597 research outputs found
Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantification
This paper starts with a discussion of the various aspects of accountability of central banks. On the basis of this discussion we construct an indicator for accountability for 16 central banks, including the European Central Bank. It is shown that the degree of accountability differs considerably and that the ECB has a rather low score. The indicator is used to examine the relationship between central bank independence and accountability. It is concluded that although there appears to be a negative relationship between independence and accountability, this does certainly not imply that a central bank cannot both be independent and accountable.central bank independence;central bank accountability;European central bank
The (potential) contribution of the European Union’s fiscal architecture to financial stability
Central Bank Challenges in the Global Economy
Introductory Remarks: There are few institutions linked to the exercise of public power in the economic sphere that have stood the test of time for as long as central banks. Indeed their
origins can be traced back to the seventeenth century when in 1668 the Swedish ‘Bank of the Estates of the Realm’ the forerunner of todays Riksbank was established by the Riksdag, at the dawn of two major armed conflicts with neighbouring
Denmark. Soon thereafter, in the midst of the Nine Year War between England and France the Bank of England was established by an Act of Parliament. Other European countries such as France and the German Reich would follow suit in
due course. Asserting that the role of central banks has changed in the course of their long history is hardly original. These changes can be observed both with regard to their main tasks, as well as their ownership and (corporate) institutional structure.
A number of central bank systems have emerged from private corporations ((joint-) stock companies) that were initially set up with the aim to raise capital for the financing of wars thus acting as the quasi-banker of government, while at the same time undertaking commercial banking. Eventually these banks would
become public corporations. ..
Continuation or Reorientation - What Future for European Integration?
On the 25th of March the European Union celebrates the 50th anniversary of the Treaty
of Rome by which the European Economic Community was established; the
Netherlands being one of the founding members. Until this very day, albeit in revised
form, this Treaty still constitutes the very centrepiece of the post-war European
supranational legal order.
Anniversaries are a time of celebration, a time of praise of previous accomplishments
and encouragements to keep up the good work. I am confident that the Informal
Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States planned for the
25th of March will do an excellent job in issuing a statement to that effect.
Yet, these celebrations come at an awkward time for Europe: there is talk of a
constitutional crisis and of a rift that goes through Europe caused by the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe. With the negative referenda in the Netherlands
and France the destiny of this Treaty remains unclear. The initial disbelief triggered
by the rejection of this European prestige project by the citizens of two of the
founding members of the European Communities has given way for a certain
resignation regarding the current state and the future perspectives for Europe. Taken
aback were especially those who consider the Constitutional Treaty a substantial step
forward. For some the importance of this project has existential proportions, as its
failure is thought to jeopardize the future of European integration as a whole.Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van Hoogleraar Recht van de Europese Unie aan de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.
In zijn oratie gaat Amtenbrink onder andere in op de organisatie van het Europees Parlement, waarin de burgers per land zijn vertegenwoordigd. Hij is van mening dat het huidige juridische kader niet voldoet aan de democratische grondslag, omdat het geen proportionele vertegenwoordiging van de burgers van de Europese Unie waarborgt. Bovendien is het Europees Parlement op belangrijke beleidsterreinen nog steeds nauwelijks betrokken bij de besluitvorming. Ook in de voorgestelde Europese Grondwet worden deze tekortkomingen niet opgelost.
Amtenbrink oordeelt dat voor de vooruitgang van de Europese Unie en vooral voor de beoogde verdere uitbreiding een grondige heroriëntatie noodzakelijk is. Anders dreigen burgers steeds meer in verzet te komen tegen Europa. Bij een reorganisatie van de huidige Europese instellingen dient ook buiten de gebaande paden gedacht te worden. Als mogelijke oplossingen stelt Amtenbrink voor een duidelijke scheiding tussen vertegenwoordiging van burgers en van lidstaten en de introductie van Europese verkiezingen gebaseerd op een Europees stembiljet
Securing financial independence in the legal basis of a central bank
Together with institutional, functional and organizational independence, financial independence constitutes one of the cornerstones of central bank independence, the economic ratio of which has been demonstrated extensively in the literature. In broad terms financial independence may be defined as referring to the legal and practical arrangements identifying the finances of a central bank and the extent to which the bank is subject to outside influence in this regard. In the (legal) debate on central bank accountability, arguably arrangements relating to central bank finances have sometimes been treated in a rather step motherly fashion. Yet, with the wider debate on good governance structures having reached central banking, more attention is paid to such detailed arrangements. This contribution focuses on and aims at providing an overview on the impact on central bank independence of the legal arrangements relating to several aspects of central bank finances. While government access to central bank money undoubtedly has an impact on the financial position of the central bank, this contribution focuses on those elements, which are arguably more directly linked to the financial position of a central bank, including capitalization and recapitalization, the determination of the central bank budget and the arrangements on profit and loss distribution. In legal studies these arrangements have certainly received less attention. To this end a critical assessment of the role which the legal basis of a central bank plays in enhancing or undermining the financial position of a central bank vis-Ã -vis government and, thereafter. In this context, legal arrangements which do not only support the financial independence of a central bank but also enhance its accountability are observed. Where appropriate, references are included to legal arrangements in existing central bank systems so to provide for negative and positive examples
Introduction: Observing the Rule of Law in the European Union-Selected Issues
This is an editorial introduction to the theme of the Erasmus Law Review Vol. 2 No.1. Focusing on different relevant topics linked to the rule of law in the European Union, the contributions highlight both the ambiguity and broad scope of this notion, as well as its exceptional place in the European legal order; the application of the rule of law concept to a new, supranational legal order arguably being a contributing factor in this regard. The editorial introduction places the different contributions in perspective
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