Alliance Theory and Northeast Asia: Challenges on the 60th Anniversary of the Korea-U.S. Alliance

An alliance system is often compared to a living organism in that the equilibrium point of the alliance constantly changes. The Korea-U.S. alliance is no exception, having adapted to the post-Cold War international security environment and continually seeking a new alliance vision. Based on the assumption that the Cold-War security threats still exist, Korea chose to consolidate its bilateral alliance with the United States in lieu of multilateralism or confidence-building measures among regional states. The problem, however, is that while the Korea-U.S. alliance has evolved into a relationship that encompasses economic, social and cultural cooperation in the post-Cold War period, South Korea's core security interest-the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the realization of peace on the Korean Peninsula-cannot be attained. This is because the strengthening of Korea-U.S. military deterrence against North Korea can unintentionally justify North Korea's nuclear development as well as constant reproduction of crisis, on the grounds that it intensifies the threat perception of the North. At this time of its sixtieth anniversary, the goals and identity of the Korea-U.S. alliance need to be reconsidered in order to reflect the changing security situation. While maintaining the deterrence against the North through an elaborate cooperation system, the alliance needs to set more creative goals that include the realization of human security on the Korean Peninsula or the formation of a Northeast Asian security community

Two-Level Game and Politics of the United States-North Korea Negotiation

When the second U.S.-North Korea Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam ended abruptly without a deal, critics and experts argued that U.S. President Trump, considering the domestic pressure, changed his goals and interests at the very last minute. To theoretically explain the negotiation process in Hanoi, this study analyzes the win-set structure of the United States and North Korea. This study also aims to examine the causes of the failure by comparing the agreement zones between the United States and North Korea's win-sets before and after the summit. Two-level game theory explains how negotiating countries with conflicting interests achieve an agreement and what kinds of strategies the governments use to maximize their own national interests. The key assumption of the two-level game theory is the linkage between domestic politics and international affairs, and the interconnection was widely suggested by many scholars including Gabriel A. Almond, James N. Rosenau, and Bruce M. Russett. Building on to this literature, Putnam's two-level game theory introduced the concept of a "win-set" and examined the international negotiation process thoroughly using this theoretical model. Based on the analysis of the two parties' win-sets, this study finds that the United States intentionally ended the negotiation without a deal by contracting the size of its win-set. The United States shifted its interest from the original position, which is "trading partial (or symbolic) dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons with partial removal of economic sanctions," to the new interest position including the abandonment of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) referred to as "Yongbyon Plus Alpha" and the agreement on a roadmap to denuclearization

Global Politics of Policy Knowledge Networks_The Case of Foreign and Security Policy Think tank

초국가적 수준에서 외교안보 관련 지식과 정보가 지속적으로 교류 및 공유되고 있으며 결과적으로 글로벌한 수준에서 외교안보 정책지식 네트워크가 형성되고 있다. 이러한 과정에서 탈냉전기 이후 싱크탱크가 외교안보 정책지식의 생산 및 국제적 교류에 주도적인 역할을 기여하게 되었다. 일반적으로 정책지식은 복합성경쟁성특정 정책의 발전주기와 결합등의 특징을 보이게 되는데, 싱크탱크는 정책 지식의 이러한 특징을 가장 잘 구현하는 정책지식 생산주체라는 평가를 받고 있다. 특히 싱크탱크는 특정한 자본, 이념, 주체의 수준 등으로부터 자유롭기 때문에 개별 국가의 범위를 넘어서는 외부환경과의 링크 역할을 적극적으로 추진한다. 현재 다양한옹호 싱크탱크(advocacy think tank)가 전 세계적으로 생겨나면서 외교안보 영역의 정책결정 참여자들에게 다양한 방식과 경로를 통해 정책지식을 공급하고 있는 것이다. 외교안보 영역의 경우 개별 국가의 정책적 선택이 국제정치적 세력관계에 직접적으로 영향을 미치는 특수성으로 말미암아 글로벌 수준의 관련 지식 교류가 매우 중요하게 인식되고 있으며, 이러한 배경에서 싱크탱크의 역할은 최근 중요성을 인정받고 있다. 한국의 경우 과거로부터 국가 싱크탱크의 전통이 강하게 남아있는데 현재에도 이들을 중심으로 주변국들과 활발한 정책지식 교환 현상이 가시화되고 있다. 대표적으로 외교안보연구원, 국방연구원, 세종연구소, 국제교류재단 등의 싱크탱크 주체들이 외부 환경의 싱크탱크들과 글로벌 안보에 대한 인식의 공유 및 정책지식의 교환을 주도하고 있으며, 이러한 현상은 궁극적으로 한국의 국가안보를 어떻게 규정하고 실천하느냐의 문제와 관련하여 글로벌한 차원의 인식공동체에 일정 부분 의존하게 만듦은 물론 나아가 글로벌 안보공동체의 규범과 지식에 의거한 정책지식을 채택하게 만들 것으로 기대된다.Since the beginning of the globalization states are interdependent each other in many issue areas. In particular, individual sates security related policies, which were traditionally known as the most remote filed from globalization,are not in the exceptional area. States are supposed to understand the characteristic features of their both regional security and global security to more comprehensively identify their national interests in terms of national security in the globalization era. Korea began to associate her national interests in the context of East Asian regional security community or global security community. In the meantime epistemic communities are formed as the consequences of globally communicated policy-oriented knowledge. Think tanks center on the global flow of policy knowledge. Mainly, this is because they are more appropriate to produce usable knowledge to be applicable to specific foreign and security policy. Since the unique tradition of developmental state of Korea our government-run think tanks are the main player to actively contact to globally known think tanks. They typically include think tanks such as Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security Sejong Institute Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and Korea Foundation,etc. Their global contact to foreign think tanks dramatically increased since the mid 1990s. and not only in the visible development of their participation to global policy-knowledge network, but also their appreciation on regional or global security community has increased

Combination Treatment of Angiotensin-II Receptor Blocker and Angiotensin-Converting-Enzyme Inhibitor in Non-Diabetic Renal Disease on Effect of Reducing Proteinuria

학위논문(석사)--아주대학교 대학원 :의학과,2005배경 및 목적 : 안지오텐신 전환효소 억제제와 안지오텐신 수용체 길항제는 서로 다른 수준에서 레닌-안지오텐신계를 억제하여 각각 만성 신질환의 진행을 억제하는데 도움을 준다는 여러 보고가 있어왔다. 따라서, 이 둘의 병합 사용은 상호 부가적인 효과로 신장을 보호할 것이라고 기대가 되나, 이에 관해서는 많은 이견들이 있어 이에 관해 연구하고자 하였다. 연구대상 및 방법 : 1998년 6월부터 2002년 12월까지 아주대학교병원에 내원하여 신조직검사를 시행받고 비당뇨성 신병증이 진단된 266명의 환자 중 24주 이상 관찰가능하고 안지오텐신 전환 효소 억제제 또는 안지오텐신 수용체 길항제를 각각 사용하거나 병합사용한 83명을 대상으로 사용된 약제에 따라 각각 세군으로 나누어 24주간 단백뇨와, 혈중 크레아티닌 변화량을 조사하였다. 결과 : 사용약제들에 따른 부작용으로 마른기침은 ACEI(angiotensin-converting- enzyme inhibitor) 사용자 10명과 병합사용자4명이 호소하였으며, 기립성 저혈압은ACEI 사용자 1명과 ARB (angiotensin-II receptor blocker) 사용자 1명, 병합사용자 2명이 발생하였고, 혈관부종은 ARB 사용자 1명, 병합사용자 1명이 발생하였다. 안지오텐신 전환 효소 억제제를 사용한 군, 안지오텐신 수용체 길항제를 사용한 군 그리고 이 둘을 병합사용한 군에서 단백뇨는 사용전을 100%라고 했을 때 각각 처음의 52.6%, 76.7%, 52.2% 수준으로 감소하는 소견을 보였으나 세군간 유의한 차이는 없었으며, 혈중 크레아티닌은 각각 1.3±0.6 mg/dl, 1.3±0.5 mg/dl , 1.3±0.3 mg/dl에서 투약 3개월후의 혈중 크레아티닌 수치는 각각1.3±0.7 mg/dl, 1.3±0.6 mg/dl, 1.3±0.4 mg/dl 이었으며 투약 6개월후 각각1.4±0.8 mg/dl, 1.3±0.6 mg/dl, 1.4±0.4 mg/dl로 다소 상승하는 경향이 있었으나 각군간의 유의한 차이는 보이지 않았다. 결론 : 본 연구에서는 ACE와 ARB 그리고 이 두 가지 약제를 병합사용함으로써 고칼륨혈증이나, 신기능 감소의 부작용 없이 단백뇨를 모두에서 감량시킬 수 있음을 보여주었으나 세 군간의 단백뇨 감량의 차이는 관찰할 수 없어 신질환의 진행을 일으키는데 RAS(Renin-Angiotensin System)뿐만 아니라 RAS외에 다른 요소들에 대한 지속적인 연구가 필요하다고 생각되었다.차례 국문요약 = ⅰ 차례 = ⅲ 그림 차례 = ⅳ 표차례 = ⅴ Ⅰ. 서론 = 1 Ⅱ. 연구대상 및 방법 = 3 A. 대상환자 = 3 B. 혈액검사 및 단백뇨량의 측정 = 3 C. 투약 부작용의 관찰 = 4 D. 자료의 분석 = 4 Ⅲ. 결과 = 5 Ⅳ. 고찰 = 9 Ⅴ. 결론 = 12 참고문헌 = 13 ABSTRACT = 16|그림 차례 Fig. 1. Trial profile = 5 Fig. 2. Percentage of proteinuria by treatment group = 7 Fig. 3. Mean serum creatinine concentration by treatment group = 8|표 차례 Table 1. Patients characteristics = 6MasterBackground : The fact that angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors(ACEI) and angiotensin receptor blockers(ARB) antagonize the renin-angiotensin system at different levels suggests that these agents, already confirmed by clinical benefit in retarding the progression of chronic renal disease, may have additive effects that result in even greater renoprotection when used in combination. But many studies have failed to distinguish clearly between the additive intrinsic renoprotective effect. So we aimed to assess the efficacy and safety of combined treatment of ACEI and ARB, and monotherapy of each drug in patients with non-diabetic renal disease. Methods : 266 patients who have non-diabetic renal disease comfirmed by renal biopsy in Ajou university hospital retrospectively reviewed. After reviewing, 83 patients who were followed up for 24 weeks more and prescribed ACEI only, ARB only, or a combination of both drugs are selected. The 83 patients were classified into 3 subgroups based on the kind of the drugs prescribed. We evaluated the changes of serum creatinine, the amount of proteinuria, the development of hyperkalemia and hypotension in the subgroups. Results : Dry cough was recorded in 10 patients of ACEI group and 4 patients of combination group. Orthostatic hypotension was recorded in 1 patient of ACEI group, 1 patient of ARB group, and 1 patient of combination group. Angioedema was recorded in 1 patient of ARB group and 1 patient of combination group. In ACEI group, ARB group, and combination group, amount of proteinuria decreased to 52.6%, 76.7% and 52.5% of initial amount at 24 week after starting each drug. There were no statistical significancy among these groups. Each initial mean serum creatinine concentration of groups (1.30.6 mg/dl, 1.30.5 mg/dl , 1.30.3 mg/dl) statistically didn't increase significantlyat 24 week after starting each drug(1.40.8 mg/dl, 1.30.6 mg/dl , 1.40.4 mg/dl). Conclusions : Combination treatment safely retards progression of non-diabetic renal disease compared with monotherapy. However we failed to distinguish clearly the additive intrinsic renoprotective effect. Another intervention aimed at non-renin angiotensin system pathogenesis is needed to completely halt the progression of renal disease