A pillar of the system? The political phenomenon of Arsen Avakov. OSW Commentary 2020-06-03.

The change of government in Ukraine in 2019 has boosted the political position of Arsen Avakov, the longest-serving interior minister in the history of independent Ukraine (he has been in five consecutive governments since February 2014). He was the only member of Volodymyr Hroysman’s cabinet to remain in office following Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s presidential victory. Zelenskiy came to power demanding that the political class should be renewed and the ‘old politicians’ removed, among other things. According to some Ukrainian politicians and media outlets, Avakov is an essential and highly influential politician, a guarantor of internal stability and a possible candidate for prime minister. Over the last six years, the interior minister has built up a strong position for himself in the internal security sector (for example, he supervises the National Police and the National Guard) and has successfully neutralised attempts by other politicians to limit his power. Moreover, any talk of his dismissal is frequently viewed as a threat to the country’s stability. Avakov has a big media presence and positions himself as an experienced official, a statesman and a guardian of justice and order above the divisions that run along party lines. While maintaining control of the Interior Ministry agencies, he has become politically independent and has built up an exceptionally strong position for himself. However, it seems that his media image as an omnipotent and increasingly influential politician does not correspond completely to his actual status. His attempts so far to extend his influence beyond the Interior Ministry (in politics in general, as well as in numerous institutions of the judiciary) have had less impressive results than he had expected. Alongside this, Avakov is among Ukraine’s least popular politicians; he has no political party base, no sufficient funds and no media assets that could enable him to have any effective influence on the work of the government and parliament

How the COVID-19 pandemic will develop in Ukraine. OSW Commentary NUMBER 323 27.03.2020

According to data compiled by Ukraine’s Ministry of Health, by 27 March more than 200 cases of COVID-19 were confirmed nationwide, with five fatalities. However, there is a risk of the epidemic soon developing on a much larger scale. This is due to the high daily increase in the number of infections diagnosed, the unpreparedness and inefficiency of the healthcare sector, the shortage of medical equipment, the ongoing dispute in the Ministry of Health, and the organisational and financial weakness of the Ukrainian state combined with of the ruling elite’s limited experience of governance. At the present stage, the possible consequences of the pandemic are difficult to forecast. However, it is certain that Ukraine will see a deep recession (the most optimistic forecasts spell a 5% drop in Ukraine’s GDP in 2020)

Combating corruption in Ukraine – awaiting the results. OSW Commentary NUMBER 244 | 12.07.2017

Systemic corruption has been the dominant problem of an independent Ukraine for more than two decades. The takeover of the state by a political-business group led by Viktor Yanukovych had been one of the principal causes for large-scale street protests during the Revolution of Dignity. Following the 2014 power shift, slogans calling for combating corruption and cleaning up the elites have featured among the most important priorities announced by President Petro Poroshenko and two consecutive prime ministers – Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Volodymyr Groysman. Moreover, the fight against corruption remains the West’s main condition to support Ukraine

Active measures. Russia’s key export. OSW Point of View 64, June 2017

The remarks presented in this paper show the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the techniques referred to as ‘active measures’. The renaissance of this question currently observable today has called their role in causing crises into prominence. This topic also deserves special treatment because the contemporary forms of active measures are largely based on patterns already known and described in the past. A historical perspective may help to assess and identify their covert mechanisms. The current problems with the aggressive actions of the Russian special services are enhanced versions of the old, to which new informational and communication technologies have contributed. This text is an attempt to clarify this historical concept, by showing the institutional framework of the information-sabotage activities, the conceptual and organisational innovations made since the Cold War, and it also highlights the current challenges and how to identify them

Russophobia in the Kremlin’s strategy. A weapon of mass destruction. OSW POINT OF VIEW #56, 2015-11-02

Building up an image of Russophobic countries is currently instrumental in shaping a neo-imperial political identity among the citizens of the Russian Federation, mobilising them in the face of real or alleged threats, and also serves as a form of restoring psychological comfort to them in the face of the failure of the Kremlin’s actions (as in Ukraine, for example). The mythologised stereotype of Russophobic countries also remains a crowning argument and a simple explanation for the ongoing tensions in relations between Russia and the West

The End Of The Myth of a brotherly Belarus? Russian soft power in Belarus after 2014: the background and its manifestations. OSW STUDIES 58 November 2016

The Russian narrative on Belarus changed in 2014, when Russian expert circles and the government elite essentially redefined their perception of their Belarusian ally in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and the escalation of tensions between Moscow and the West. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who was distancing himself from Moscow’s aggressive policy towards Kyiv, finally ceased to be viewed as the only and sufficient guarantor of keeping Belarus within the sphere of Russian influence. This gave rise to growing conviction in Russia that Moscow controls Minsk to an insufficient degree; the instruments of control are the energy sector (oil and gas supplies), trade (preferences on Russian output) and the military sector (close co-operation between the armies of the two countries). As a result, actions to create socio-cultural soft power promoting the ‘Russian World’ values, which had previously been taken on a very limited scale, were intensified

Business under supervision – pathologies serving the system of power in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 212 | 31.05.2016

The relations between Russia’s authorities and business circles are subordinated not so much to rational economic calculations as to the interests of political elites. The key interest in this case is maintaining the current model of government. The formal and informal supervision of business by law enforcement agencies is an important element of Russia’s economic reality. Despite the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, intended to suggest that the state is taking care of businesspeople’s interests, it is evident that there is no will to devise a systemic solution to the most urgent problems, including the state institutions’ disrespect for the rights of ownership

Differential stability of solutions to air quality control problems in urban area

summary:The convex optimal control problem for a system described by the parabolic equation is considered. The form of the right derivative of an optimal solution with respect to the parameter is derived. The applications to an air quality control problem are discussed. Numerical result are provided

A friend in need. Russia on the protests in Belarus. OSW Commentary 2020-08-20.

Due to the dynamic and surprising development of events in Belarus, Russia’s previous tactic –weakening Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s position in order to force further integration with Russia – has had to change. Moscow’s restrained public reaction to the result of the Belarusian elections and Lukashenka’s appeals for help may suggest that in the face of mass protests, the wave of strikes and the initial signs that the ruling elite in Belarus is starting to break up, the Kremlin is considering the various scenarios in the neighbouring republic, including Lukashenka’s possible resignation. Moscow’s support is of key importance for the Belarusian regime, but Russia’s readiness to grant that support to Lukashenka – a difficult partner who now faces the threat of losing power – although considerable, does not seem unconditional. The scope and form of any such support will be the subject of the Kremlin’s calculations; these will be based both on how events in Belarus develop further, and on assessing the potential gains and losses for Moscow in the context of its relations with Minsk, the internal situation in Russia itself, and the attitude of the West. In the short term, Moscow is likely to try, both overtly and covertly, to prevent the uncontrolled collapse of the Belarusian regime, while sounding out possible replacements for Lukashenka and the political consequences thereof. Russia’s priority remains obtaining guarantees that the integration of both countries will be further deepened and Russia’s long-term interests respected

Ukraine: attempted attack on anti-corruption bodies? OSW Commentary 2020-10-16.

The high susceptibility of Ukrainian officials to corruption has been one factor affecting the condition of the Ukrainian state. Since 2014, the government has managed to create several anti-corruption institutions whose independence from the executive is one of the main conditions for Ukraine to continue receiving financial assistance from the West. Over the past year, this system has become more robust, and the first sentences were issued in cases involving state officials caught up in corruption schemes. However, despite President Volodymyr Zelensky’s declared determination to combat corruption among state officials, recent months have seen measures that may weaken the key institutions established to combat corruption; this would be tantamount to reversing reforms in this field. These actions have been initiated by politicians and oligarchs intending to make the fight against corruption less effective. This has triggered major concern from Western donors (who are responding to this by threatening to halt financial support and to suspend the visa-free regime) and from Ukrainian civil society