28 research outputs found

    Shape and Text Imprint Recognition of Pill Image Taken with a Smartphone

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (์„์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› ๊ณต๊ณผ๋Œ€ํ•™ ๊ธฐ๊ณ„ํ•ญ๊ณต๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€, 2017. 8. ์ด๊ฑด์šฐ.์‚ถ์„ ์ด๋กญ๊ฒŒ ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์ˆ˜ ๋งŽ์€ ์•ฝ๋“ค์ด ์ œ์กฐ ยท ํŒ๋งค๋˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์•ฝ๋“ค์€ ์˜ค์šฉ๋˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜ ๋‚จ์šฉ๋  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์—๊ฒŒ ์น˜๋ช…์ ์ธ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ์ผ์œผํ‚ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ธํ„ฐ๋„ท๊ณผ ์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ์•Œ์•ฝ์„ ๊ฒ€์ƒ‰ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ทธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์–ป์„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์œผ๋‚˜, ๋ชจ์–‘๊ณผ ์ƒ‰์ƒ, ๊ธ€์ž๋ฅผ ์ง์ ‘ ์ž…๋ ฅ ํ•ด์•ผํ•˜๊ณ  ํŠน์ˆ˜ํ•œ ๋งˆ์ปค๋ฅผ ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ์œผ๋กœ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•ด์•ผํ•˜๋Š” ๋“ฑ ์ ‘๊ทผ์„ฑ์ด ๋‚ฎ๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ํŠน์ˆ˜ํ•œ ๋งˆ์ปค๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์œผ๋ฉด์„œ๋„ ์•Œ์•ฝ ์ด๋ฏธ์ง€๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๊ธ€์ž ์ •๋ณด๊นŒ์ง€ ํš๋“ํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” ์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์œผ๋กœ ์ดฌ์˜๋œ ์•Œ์•ฝ ์˜์ƒ์—์„œ ๊ธ€์ž์™€ ํ˜•์ƒ์„ ์ธ์‹ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ๋‹ค. ์•Œ์•ฝ์ด ํฌํ•จ๋œ ์˜์ƒ์—์„œ ์•Œ์•ฝ ์˜์—ญ์„ ํŠน์ • ์ง“๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด Saliency Map์„ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ๋’ค, ๋น› ํšจ๊ณผ์™€ ๊ทธ๋ฆผ์ž ํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์ œ๊ฑฐํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ํš๋“๋œ ์•Œ์•ฝ ์˜์—ญ์—์„œ Zernike Moment๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ํ˜•์ƒ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์–ป๋Š”๋‹ค. Gaussian Filter, Gradient Filter, Binarization์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ์•Œ์•ฝ์˜ ๊ธ€์ž๋ฅผ ๊ฐ์‹ธ๋Š” ๋ฐ•์Šค๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ถœํ•˜๊ณ , CNN Deep Learning์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ํ•™์Šต๋œ ๊ฐ์ธ ๊ธ€์ž ์ธ์‹๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์ตœ์ข…์ ์ธ ๊ธ€์ž ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ํš๋“ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ ์ œ์•ˆํ•˜๋Š” ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์„ ํ…Œ์ŠคํŠธํ•˜๊ธฐ์œ„ํ•ด NLM ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋ฒ ์ด์Šค์˜ ์•Œ์•ฝ ์ด๋ฏธ์ง€ ์ด 500๊ฐœ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ, 1) Shape Matching Rate, 2) Text Box Detection Rate, 3) Character Recognition Rate, 4) Text Recognition Rate, 5) Recognition Success Rate๋กœ ์ด 5๊ฐ€์ง€ ํ•ญ๋ชฉ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์„ ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๊ฐ๊ฐ 75.5%, 87.5%, 0.786, 73%, 58.4%์˜€์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์•Œ์•ฝ ์ธ์‹ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜๊ณผ ๋น„๊ตํ•˜์˜€์„ ๋•Œ, ์ƒ๋‹นํžˆ ๊ฐœ์„ ๋œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์–ป์—ˆ๋‹ค.์ œ 1 ์žฅ ์„œ๋ก  1 ์ œ 2 ์žฅ ๊ด€๋ จ์—ฐ๊ตฌ 4 2.1 ๋ชจ์–‘ ๋˜๋Š” ์ƒ‰์ƒ ๋“ฑ ์ผ๋ถ€๋งŒ ์ธ์‹ 4 2.2 ๋ชจ์–‘๊ณผ ์ƒ‰์ƒ, ๊ธ€์ž ๋ชจ๋‘ ์ธ์‹ 5 ์ œ 3 ์žฅ ์ œ์•ˆ๋œ ์ธ์‹ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ 10 3.1 ์ „์ฒด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ฐœ์š” 10 3.2 ์•Œ์•ฝ ์ฃผ๋ณ€๋ถ€ ํš๋“ 11 3.3 ์•Œ์•ฝ ์˜์—ญ ์ถ”์ถœ 13 3.4 ํ˜•์ƒ ์ •๋ณด ํš๋“ 14 3.5 ๊ธ€์ž๋ถ€ ํš๋“ 19 3.6 ๊ธ€์ž ํ•™์Šต ๋ฐ ์ธ์‹ 22 ์ œ 4 ์žฅ ์‹คํ—˜ ๋ฐ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 25 4.1 Database 25 4.2 Shape Matching Rate 26 4.3 Text Box Detection Rate 29 4.4 Character Recognition Rate 30 4.5 Text Recognition Rate & Recognition Success Rate 32 ์ œ 5 ์žฅ ๊ฒฐ๋ก  34 ์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ 35 Abstract 39Maste

    The Effect of the Size of a Local Administrative District on Democracy and Efficiency

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ํ–‰์ •๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ํ–‰์ •ํ•™๊ณผ ํ–‰์ •ํ•™ ์ „๊ณต, 2012. 8. ์ด์Šน์ข….๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์‹ค์ฆ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฒ€์ฆํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ชฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ๊ทน์‹ฌํ•œ ์ด๋ก ์ ยท์‹ค์ฆ์  ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์˜ ์ƒ์ถฉ์„ ํ•ด์†Œํ•˜๊ณ , ๋ณด๋‹ค ์ ์ ˆํ•œ ์ด๋ก ์˜ ์ œ์‹œ ๋ฐ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ฐœํŽธ์˜ ์‹ค์ฒœ์  ํ•จ์˜๋ฅผ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์„ ๊ท ํ˜•์ ์ธ ๊ด€์ ์—์„œ ์ ‘๊ทผํ•˜์˜€๊ณ , ๋ชจ์ง‘๋‹จ์„ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ผ๋ฐ˜ํ™” ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์„ ์ œ๊ณ ํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์–‘์ž ๊ฐ„์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ณด๋‹ค ์ •๊ตํ•œ ํ†ต๊ณ„์  ๋ถ„์„์„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ฐ€์„ค์˜ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์€ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ํ†ต๋…์ธ ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๋ก ๊ณผ ํ†ตํ•ฉ๋ก ์˜ ๊ด€์ ์—์„œ ๊ฐ๊ฐ ์„ค์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ฆ‰ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ์ปค์ง€๋ฉด ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ์€ ๋‚ฎ์•„์ง„๋‹ค๋Š” ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๋ก ๊ณผ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ์ปค์ง€๋ฉด ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์€ ๋†’์•„์ง„๋‹ค๋Š” ํ†ตํ•ฉ๋ก ์˜ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฐ€์„ค์„ ์„ค์ •ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๊ฐ€์„ค์„ ๊ฒ€์ฆํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋‚˜๋ผ ๊ธฐ์ดˆ์ง€๋ฐฉ์ •๋ถ€ 230๊ฐœ ์ „์ฒด๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์„์˜ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ์„ ์ •ํ•˜๊ณ , ํ†ตํ•ฉํšŒ๊ท€๋ถ„์„(Pooled OLS), ๋ถ„ํ•ด๋‹คํ•ญ์‹๋ชจํ˜•(Fractional Polynomial)์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ์„ ์ •ํ•œ ์ด์œ ๋Š” TSCS(Time-Series-Cross-Section) ์ž๋ฃŒ์˜ ํŠน์„ฑ๊ณผ ๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜์™€ ์ข…์†๋ณ€์ˆ˜ ๊ฐ„์˜ ๋น„์„ ํ˜•์„ฑ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜์ธ ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๋Š” ์ธ๊ตฌ์™€ ๋ฉด์ ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์˜€๊ณ , ์ข…์†๋ณ€์ˆ˜์ธ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์€ ๊ฐ๊ฐ 4๊ฐ€์ง€ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ง€๋ฐฉ์ฐจ์›์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ฐœ๋‹ฌ์ •๋„๋ฅผ ์˜๋ฏธํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ์˜ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ์š”์†Œ๋Š” ํˆฌํ‘œ์ฐธ์—ฌ, ์‹œ๋ฏผ๋‹จ์ฒด์ฐธ์—ฌ, ์ž์›๋ด‰์‚ฌ์ฐธ์—ฌ, ํ–‰์ •์ •๋ณด๊ณต๊ฐœ์ฒญ๊ตฌ์ˆ˜์šฉ์„ ์„ ์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋Šฅ๋ฅ ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ๊ณผ์„ฑ์„ ๋ณตํ•ฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์˜๋ฏธํ•˜๋Š” ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์€ ํ–‰์ •์ธ๋ ฅ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ, ํ–‰์ •๋น„์šฉ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ, ๊ณต๊ณต์„œ๋น„์Šค์ด๋น„์šฉ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ, ์ง€์—ญ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ ฅ์„ ์„ ์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด์™€ ํ•จ๊ป˜ ์ •์น˜์  ์š”์ธ, ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ์š”์ธ, ์ง€์—ญ์‚ฌํšŒํŠน์„ฑ ์š”์ธ์„ ํ†ต์ œ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋กœ ํฌํ•จ์‹œ์ผฐ๋‹ค. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์ด ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์šฐ์„  ๊ทœ๋ชจ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ ์ค‘ ์ธ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํˆฌํ‘œ์ฐธ์—ฌ์—๋Š” L์žํ˜• ๊ณก์„ ์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„, ์‹œ๋ฏผ๋‹จ์ฒด์ฐธ์—ฌ์™€ ์ž์›๋ด‰์‚ฌ์ฐธ์—ฌ์—๋Š” ์Œ(-)์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ๋ฉด์ ์€ ํˆฌํ‘œ์ฐธ์—ฌ์—๋Š” ์–‘(+)์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„, ์ž์›๋ด‰์‚ฌ์ฐธ์—ฌ์—๋งŒ ์Œ(-)์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ๊ทœ๋ชจ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋Š” ํ–‰์ •์ •๋ณด๊ณต๊ฐœ์ฒญ๊ตฌ์ˆ˜์šฉ์—๋Š” ํŠน๋ณ„ํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜์ง€ ์•Š๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์ข…ํ•ฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณผ ๋•Œ, ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์€ ์ธ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์Œ(-)์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ, ๋ฉด์ ์€ ํ˜ผํ•ฉ์  ์˜ํ–ฅ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์ด ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์šฐ์„  ์ธ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์ฃผ๋ฏผ 1,000๋ช…๋‹น ๊ณต๋ฌด์› ์ˆ˜, ์ฃผ๋ฏผ 1์ธ๋‹น ์ผ๋ฐ˜ํ–‰์ •๋น„, ์ฃผ๋ฏผ 1์ธ๋‹น ์ด์„ธ์ถœ๊ณผ๋Š” ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ L์žํ˜• ๊ณก์„ ๊ด€๊ณ„๋ฅผ ์ด๋ฃจ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ์ผ์ • ์ธ๊ตฌ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊นŒ์ง€๋Š” ๊ทœ๋ชจ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ ํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜๊ณ  ๊ทธ ๋ฒ”์œ„๋ฅผ ๋„˜์–ด์„œ๋ฉด ๊ทœ๋ชจ์˜ ๋ถˆ๊ฒฝ์ œ ํšจ๊ณผ์™€ ํ˜ผ์žกํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ๊ทœ๋ชจ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ ํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์ƒ์‡„์‹œํ‚จ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์„ ์•Œ๋ ค์ค€๋‹ค. ์ด ๋•Œ ๋ถ„๊ธฐ์ ์€ ์ธ๊ตฌ๊ทœ๋ชจ๋กœ ์•ฝ 20๋งŒ๋ช…์ธ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ํ•œํŽธ, ์ธ๊ตฌ๊ทœ๋ชจ๋Š” ์ง€์—ญ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ ฅ์— ์„ ํ˜• ๊ธ์ • ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฉด์ ์€ ์ฃผ๋ฏผ 1,000๋ช…๋‹น ๊ณต๋ฌด์› ์ˆ˜, ์ฃผ๋ฏผ 1์ธ๋‹น ์ผ๋ฐ˜ํ–‰์ •๋น„, ์ฃผ๋ฏผ 1์ธ๋‹น ์ด์„ธ์ถœ์„ ์ฆ๊ฐ€์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์—๋Š” ๋ถ€์ •์  ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ๋ฉด์ ์€ ์ง€์—ญ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ ฅ์—๋Š” ๊ธ์ •์  ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฐํ˜€์กŒ๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์ข…ํ•ฉ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณผ ๋•Œ, ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จํ•œ ํ†ต๋…์ธ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์˜ ํ™•์žฅ์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ์€ ํ›ผ์†๋˜๊ณ  ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์€ ์ฆ์ง„๋œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ฃผ์žฅ์€ ๋Œ€์ฒด์ ์œผ๋กœ ํƒ€๋‹น์„ฑ์ด ์ธ์ •๋œ๋‹ค๊ณ  ํŒ๋‹จ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ถ”๊ฐ€์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์‹œ๊ตฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ์œ ํ˜•๋ณ„ ํŠน์ˆ˜ํ•œ ์ฐจ์ด ๊ฒ€์ฆ๊ณผ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ์ •์ฑ…ํ•จ์˜์˜ ๋„์ถœ์„ ์œ„ํ•ด ์‹œ๊ตฐ๊ตฌ๋ณ„ ๋ถ„์„์„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์‹œ๊ตฐ๊ตฌ๋ณ„ ๋ถ„๊ธฐ์ ์˜ ์ฐจ์ด๊ฐ€ ์กด์žฌํ•จ์„ ํ™•์ธํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์„ ๋™์‹œ์— ๊ณ ๋ คํ•œ ์ค€์ตœ์ ๊ทœ๋ชจ๋กœ ์‹œ๋Š” ์•ฝ 40๋งŒ, ๊ตฐ์€ ์•ฝ 10๋งŒ, ๊ตฌ๋Š” ์•ฝ 30๋งŒ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ด๋ก ์ ยท์‹ค์ฒœ์  ํ•จ์˜๋ฅผ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋ก ์  ํ•จ์˜๋กœ๋Š” L์žํ˜• ๊ด€๊ณ„์ด๋ก  ์ œ์‹œ, ๋ฉด์ ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋…ผ์˜์˜ ํ•„์š”์„ฑ, ์ง€๋ฐฉ์ •๋ถ€ ํ˜‘๋ ฅ๋ก  ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ•„์š”์„ฑ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์‹ค์ฒœ์  ํ•จ์˜๋กœ๋Š” ํ–‰์ •๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ฐœํŽธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ , ํ–‰์ •๊ณ„์ธต๊ฐœํŽธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ , ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์˜ ์šฐ์„ ์ˆœ์œ„ ๋…ผ์˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ , ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ฐœํŽธ์˜ ์ •์น˜์„ฑ ๋ฐ ์ฃผ๋ฏผ์„ ํƒ๊ถŒ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ , ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ ์œ„์ฃผ์˜ ๊ตฌ์—ญํ†ตํ•ฉ ์ง„ํ–‰ ์‹œ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ์˜ ํ™•๋ณด๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ ์„ ๋…ผ์˜ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the size of a local administrative district on democracy and efficiency empirically. In addition, this study aims to resolve theoretical and empirical contradictions regarding the relationship between district size and democracy and efficiency, and to suggest a better theory and practical implication for district reorganization. The hypothesis is settled on the following general ideas about district size and democracy and efficiency: fragmentation and consolidation. That is, if district size is bigger, then democracy is loweralso, if district size is bigger, then efficiency is higher. To examine these hypothesises, this study selects a basic local government as an analytical target and uses the Pooled OLS and Fractional Polynomial model. The reason for the use of this methodology is to consider the characteristic of the data and non-linear relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. The size of the local administrative district, which is an independent variable, consists of the population and the area. Democracy and efficiency, which are dependent variables, each consist of 4 variables. Democracy which means the level of local democratic development consists of voting participation, civic association participation, voluntary participation, granting requests for government information. Efficiency consists of administrative human efficiency, administrative cost efficiency, public service cost efficiency, and local economic power. Political factors, economic factors, and local characteristics factors were the control variables. The analytical result of the effect of the district size on democracy is as follows. Population has an L-curve effect on voting participation, and a negative effect on civic organization participation and voluntary participation. Area has a positive effect on voting participation and a negative effect on voluntary participation. Both size variables do not have an effect on granting requests for government information. Overall, the effect of the district size on democracy is that population has a negative effect and area has a mixed effect. The analytical result of the effect of the district size on efficiency is as follows. Population has significant L-curve effect on per 1,000 resident officials, per capita administrative cost, and per capita total cost. This means that economy of scale exists for a certain population size and diseconomy of size and chaotic effect countervail the economy of scale over a certain population size. The branch point is about a population of 200 thousand. Population size has a positive linear effect on local economic power. Area has a positive effect on per 1,000 resident officials, per capita administrative cost, and per capita total cost. This means area has a negative effect on efficiencyhowever, area has positive effect on local economic power. When considering the above mentioned overall results, the general idea that the district size has a negative effect on democracy and a positive effect on efficiency is generally accepted. Additionally, this study examines siยทgunยทgu data separately to find specific differences and draw various practical implications. The analytical results show that there is a clear difference in branch point. When considering democracy and efficiency together, the optimal size is as follows: si = 400,000, gun = 100,000, gu = 300,000. Finally, this study suggested theoretical and practical implications. The theoretical implications are L-curve theory, discussion about area effect on efficiency, and local government cooperation theory. The practical implications are on district reorganization, administrative level reorganization, district reorganization politics and resident choice, and securing democracy at the time of district consolidation.์ œ1์žฅ ์„œ๋ก  1 ์ œ1์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ๋ชฉ์ ๊ณผ ํ•„์š”์„ฑ 1 ์ œ2์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ๋Œ€์ƒ๊ณผ ๋ฒ”์œ„ 5 ์ œ3์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 8 ์ œ2์žฅ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋…ผ์˜ 10 ์ œ1์ ˆ ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •๊ตฌ์—ญ: ๊ณต๊ฐ„๊ณผ ์ง€๋ฐฉ์ž์น˜ 10 1. ํ–‰์ •๊ตฌ์—ญ์˜ ๊ฐœ๋… ๋ฐ ์ค‘์š”์„ฑ 10 2. ํ–‰์ •๊ตฌ์—ญ์„ค์ •์˜ ๊ธฐ์ค€ 13 3. ๊ตญ๋‚ด์™ธ ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •๊ตฌ์—ญ์˜ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ๊ณผ ๊ฐœํŽธ 16 ์ œ2์ ˆ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ: ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •์˜ ๊ฐ€์น˜ 33 1. ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •์ด๋…์œผ๋กœ์„œ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ 33 2. ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์˜ ์š”์†Œ 40 3. ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ๊ณผ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์š”์ธ 50 ์ œ3์ ˆ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ ๋ฐ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„ 55 1. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ 55 2. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ 67 ์ œ3์žฅ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์„ค๊ณ„ 82 ์ œ1์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฐ€์„ค 82 1. ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฐ€์„ค 82 2. ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฐ€์„ค 85 ์ œ2์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ชจํ˜• 88 ์ œ3์ ˆ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ ๋ฐ ์ง€ํ‘œ์˜ ์กฐ์ž‘ํ™” 94 1. ์ข…์†๋ณ€์ˆ˜ 94 2. ๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ 98 3. ํ†ต์ œ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ 99 ์ œ4์ ˆ ๋ถ„์„์ž๋ฃŒ์˜ ๊ฒ€ํ†  103 ์ œ4์žฅ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 107 ์ œ1์ ˆ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ํ†ต๊ณ„ ๋ถ„์„ 107 1. ์ข…ํ•ฉ์  ๊ธฐ์ˆ ํ†ต๊ณ„ 107 2. ์—ฐ๋„๋ณ„ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ํ†ต๊ณ„ 109 ์ œ2์ ˆ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์„ฑ 112 1. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ํˆฌํ‘œ์ฐธ์—ฌ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 112 2. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ์‹œ๋ฏผ๋‹จ์ฒด์ฐธ์—ฌ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 122 3. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ์ž์›๋ด‰์‚ฌ์ฐธ์—ฌ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 127 4. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ํ–‰์ •์ •๋ณด๊ณต๊ฐœ์ฒญ๊ตฌ์ˆ˜์šฉ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 132 5. ์†Œ๊ฒฐ 137 ์ œ3์ ˆ ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ์™€ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ 141 1. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ํ–‰์ •์ธ๋ ฅ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 141 2. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ํ–‰์ •๋น„์šฉ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 149 3. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ๊ณต๊ณต์„œ๋น„์Šค์ด๋น„์šฉ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 157 4. ๊ตฌ์—ญ๊ทœ๋ชจ๊ฐ€ ์ง€์—ญ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ ฅ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ 165 5. ์†Œ๊ฒฐ 170 ์ œ5์žฅ ๊ฒฐ๋ก  174 ์ œ1์ ˆ ์š”์•ฝ 174 ์ œ2์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ•จ์˜ 178 1. ์ด๋ก ์  ํ•จ์˜ 178 2. ์ •์ฑ…์  ํ•จ์˜ 183 ์ œ3์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ•œ๊ณ„ ๋ฐ ํ–ฅํ›„ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ณผ์ œ 191 193Docto

    ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ฒฐ์ •์š”์ธ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (์„์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ์‚ฌํšŒํ•™๊ณผ, 2012. 8. ์ •์ง„์„ฑ.์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์ œ๋„์™€ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์ด ์‹ค์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ์˜ ๊ฐœ์„ ์—๋„ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์ณค๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ ํ™•์ธํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ์ ์ธ ๋ชฉํ‘œ์ด๋‹ค. ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ฒฐ์ • ์š”์ธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ๊ฒฝํ—˜์  ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€ ํฌ๊ฒŒ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๋‚ด๋ถ€์  ์š”์ธ์„ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•˜๋Š” ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์™€ ์™ธ๋ถ€์  ์š”์ธ์— ์ฃผ๋ชฉํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋กœ ๊ตฌ๋ถ„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๋‚ด๋ถ€์  ์š”์ธ๊ณผ ์ธ๊ถŒ์˜ ๊ด€๊ณ„์— ์ฃผ๋ชฉํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฐœ์ „๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๋‚ด๋ถ€ ์ƒํ™ฉ์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ ๊ฐœ์„ ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์„ ๋งˆ๋ จํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์„ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋ฐ˜๋ฉด ๊ตญ์ œ์  ์กฐ๊ฑด์„ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•˜๋Š” ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€ ์„ธ๊ณ„๋ฌธํ™”์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ๋ ฅ์— ์ดˆ์ ์„ ๋‘๋Š” ๊ฒฝํ–ฅ์ด ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ธ๊ถŒ์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ ๊ณผ์ •์€ ์„ธ๊ณ„์‚ฌํšŒ์ด๋ก ์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๊ด€์ ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅด๋ฉด ๊ฐ๊ตญ์ด ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์„ ๋ฐ›์•„๋“ค์ด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€ ์ „ ์„ธ๊ณ„์ ์ธ ์ธ๊ถŒ ๋ฌธํ™”์™€ ๋ชจ๋ธ์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋กœ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ์˜ ๋น„์ค€, ๊ตญ์ œ๋น„์ •๋ถ€๋‹จ์ฒด์™€์˜ ์—ฐ๊ณ„, ์ธ๊ถŒ๊ด€๋ จ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ตญ์ œํšŒ์˜ ์ฐธ์—ฌ ๋“ฑ์ด ์ธ๊ถŒ ํ™•์‚ฐ์˜ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ๊ณ„๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋œ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ ‡๋‹ค๋ฉด ์ธ๊ถŒ์ œ๋„์™€ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์€ ์‹ค์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ์˜ ๊ฐœ์„ ์œผ๋กœ๋„ ์ด์–ด์กŒ์„๊นŒ? ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ์˜ ๋น„์ค€์ด ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ๊ณผ๋Š” ๊ด€๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ์—†๊ฑฐ๋‚˜ ์˜คํžˆ๋ ค ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ์„ ์•…ํ™”์‹œํ‚ค๊ธฐ๋„ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒฐ๋ก ์„ ๋‚ด๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์—์„œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์ด ์‹ค์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ์˜ ๊ฐœ์„ ์œผ๋กœ ์ด์–ด์กŒ๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ ํ™•์ธํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐ ์ง€์—ญ ์ˆ˜์ค€์œผ๋กœ ๊ตฌ๋ถ„ํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฐ€์„ค์„ ์„ค์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋จผ์ € ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ์ˆ˜์ค€์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ์„ค๋ฆฝ, ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ๋น„์ค€, ๊ตญ์ œ๋น„์ •๋ถ€๋‹จ์ฒด ์ฐธ์—ฌ ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ํ™•์ธํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ๋ ˆ์ง์˜ ํ•ต์‹ฌ์  ์ œ๋„๋กœ ์ธ์ •๋ฐ›๊ณ  ์žˆ์œผ๋ฏ€๋กœ, ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์„ค๋ฆฝํ•œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์€ ๊ทธ๋ ‡์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์— ๋น„ํ•ด ๋” ์ ๊ทน์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์„ ์ˆ˜์šฉํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ์˜ ๋น„์ค€ ์—ฌ๋ถ€๋„ ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ๋ ˆ์ง ์ฐธ์—ฌ ์ •๋„๋ฅผ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ๋Š” ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ง€ํ‘œ์ด๋‹ค. ํ•œํŽธ ๊ตญ์ œ๋น„์ •๋ถ€๋‹จ์ฒด๋Š” ์„ธ๊ณ„ ๋ฌธํ™”์™€ ๋‹ด๋ก ์˜ ์ฃผ๋œ ๋งค๊ฐœ์ž๋กœ์„œ ์˜ํ–ฅ๋ ฅ์„ ํ–‰์‚ฌํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜์ด๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์Œ์œผ๋กœ ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ์ง€์—ญ ์ˆ˜์ค€์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์€ ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ด€๋ จ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ตญ์ œํšŒ์˜์˜ ๊ฐœ์ตœ, ์ง€์—ญ์—์„œ์˜ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ์„ค๋ฆฝ ๋ฐ ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ ๋น„์ค€ ๋ˆ„์  ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ์ธก์ •ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๊ตญ์ œํšŒ์˜๋Š” ์„ธ๊ณ„ ๋ฌธํ™”๊ฐ€ ํ™•์‚ฐ๋˜๋Š” ์žฅ์œผ๋กœ์„œ ๋Œ€๊ทœ๋ชจ ๊ตญ์ œํšŒ์˜๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ์ธ๊ถŒ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ๊ฐ€์น˜๋“ค์ด ๊ณต๋ก ํ™”๋œ๋‹ค. ํ•œํŽธ ์„ธ๊ณ„์‚ฌํšŒ์ด๋ก ๊ฐ€๋“ค์€ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์„ ๊ทœ๋ฒ” ์ผ€์Šค์ผ€์ด๋“œ ๋ฐ ์œ ํ–‰์œผ๋กœ ๊ฐœ๋…ํ™”ํ•œ๋‹ค. ํ•ด๋‹น ์ง€์—ญ์—์„œ ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ์„ ๋น„์ค€ํ•˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์„ค๋ฆฝํ•œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ๋งŽ์•„์งˆ์ˆ˜๋ก ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์ด ์ด๋ฅผ ์˜์‹ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ฐœ์„ ์„ ๊พ€ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฐ€์„ค์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ๋Š” ํ”„๋ฆฌ๋คํ•˜์šฐ์Šค ์ž์œ ์ง€์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์ข…์†๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋กœ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ฐ๊ฐ 7์  ์ฒ™๋„์ธ ์ •์น˜์  ์ž์œ  ์ง€์ˆ˜์™€ ์‹œ๋ฏผ์  ์ž์œ  ์ง€์ˆ˜์˜ ํ‰๊ท ๊ฐ’์„ ํ•ด๋‹น ํ•ด์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ง€์ˆ˜๋กœ ๋ฐ˜์˜ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ ๊ฐ€์šด๋ฐ, ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ์„ค๋ฆฝ ์—ฌ๋ถ€๋Š” ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์˜ ์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ์ฃผ๋กœ ์ฐธ์กฐํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ ๋น„์ค€ ์—ฌ๋ถ€๋Š” 6๊ฐœ์˜ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ์„ ๊ธฐ์ค€์œผ๋กœ ์‚ผ์•˜๋‹ค. ๊ฐ๊ตญ์ด ๊ฐ€์ž…ํ•œ ๊ตญ์ œ ๋น„์ •๋ถ€๋‹จ์ฒด์˜ ์ˆ˜๋Š” ๊ตญ์ œ์กฐ์ง์—ฐ๊ฐ์˜ ์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ธ๊ถŒ๊ด€๋ จ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ตญ์ œํšŒ์˜๋Š” 1993๋…„ ๋น„์—”๋‚˜ ์ธ๊ถŒํšŒ์˜์™€ 1996๋…„ ์ œ1ํšŒ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ์ปจํผ๋Ÿฐ์Šค๋ฅผ ์„ ์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ง€์—ญ์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ ํ™•์‚ฐ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋Š” ํ•ด๋‹น ์—ฐ๋„์— ๊ฐ๊ตญ์ด ๋น„์ค€ํ•œ ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ, ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์„ค๋ฆฝํ•œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜ ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์ง‘๊ณ„ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ˆ„์  ์ˆซ์ž๋ฅผ ๊ณ„์‚ฐํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. 1์ธ๋‹น ๊ตญ๋ฏผ์†Œ๋“, ๋‚ด์ „ ๋ฐœ๋ฐœ ์—ฌ๋ถ€, ์ธ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํ†ต์ œ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋กœ ํšŒ๊ท€๋ชจ๋ธ์— ํฌํ•จ์‹œ์ผฐ๋‹ค. ๋Œ€์ƒ ๊ธฐ๊ฐ„์€ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ์ง€์—ญ ์ธ๊ถŒ๋ ˆ์ง ํ˜•์„ฑ์˜ ์—ญ์‚ฌ๋ฅผ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์—ฌ 1980๋…„๋„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ 2009๋…„๊นŒ์ง€๋กœ ์„ค์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ํ•œํŽธ ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—์„œ ํ™œ์šฉ๋˜๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ํŒจ๋„ ๋ฐ์ดํƒ€๋Š” ํŒจ๋„ ๊ฐœ์ฒด๊ฐ€ ๋ชจ์ง‘๋‹จ ์ž์ฒด์ด๊ณ , ์‹œ๊ฐ„ ๋ณ€๋™ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๊ฐ€ ์ฃผ๋กœ ํ™œ์šฉ๋˜๋ฏ€๋กœ ๊ณ ์ •ํšจ๊ณผ ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ์ ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ์ˆ˜์ค€์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จ๋œ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋“ค ๊ฐ€์šด๋ฐ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ์„ค๋ฆฝ, ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ ๋น„์ค€ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๊ฐ€ ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ๋ฐ˜๋ฉด ๊ตญ์ œ๋น„์ •๋ถ€๋‹จ์ฒด ๊ฐ€์ž… ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋Š” ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ฐœ์„ ์— ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์น˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค. ์ง€์—ญ ์ˆ˜์ค€์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จ๋œ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๋“ค ๊ฐ€์šด๋ฐ์—๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ์„ค๋ฆฝ ๋ฐ ๊ตญ์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ ๋น„์ค€์˜ ์ง€์—ญ ๋ˆ„๊ณ„ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๊ฐ€ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ํ†ต์ œ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ ๊ฐ€์šด๋ฐ์—๋Š” ๋‚ด์ „ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜๊ฐ€ ์ผ๊ด€์„ฑ ์žˆ๊ฒŒ ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์ด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ œ๋„์™€ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์ด ์‹ค์ œ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ์˜ ๊ฐœ์„ ์—๋„ ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์ณค๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ง€์—ญ ์ˆ˜์ค€์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ œ๋„์™€ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ์ด ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ฐœ์„ ์— ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฏธ์ณค๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด์˜ ์ง€์—ญ ์ธ๊ถŒ๋ ˆ์ง์˜ ๋ฐœ์ „๊ณผ ๊นŠ์€ ๊ด€๋ จ์ด ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ ํ™•์‚ฐ๊ณผ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ์˜ ๋””์ปคํ”Œ๋ง์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ๋Š” ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์™€๋Š” ์ฐจ์ด๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค.This study focuses on the relationship between the expansion of the human rights regime and the improvement in human rights practice in Sub-Saharan African countries. Over the past few decades, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on the determinants of human rights. The focus of these researches can be classified into two main groups: internal and external factors. Some scholars emphasize the importance of internal factors for improvement in human rights practice. The most important point of their argument is that internal factors like economic development affect the human rights practice. On the contrary, researches which stress external factors have a tendency of giving priority to world culture. This study bases itself on the world polity theory. According to this theory, nation-states are embedded in world and influenced by world culture. In this regard, states commitment to human rights norms is also the result of global expansion of human rights culture. A critical question is whether the expansion of the human rights norms and institution have caused an actual improvement in human rights practice. The purpose of this study is to examine this question in Sub-Saharan African countries. It is possible to establish two hypotheses, which are on state and regional level. Hypotheses on state level deals with the relationship between human rights practice and state level independent variables which are the establishment of a national human rights institution, the ratification of international human rights treaties and the participation in INGOs. And hypotheses on regional level deals with the relationship between human rights practice and regional level independent variables which are major international conferences on human rights, regional cumulative number of the establishment of a national human rights institution and the ratification of international human rights treaties. The dependent variable is freedom house index which measures human rights practice worldwide. The control variables are GDP per capita, civil war and population. It covers the time series data from 1980 to 2009. And due to the characteristic of panel data used in this study, fixed effects model is applied. The result shows that the establishment of a national human rights institution and the ratification of international human rights treaties are statistically significant. But INGOs membership variable is insignificant. Among the regional level variables, regional cumulative number of establishment of a national human rights institution and ratification of international human rights treaties are significant. And civil war variable is consistently significant among the control variable. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the expansion of the human rights norms and institution in Sub-Saharan African countries have caused an actual improvement in human rights practice. The result of the researches differs from previous studies show decoupling between expansion of human rights and improvement of human practice.์ œ1์žฅ ์„œ๋ก  1 ์ œ2์žฅ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋…ผ์˜ 5 ์ œ1์ ˆ ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ฒฐ์ •์š”์ธ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์„ ํ–‰ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ 5 ์ œ2์ ˆ ์ด๋ก ์  ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ: ์„ธ๊ณ„์‚ฌํšŒ์ด๋ก  9 ์ œ3์žฅ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฐ€์„ค 12 ์ œ1์ ˆ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ์ˆ˜์ค€์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์ œ๋„ ๋ฐ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ 13 ์ œ2์ ˆ ์ง€์—ญ ์ˆ˜์ค€์—์„œ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์ œ๋„ ๋ฐ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”์˜ ํ™•์‚ฐ 15 ์ œ4์žฅ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ์ž๋ฃŒ ๋ฐ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 17 ์ œ1์ ˆ ์ข…์† ๋ณ€์ˆ˜: ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ƒํ™ฉ 17 ์ œ2์ ˆ ๋…๋ฆฝ ๋ณ€์ˆ˜: ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ทœ๋ฒ”๊ณผ ์ œ๋„ 22 ์ œ3์ ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 26 ์ œ5์žฅ ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ: ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ ๊ฒฐ์ •์š”์ธ 28 ์ œ6์žฅ ๊ฒฐ๋ก  31 ์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ 33 ๋ถ€๋ก 1. 1990๋…„๋Œ€์˜ ๋Œ€ํ‘œ์ ์ธ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ง€์ˆ˜ ๊ฐœ์„ /์•…ํ™” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๋ชฉ๋ก 38 ๋ถ€๋ก 2. 2000๋…„๋Œ€์˜ ๋Œ€ํ‘œ์ ์ธ ์ธ๊ถŒ ์ง€์ˆ˜ ๊ฐœ์„ /์•…ํ™” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๋ชฉ๋ก 39 ๋ถ€๋ก 3. ๋ถ„์„ ๋Œ€์ƒ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๋ชฉ๋ก 40 ๋ถ€๋ก 4. ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜ ์ฃผ์š” ์ธ๊ถŒ์กฐ์•ฝ ๋น„์ค€ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 41 ๋ถ€๋ก 5. ์‚ฌํ•˜๋ผ ์ด๋‚จ ์•„ํ”„๋ฆฌ์นด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ถŒ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ์„ค๋ฆฝ ํ˜„ํ™ฉ 43 Abstract 45Maste

    KSIAM Young Researcher Paper Award

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    International Development Cooperation and Human Rights: A Comparative Study of the Implementation of Rights-Based Approach to Development in Eight Major Donor Countries, 1990~2009

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    ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ ์ง€๋‚œ 20๋…„ ๋™์•ˆ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ณต์—ฌ๊ตญ๋“ค์˜ ๊ตญ์ œ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ˜‘๋ ฅ ์ •์ฑ… ์ดํ–‰ ๊ณผ์ •์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ ์ธ๊ถŒ์— ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ํ•œ ์ ‘๊ทผ์ด ์–ด๋Š ์ •๋„๋กœ ๋„์ž…๋˜์—ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ฅผ ์ถ”๋™ํ•œ ์š”์ธ์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€๋ฅผ ๋ฐํžˆ๋Š” ๋ฐ ๊ทธ ๋ชฉ์ ์ด ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ฃผ์š” ๊ณต์—ฌ๊ตญ๋“ค์˜ ๊ถŒ๋ฆฌ์— ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ํ•œ ์ ‘๊ทผ๋ฒ•(RBA) ๋„์ž… ์ˆ˜์ค€์— ์žˆ์–ด ์–ด๋–ค ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ„ ์ฐจ์ด๊ฐ€ ์กด์žฌํ•˜๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ฅผ ์ถ”๋™ํ•œ ์š”์ธ์€ ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€๋ฅผ ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌ์–ธ ๋ถ„์„์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ํƒ์ƒ‰์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฐ€๋Š ํ•ด ๋ณด๊ณ ์ž ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๊ฐ๊ตญ์˜ RBA ๋„์ž… ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์ธ ์ง€ํ‘œ๋กœ๋Š” ์ตœ๋นˆ๊ตญ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ง€์› ๋น„์œจ, ํŒŒํŠธ๋„ˆ๊ตญ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์ง€์ˆ˜์™€ ์›์กฐ๊ธˆ์•ก ๋ณ€๋™์˜ ์ƒ๊ด€๊ด€๊ณ„, ๋น„๊ตฌ์†์„ฑ ์›์กฐ ๋น„์œจ, ์ธ๋„์ฃผ์˜์  ์›์กฐ ๋น„์œจ, ์ฐธ์—ฌ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ ๋ฐ ๊ตฟ๊ฑฐ๋ฒ„๋„Œ์Šค ๊ด€๋ จ ์ง€์› ๋น„์œจ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ๊ฐ๊ตญ์˜ ๊ตญ์ œ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ˜‘๋ ฅ ์ •์ฑ…์ด ์ธ๊ถŒ์— ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์„ ๋‘๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ์ƒ(์˜๊ตญ, ์Šค์›จ๋ด, ์บ๋‚˜๋‹ค), ์ค‘(๋ฏธ๊ตญ, ๋…์ผ), ํ•˜(ํ”„๋ž‘์Šค, ์ผ๋ณธ, ํ•œ๊ตญ)๋กœ ๊ตฌ๋ถ„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ฐจ์ด๋ฅผ ๋‚ณ๋Š” ์กฐ๊ฑด์œผ๋กœ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ˜‘๋ ฅ ์ง‘ํ–‰ ๊ตฌ์กฐ, ์›์กฐ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ตญ๋‚ด ์—ฌ๋ก , ์ธ๊ถŒ ์นœํ™”์  ์™ธ๊ต์ •์ฑ…, ์‹œ๋ฏผ์‚ฌํšŒ์˜ ์—ญ๋Ÿ‰์„ ๊ฐ€์„ค์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌ์–ธ ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์—ฌ๋ก ์˜ ์••๋ ฅ์„ ์ œ์™ธํ•œ ์„ธ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ์กฐ๊ฑด๋“ค์˜ ์„ค๋ช…๋ ฅ์ด ์œ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋“œ๋Ÿฌ๋‚ฌ๊ณ , ํŠนํžˆ ์ƒ์œ„๊ทธ๋ฃน๊ณผ ํ•˜์œ„๊ทธ๋ฃน์„ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•˜๋Š”๋ฐ ์˜๋ฏธ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ๋ถ„์„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ํ–ฅํ›„ ๊ตญ์ œ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ˜‘๋ ฅ์˜ ์ธ๊ถŒ์ฃผ๋ฅ˜ํ™”๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•œ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ •์ฑ…์  ์‹œ์‚ฌ์ ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค. This article seeks to examine the degree to which eight major donors implement Rights-Based Approach to Development (RBA) in their policies on international development. Furthermore, it explicates the factors that might have led to the differences among the donors using the Boolean Analysis. In an effort to measure the degree of RBA implementation, we consider the ratios of aid to the least developed countries (LDCs), untied aid, humanitarian aid, and aid for participatory development and good governance. We then consider several political, social, and cultural processes that might be associated with the degree to which donor countries consider and implement RBA. The findings suggest that there are three tiers among donors that correspond to the differences of their commitment to RBA; the first tier (UK, Sweden, Canada), the second tier (US, Germany), and the third tier (France, Japan, Korea). Our analysis indicates that aid delivery structure, foreign policy framework, and the strength of civil society might be the major factors explaining the division among the countries especially in the first and the third tiers. This study provides a crucial policy implication for how to mainstream human rights in the field of international development cooperation

    ์ •๋ถ€์‹ ๋ขฐ๊ฐ€ ์ฐธ์—ฌ์— ๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š” ์˜ํ–ฅ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(์„์‚ฌ) --์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› :ํ–‰์ •ํ•™๊ณผ(์ •์ฑ…ํ•™์ „๊ณต),2008.Maste

    A Consolidation Plan for North and South Korean Local Administrative Systems

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    ๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ํ•œ๋ฐ˜๋„ ํ†ต์ผ์„ ๋Œ€๋น„ํ•œ ๋‚จ๋ถํ•œ ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •์ฒด์ œ์˜ ํ†ตํ•ฉ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์„ ๋…ผ์˜ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋‚จ๋ถํ•œ ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •์ฒด์ œ๋Š” ์™ธํ˜•์ƒ ์œ ์‚ฌ์„ฑ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ  ์‹ค์ œ ์šด์˜์ƒ์˜ ์ฐจ์ด๋Š” ํฐ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„๋œ๋‹ค. ํ†ตํ•ฉ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ๋Š” ๊ธ‰์ง„์  ํ†ต์ผ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์œผ๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ, ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •๊ณ„์ธต, ๊ตฌ์—ญ, ๊ธฐ๊ด€๊ตฌ์„ฑ, ์ค‘์•™-์ง€๋ฐฉ๊ด€๊ณ„, ์ •๋‹น-ํ–‰์ •๊ด€๊ณ„, ๊ด‘์—ญ-๊ธฐ์ดˆ๊ด€๊ณ„, ์ง€๋ฐฉ์ •๋ถ€-์ฃผ๋ฏผ๊ด€๊ณ„ ๋“ฑ ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •์ฒด์ œ์˜ ์ œ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ์š”์†Œ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํ†ตํ•ฉ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค. ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ˜„ํ–‰ 3๊ณ„์ธต์ œ์˜ ์œ ์ง€ ๋ฐ ์ ์ฐจ์  ์ถ•์†Œ, ๊ด‘์—ญ๋‹จ์ฒด์˜ ํ†ตํ•ฉ์„ ํ†ตํ•œ ํšจ์œจ์„ฑ ํ–ฅ์ƒ, ๊ธฐ๊ด€๋ณ‘๋ฆฝํ˜• ์ฑ„ํƒ, ์ ์ ˆํ•œ ์ง€๋ฐฉ๋ถ„๊ถŒ ์‹ค์‹œ, ๋ถํ•œ์ง€์—ญ ์ •๋‹น์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผํ™” ๋ฐ ๋‹ค๋‹น์ œ ์ˆ˜ํ˜ˆ, ๊ด‘์—ญ๋‹จ์ฒด์™€ ๊ธฐ์ดˆ๋‹จ์ฒด์˜ ๋Œ€๋“ฑํ•œ ๊ด€๊ณ„ ์„ฑ๋ฆฝ ํ›„ ์ ์ ˆํ•œ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ๋ถ„๋‹ด, ์ฃผ๋ฏผ์ฐธ์—ฌ์˜ ํ™œ์„ฑํ™” ๋ฐ ์ง€์—ญ์‚ฌํšŒ ๊ธฐ์ดˆ์ฃผ๋ฏผ์กฐ์ง ์ฒด๊ณ„์˜ ๊ตฌ์ถ•์„ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋์œผ๋กœ ์ถ”์ง„์ „๋žต์œผ๋กœ ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •์ฒด์ œํ†ตํ•ฉ ์ถ”์ง„์œ„์›ํšŒ์˜ ๊ตฌ์„ฑยท์„ค์น˜, ์ง€๋ฐฉ๊ณต๋ฌด์›์˜ ์ธ์‚ฌ์™€ ๊ต์œกํ›ˆ๋ จ, ์ง€๋ฐฉํ–‰์ •ํ†ตํ•ฉ์ง€์›๊ธฐ๊ธˆ์˜ ๋งˆ๋ จ ๋“ฑ์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค This article discusses a plan for consolidating local administrative systems in preparation for the reunification of North and South Korea. Despite high levels of outward similarity between the local administrative systems in the North and the South, there is considerable difference in the management of these systems. Based on a scenario of rapid reunification, this article offers a comparative analysis between North and South Korean local administration as well as guidelines for the consolidation of North and South Korean local administration levels, districts, institutions, central-local government relationships, party-administration relationships, metropolitan-local government relationships, and the relationships between residents and local government. In particular, this article suggests the following guidelines for consolidation: maintenance of the current three-tier system with a gradual reduction, metropolitan consolidation for increased efficiency, parallel structures for institutional arrangements, appropriate decentralization for central-local relationships, democratization of North Korean parties and introduction of a multiparty system, equalized metropolitan-local government relationships with appropriate functional allocations, invigoration of resident participation and increased introduction of participation mechanisms in North Korea, expansion of neighborhood councils as the basic participation mechanism in local communities. The paper concludes with the following strategic recommendations: creation of a local administrative system reunification commission, further education and training of local public personnel, and the establishment of a local administrative system consolidation support fund.์ด ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ 2010๋…„๋„ ์ •๋ถ€์žฌ์›(๊ต์œก๊ณผํ•™๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋ถ€ ์ธ๋ฌธ์‚ฌํšŒ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—ญ๋Ÿ‰๊ฐ•ํ™”์‚ฌ์—…๋น„)์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ๊ตญ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์žฌ๋‹จ์˜ ์ง€์›์„ ๋ฐ›์•„ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋˜์—ˆ์Œ(NRF-2010-330-B00259)
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