22 research outputs found
Campaign Contribution Limits and Interest Groups: Further Evidence from State House Elections
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μΌλ‘ μμ©ν κ°λ₯μ±μ΄ ν° κ²μΌλ‘ μ°κ΅¬κ²°κ³Όλ μ μνκ³ μμλ€. μ΄μ κ°μ μ°κ΅¬κ²°κ³Όλ μ£Όμ§μ¬ μ κ±°λ₯Ό λμμΌλ‘ ν μ°κ΅¬κ²°κ³Όμ λΆν©νλ κ²μΌλ‘ λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ μ΄μ΅μ§λ¨μ κΈ°λΆλ₯Ό μ ννκ³ μλ κΈ°λΆκΈ μ νλ²μ ν μΆμΈκ° κ³μ μ μ§λμ΄μΌ ν κ²μμ λ€μ νλ² μ μνκ³ μλ€.This paper examines whether campaign contribution limits reduce the influence of interest groups, measured by the number and amount of contributions. In addition, it also investigates one of possible unintended consequences; increasing disparity in contributions between incumbents and challengers in favor of incumbents. After examining 34 state house elections during the period of 1999 to 2002, I found that the presence of contribution limits decreases contributions of interest groups in numbers and amounts. These effects were not accompanied by the unintended consequences; in fact, the presence of limits tends to rather decrease disparity in contributions. The findings provide further evidence of positive effects of contribution limits, which were previously found in gubernatorial elections. Regardless of electoral settings, gubernatorial elections or state house elections, contribution limits reduce the influence of interest groups without negative consequence. Therefore, this study suggests that restrictive contribution limits should remain in the current direction
Rethinking of Voters Evaluations on the Representative Role of Local Assembly: Empirical Analyses of the 6th Local Assembly in Gyeonggi
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A representative role of local assemblymen has been known for an important factor for reelection. Local assemblymen make a serious investment in constituency service and case work. The evaluations of voters on representation, however, are low. This paper attempts to solve this puzzle. I suggest that a voter evaluates a representative role of assemblymen through his or her lens. A voter tends to evaluate high if his or her favorite party is a majority party in assembly, but evaluate low otherwise. Therefore, this theory predicts that if a voter's favorite party is controlled the evaluation of representation does not affect his or her party choice. Examining survey data of the 6th Local Assembly in Gyeonggi supports the theory