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    Focused on Ownership Structure

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(์„์‚ฌ)--์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› :๊ฒฝ์˜๋Œ€ํ•™ ๊ฒฝ์˜ํ•™๊ณผ,2020. 2. ๊ณ ๋ด‰์ฐฌ.This thesis explores the operation of the internal control mechanism and the agency problem, centered on the ownership structure of corporate governance through a study of the relationship between earnings management and firm value. This study will first review the effects of corporate earnings management on firm value, and then, demonstrates how corporate governance affects the link between earnings management and corporate values. The results from the empirical study can be summarized as follows. As the level of earnings management of the prior year increases, the firm value decreases. This suggests that information on earnings management is negatively viewed in the capital market. In other words, earnings management by firms reduces the credibility and utility of accounting information, leading to an increase in capital costs and a decrease in firm value. According to the analysis that took into account corporate governance, ownership structure variable, among various factors that can mitigate the negative impact of earnings management on firm value, foreign investors (an external corporate governance factor) do not have a statistically significant impact. On the other hand, internal corporate governance factors, such as the largest shareholders, the board of directors, and the CEO, have a positive and statistically significant effect on the relationship between earnings management and firm value. Therefore, it can be inferred that because earnings management practices are discretely done inside firms, ultimately only the internal governance structure has an effect on firm value. The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of earnings management practice on investors evaluation through the impact on firm value as well as the effect of corporate governance on the relationship between earnings management and firm value. This research provides a compelling study as the first domestic research on the subject offering empirical evidence through domestic references. Furthermore, it differentiates itself from existing researches by pointing to the factors of corporate governance that affect the relationship between earnings management and firm value by using various proxy variables. The findings from this thesis imply that investors should consider the factors of corporate governance when utilizing information on reported earnings.๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์—…์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ์ค‘ ์†Œ์œ ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ์ค‘์‹ฌ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚ด๋ถ€ํ†ต์ œ(Internal Control) ๋ฉ”์ปค๋‹ˆ์ฆ˜์˜ ์ž‘๋™ ๋ฐ ๋Œ€๋ฆฌ์ธ๋ฌธ์ œ์˜ ์™„ํ™” ์—ฌ๋ถ€๋ฅผ ์ด์ต์กฐ์ • ์ˆ˜์ค€๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์—…๊ฐ€์น˜ ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ๊ฒ€์ฆํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ชฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋‹จ๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋จผ์ € 1) ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์ด์ต์กฐ์ •์ด ๊ธฐ์—… ๊ฐ€์น˜์— ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”์ง€ ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•˜๊ณ , 2) ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ๊ฐ€ ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์ด์ต์กฐ์ • ์ˆ˜์ค€๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์—…๊ฐ€์น˜ ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์ง€์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์‹ค์ฆ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์š”์•ฝํ•˜๋ฉด ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™๋‹ค. ์ฒซ์งธ, ์ „๊ธฐ์˜ ์ด์ต์กฐ์ • ์ˆ˜์ค€์ด ์ฆ๊ฐ€ํ• ์ˆ˜๋ก ๋‹น๊ธฐ์˜ ๊ธฐ์—…๊ฐ€์น˜๋Š” ๊ฐ์†Œํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ™•์ธ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ์ด์ต์กฐ์ •์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์ž๋ณธ์‹œ์žฅ์—์„œ ๋ถ€์ •์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ•ด์„๋œ๋‹ค. ์ฆ‰, ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์ด์ต์กฐ์ • ํ–‰์œ„๊ฐ€ ํšŒ๊ณ„์ •๋ณด์˜ ์‹ ๋ขฐ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ์œ ์šฉ์„ฑ์„ ๊ฐ์†Œ์‹œ์ผœ ๊ถ๊ทน์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ž๋ณธ๋น„์šฉ์ด ์ฆ๊ฐ€ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ธฐ์—…๊ฐ€์น˜๋Š” ๊ฐ์†Œํ•  ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ™•์ธ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ, ์ƒํ˜ธ์ž‘์šฉ๋ณ€์ˆ˜์ธ ๊ธฐ์—…์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์— ์˜ํ•˜๋ฉด, ์ด์ต์กฐ์ •์ด ๊ธฐ์—…๊ฐ€์น˜์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๋ถ€์ •์ ์ธ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์™„ํ™”์‹œํ‚ค ์œ„ํ•œ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ์š”์ธ ์ค‘ ๊ธฐ์—…์™ธ๋ถ€ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ์š”์ธ์ธ ์™ธ๊ตญ์ธํˆฌ์ž์ž๋Š” ๋ณ„๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ, ๊ธฐ์—…๋‚ด๋ถ€ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ์š”์ธ์ธ ์ตœ๋Œ€์ฃผ์ฃผ, ์ด์‚ฌํšŒ, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ตœ๊ณ ๊ฒฝ์˜์ž๋Š” ์œ ์˜ํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ์ด์ต์กฐ์ •์ด๋ผ๋Š” ํ–‰์œ„๊ฐ€ ๊ธฐ์—…๋‚ด๋ถ€์—์„œ ์€๋ฐ€ํžˆ ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๋Š” ์‚ฌํ•ญ์ด๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— ๊ธฐ์—… ๋‚ด๋ถ€์˜ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ์š”์ธ๋งŒ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ๋„์ถœ๋œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ•ด์„๋œ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์ด์ต์กฐ์ •๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์—…๊ฐ€์น˜ ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•œ ๊ตญ๋‚ด ์ตœ์ดˆ์˜ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋กœ์„œ ๊ตญ๋‚ด ์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ ์‹ค์ฆ์ ์ธ ๊ทผ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์—์„œ ๊ทธ ์˜์˜๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ์˜ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋Œ€์šฉ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์œผ๋กœ ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ์š”์ธ์ด ์ด์ต์กฐ์ •๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์—…๊ฐ€์น˜ ๊ฐ„์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”์— ์–ด๋– ํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”์ง€ ํ™•์ธํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค๋Š” ๋ฐ์— ๊ธฐ์กด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์™€ ์ฐจ๋ณ„์„ฑ์„ ๊ฐ–๋Š”๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ์ž๋ณธ์‹œ์žฅ์—์„œ ํˆฌ์ž์ž๋“ค์ด ์ด์ต์กฐ์ •์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•  ๋•Œ ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ์ง€๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ์š”์ธ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์Œ์„ ์‹œ์‚ฌํ•œ๋‹ค.I. INTRODUCTION. 1 II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 3 2.1. Earnings Management. 3 2.2. Firm Value. 9 2.3. Corporate Governance. 13 2.4. Hypothesis. 17 III. RESEARCH DESIGN 20 3.1. Sample Selection and Data. 20 3.2. Earnings Management Variable. 26 3.3. Research Model. 28 IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 33 4.1. The effect of the Largest shareholder ownership. 33 4.2. The effect of Foreign investor ownership. 36 4.3. The effect of Board ownership. 38 4.4. The effect of CEO ownership. 40 V. CONCLUSION. 43 APPENDIX: Ownership-Control Disparity. 45 REFERENCES. 48 ABSTRACT IN KOREAN. 53Maste
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