Endoscopic Retrograde Cholangiopancreatography in the Diagnosis and Management of Choledochal Cysts

Choledochal cysts are an uncommon anomaly of the biliary system manifested by cystic dilatation of the extra or intrahepatic biliary tree or both. It is most frequently found in Orientals and in females. Endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography is a valuable imaging technique in the diagnosis of choledochal cysts in adults. Additionaly, in selected cases, a choledochocele may be effectively managed by endoscopic sphincterotomy. We present clinical and endoscopic findings of six adult patients with choledochal cysts. Clinical symptoms were characterized by abdominal pain, jaundice and cholangitis. Associated hepatobiliary pathologic findings included cholelithiasis, recurrent acute pancreatitis, gallbladder carcinoma, Cystolithiasis, choledocholithiasis, biliary stricture and hepatic abscess

Gastrointestinal tümörlerde p53 geni

TEZ1956Tez (Uzmanlık) -- Çukurova Üniversitesi, Adana, 1995.Kaynakça (s. 60-73) var.73 s. ; 30 cm.

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash [Nash, J.F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162]. On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity [Kalai, E., 1977. Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons. Econometrica 45, 1623-1630] and scale invariance [Nash, J.F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162]. We first show that a class of monotone path rules uniquely satisfy strong monotonicity, scale invariance, weak Pareto optimality, and "continuity". We also show that dropping scale invariance from this list characterizes the whole class of monotone path rules. We then introduce a symmetric monotone path rule that we call the Cardinal Egalitarian rule and show that it is weakly Pareto optimal, strongly monotonic, scale invariant, symmetric and that it is the only rule to satisfy these properties on a class of two-agent problems.Disagreement matrix Axiomatic Monotonicity Monotone path rule Cardinal Egalitarian rule

A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies

To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies, we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency, (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility), and fairness. We show that only a uniform mechanism satisfies all three. We also show that all efficient and strategy proof mechanisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their optimal bundle. In choosing these budget sets, the agencies’ private information has to be taken into account in a particular way. The only way to additionally satisfy a weak fairness requirement (regions with identical preferences should be treated equally) is to assign all agencies the same budget set, as does the uniform mechanism. Finally and maybe more importantly, we show that the central government should not impose constraints on how much to fund an activity (e.g. by reserving some funds only for a particular activity): otherwise, there are no efficient, strategy proof and fair mechanisms, no matter how small these constraints are

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity (Kalai, 1977) and scale invariance (Nash, 1950). We first show that a class of monotone path rules uniquely satisfy strong monotonicity, scale invariance, weak Pareto optimality, and “continuity”. We also show that dropping scale invariance from this list characterizes the whole class of monotone path rules. We then introduce a symmetric monotone path rule that we call the Cardinal Egalitarian rule and show that it is weakly Pareto optimal, strongly monotonic, scale invariant, symmetric and that it is the only rule to satisfy these properties on a class of two-agent problems

Production economies with single peaked preferences: pareto optimal and strategy proof rules

We analyze production economies with a linear technology and single peaked preferences. We first characterize the class of Pareto optimal (allocation) rules. We then characterize the subclass that additionally satisfies strategy proofness. Finally, we show that a uniform production rule uniquely satisfies Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, and equal treatment of equals. A similar result is obtained if equal treatment of equals is replaced with stronger fairness properties such as no-envy or anonymity. Our results can be applied to the problem of allocating central government funds among regional development agencies

The level of antitrombin III in cases with primer hepatocellular cancer

Primer hepatosellüler kanserde (PHK) rastladığı¬mız hiperkoagülabilite safhasının tanıda faydalı olabi¬leceğini varsayarak 20 PHK'li olguda antitrombin III (AT III) düzeyi ölçüldü. PHK'li olgularda ortalama AT III düzeyi 712.3+145 ng/L olarak saptandı. Yirmi sağ¬lıklı şahısta 620.2±144.3 ng/L, 20 sirozlu olguda 566.7±132.6 ng/L ve metastatik karaciğer kanserli 20 olguda S83.5±142.1 ng/L bulundu. AT III düzeyini PHK'li olgularda diğer gruplara göre istatistiki olarak yüksek saptadık (p<0.05). PHK'lerin büyüklüğü, mak-roskopik tipi ile AT III arasında bir ilişki saptanamadı. PHK'in tanısı yanında, siroz ve metastatik karaciğer kanserlerinden ayırmada AT IIl'ün kullanılabilecek hassas ve ucuz bir test olduğu sonucuna varıldı.Assuming that the hipercoagulability phase which is often observed in primary hepatocellular carcinoma might be helpful for diagnosis, antithrombin HI levels were measured in 20 patients with hepatocellular carcinoma. Antitrombin III levels were higher in patients with hepatocellular carcinoma than in healthy persons, patients with cirrhosis and patients with metasta-tic liver cancer (<0.05, n=20 in each group). No relationship betmean AT III level and size and macroscopic type ofPHC was found. It was entitrombin III measurement may be of value in differentiating primary hepatocellular carcinoma from metastatic liver cancer and cirrhosis