A Quinean Critique of Chalmers' Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 철학과, 2015. 2. 강진호.My masters thesis is a Quinean critique of David Chalmers semantic theory, epistemic two-dimensional semantics. I criticize his epistemic two-dimensional semantics by providing a Quinean critique of his assumption that there is clear distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, which plays a fundamental role in constructing his semantic theory. In chapter 1, I discuss Chalmers epistemic two-dimensional semantics, which is intended as a vindication of Fregean semantics, and the role of the a priori in the vindication. I argue that it is paramount to define an expressions primary intension, which plays Fregean sense roles, and that the definition of primary intensions fundamentally depends on the assumption that there is the a priori/a posteriori distinction. In chapter 2, I examine Chalmers response to Quines attack on the a priori. According to Chalmers understanding of Quines attack, Quine argues that every sentence is revisable (revisability), and thus there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. Against Quines argument, Chalmers attempts to draw the principled distinction between revisability involving conceptual change and the one without conceptual change. He then argues that revisability is consistent with the a priori/a posteriori distinction, and thus Quines attack on the a priori fails. In chapter 3, I scrutinize Quines critique of Carnaps a priori relative to a language in Two Dogmas of Empiricism. I argue that Carnapian distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is repudiated by two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by evidence. In chapter 4, I will provide a Quinean critique of Chalmers rejoinder to Quines attack on the a priori and of Chalmers semantic theory. The two Quinean doctrines imply that there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. On the basis of this implication, I argue that Chalmers rejoinder fails and moreover his semantic theory would be repudiated.Contents Introduction / 1 1. Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics and the A Priori / 6 1.1. Introduction / 6 1.2. Epistemic Two-Dimensional semantics as Fregean Semantics / 8 1.2.1. The Golden Triangle between Reason, Modality and Meaning / 10 1.2.2. Kripkes Destruction of the Golden Triangle / 13 1.2.3. Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Golden Triangle / 15 1.3. A Priori Scrutability Thesis: A Foundational Thesis for Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics / 17 1.3.1. Reviving the Aufbau-like Project: A Priori Scrutability /17 1.3.2. A Priori Scrutability and Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics /24 2. Chalmerss Critique of Quines Attack on the A Priori / 28 2.1. Introduction / 28 2.2. Chalmers Understanding of Quines Attack on the A Priori /31 2.3. Grice and Strawsons Response to Quines Attack on the A Priori /33 2.4. A Carnapian Response to Quines Attack on the A Priori / 36 2.5. A Bayesian Response to Quines Attack on the A Priori /41 3. Reconsidering Quines Critique of the A Priori in Two Dogmas of Empiricism / 48 3.1. Introduction / 48 3.2. Some Background for Quines Attack on the A Priori / 49 3.3. No Absolute A Priori / 52 3.4. No Relativized A Priori / 54 3.5. What is the Distinctive Epistemic Status of Logic and Mathematics? / 62 4. A Quinean Counterattack on Chalmers Critique of Quines Attack on the A Priori / 65 4.1. Introduction / 65 4.2. Chalmers Rejoinder to Quines Attack on the A Priori / 68 4.3. A Quinean Critique of Chalmers Rejoinder to Quines Attack on the A Priori / 73 4.4. A Quinean Doubt about a Fundamental Assumption of Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics / 81 Conclusion / 84 Reference / 88 Abstract (Korean) / 92Maste