Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a loss for commercial property & casualty insurers that was both unprecedented and unanticipated. After sustaining this record capital loss, the availability of adequate private insurance coverage against future terrorist attacks came into question. Concern over the potential adverse consequences of the lack of availability of insurance against terrorist incidents led to calls for federal intervention in insurance markets. This paper discusses the economic rationale for and against federal intervention in the market, and concludes that the benefits from establishing a temporary transition program, during which the private sector can build capacity and adapt to a dramatically changed environment for terrorism risk, may provide benefits to the economy that exceed the direct and indirect costs.

Strategic responses to global challenges: The case of European banking, 1973–2000

In applying a strategy, structure, ownership and performance (SSOP) framework to three major clearing banks (ABN AMRO, UBS, Barclays), this article debates whether the conclusions generated by Whittington and Mayer about European manufacturing industry can be applied to the financial services sector. While European integration plays a key role in determining strategy, it is clear that global factors were far more important in determining management actions, leading to significant differences in structural adaptation. The article also debates whether this has led to improved performance, given the problems experienced with both geographical dispersion and diversification, bringing into question the quality of decision-making over the long term

Agency Problems and Risk Taking at Banks

Abstract The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value --a firm's profit-generating potential --as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence of owner/manager agency problems, managerial risk aversion may also offset the excessive risk taking that stems from moral hazard. Empirical models of bank risk tend to focus either on the disciplinary role of franchise value or on owner/manager agency problems. We estimate a unified model and find that both franchise value and ownership structure affect risk at banks. More important, we identify an interesting interaction effect: The relationship between ownership structure and risk is significant only at low franchise value banks --those where moral hazard problems are most severe and where conflicts between owner and manager risk preferences are therefore strongest. Risk is lower at banks with no insider holdings, but among other banks, there is no relationship between the level of insider holdings and risk. This suggests that the owner/manager agency problem affects the choice of risk for only a small number of banks --those with low franchise value and no insider holdings. Most of these banks increase their insider holdings within a year, and these changes in ownership structure are associated with increased risk. This suggests that owner/manager agency problems are quickly addressed.

How local is local? Evidence from bank competition and corporate innovation in U.S.

This paper aims to fill in a research gap in the effects of bank competition on corporate innovation. In addition to the evidence on the favorable effects of bank competition on corporate innovation, we show novel evidence on the substitution effects of bank competition in a wider region and neighbor-state to local bank competition in financing corporate innovation activities. In banking market, we show ‘how local is local’ depends on the operating scope and information transparency of firms. Local banks have an information advantage over distant banks in financing local businesses and informationally opaque corporate innovation activities