES 21
Principal Management Agents and Financial Performance 21
Ownership Types and Interaction Effect 30
RESEARCH METHODS 38
Data Collection 38
Operational Definition of Variables 39
Analysis Methods 44
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS 46
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 51Docto
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μ μΌλ‘ 184κ°μ νλ³Έμ νμ νμλ€. νλ³Έμ νμ νκ³ ν΅κ³μ μΌλ‘ κ²μ¦ν΄ λ³Έ κ²°κ³Ό μ΄μ¬νμ νΉμ±(μ 체 μ΄μ¬νμ μ€ μ¬λ΄μ΄μ¬μ λΉμ¨, CEO Duality)μ΄ CSR νλμ μ μν μν₯μ μ€μ΄ κ²μ¦λμμΌλ©°, μ¬λ΄μ΄μ¬μ 곡μ°λΉμ μ‘°μ ν¨κ³Όλ₯Ό κ²μ¦ν κ°μ€ 3μ κ²½μ°λ μ±νλκ³ CEO dualityμΌ κ²½μ° κ³΅μ°λΉμ μ‘°μ ν¨κ³Όλ₯Ό κ²μ¦ν κ°μ€ 4λ κΈ°κ°λμλ€.The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of BOD's composition on CSR activity in China using membership of the Communist Party as a moderator. Unlike earlier studies, this study focus on "Chinese manufacturing companies CSR activity" and "membership of the Communist party" as a moderate variable. The hypotheses were tested by 184 listed companies in manufacturing sector in Shanghai SE. The study results reveal that BOD's Composition are related to CSR activity (Hypothesis 1, 2). And membership of the Communist Party has positive modering effect on BOD's composition feature (ratio of Insider directors) and CSR activity (Hypothesis 3). But it didnt prove moderator role between CEO duality and CSR activity. Implication for theory, research, and practice are suggested in the conclusion.Maste
Research on the Influence of Political Connection of Board of Directors on the Relations between CSR Activities and Precedent Factors: Case Study on Chinese Enterprises
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This research is an attempt to empirically analyze enterprises within China, undergoing increasing level of institutional, environmental pressure on CSR since mid-2000s. This is in order to examine how the political connection of board of directors influence relations between performances of CSR activities and precedent factors. Among enterprises listed on the Shanghai stock exchange, 112 companies, observable for six years ranging from 2008 to 2013, were selected as samples. With formation of 672 observed values, analysis was conducted with fixed effect model. In this research, return on assets (ROA) of enterprises, share percentage held by the largest shareholders, and political connection of board of directors were taken as independent variables. In addition, among the independent variables, political connection of board of directors was re-applied as a moderator variable to observe interaction effects. As a result of empirical analysis, it was found that all three leading variables held significant results on CSR performances.
However, alternative hypothesis on relations between share percentage held by the largest shareholders and CSR performances was rejected. Furthermore, it was proved that political connection of board of directors reinforces positive correlation between ROA and CSR performances, and in turn alleviates negative correlation between share percentage held by the largest shareholders and CSR performances. Such result displays how political connection of board of directors can be considered as an important variable in studying enterprises within China, a country with a distinct political, economic system. At the same time, it can be considered as a result showing that political factors have the potential to develop as a key research area in the field of corporate governance studies.N