证券分析师实地调研的同行溢出效应研究

分析师是资本市场有效运行必不可少的参与者,以实地调研这一分析师常用的私有信息搜集手段为研究对象,可检验分析师在实地调研过程中获取的信息是否有助于降低其与同行企业之间的信息不对称程度、产生信息溢出效应。基于2012—2016年接受分析师实地调研的深圳A股上市公司数据,实证检验的结果显示,实地调研有助于提高分析师对被调研对象的其他同行企业的盈余预测准确度,说明分析师实地调研具有信息溢出效应;而当同行企业公开披露的信息质量较高时,分析师实地调研的信息溢出效应将会减弱,说明在影响分析师盈余预测准确度上,市场公开信息与分析师私有信息之间存在互替效应。进一步研究发现,对于管制行业,由于行业层面因素对企业的影响权重相对更大且行业整体的信息透明度相对更低,分析师实地调研的信息溢出效应更加显著。浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y19G020013);;国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302032

Busy Directors, Reputational Incentives and the Monitoring Behaviors of Independent Directors

谢诗蕾,浙江工商大学财务与会计学院副教授;许永斌,浙江工商大学财务与会计学院教授,博士生导师;胡舟丽,浙江理工大学科技与艺术学院助教。【中文摘要】自繁忙董事假说以来,多席位独立董事在公司治理中起到的作用广受质疑。以公司规模作为独立董事席位的声誉激励衡量指标,可探究不同席位声誉激励对独立董事监督行为及其效率的影响。研究结果表明,多席位独立董事在各公司间的监督行为存在差异,在声誉激励较大的任职企业,独立董事履行监督义务更为勤勉负责,缺席董事会会议可能性较小;受到高声誉激励的独立董事占所有独立董事的比例与公司业绩表现成正比。以上结论为理解声誉激励的运行机理提供了行为层面的经验证据,也有助于上市公司完善独立董事的选聘和监督机制。 【Abstract】Since the busy directors hypothesis was put forth by Ferris (2003), the question of whether multi-seat independent directors contribute to corporate governance or not has been extensively inquired about. Using firm size as the measurement of reputational incentives imposed by independent directorship, we investigate the effect of distinct reputational incentives on the monitoring behaviors and performance of independent directors. We find that the monitoring behaviors of multi-seated independent directors vary among firms of different sizes. In those companies which offer higher reputational incentives, independent directors perform their monitoring obligations more diligently, as evidenced by a lower probability of absence in board meetings. Furthermore, we find a significantly positive relationship between firm performance and higher percentage of directorship with stronger reputational incentives. Our results provide behavioral-level evidence for understanding the laws of reputational incentives and contribute to the improvement of the mechanisms for listed firms to select and supervise independent directors.国家自然科学基金青年基金“声誉与独立董事制度的有效性——基于行为视角的研究”(71302032);国家社会科学基金重点项目“中国家族企业代际传承的财务安排研究”(14AGL009