1,387 research outputs found
Augmenting human memory using personal lifelogs
Memory is a key human facility to support life activities, including social interactions, life management and problem solving. Unfortunately, our memory is not perfect. Normal individuals will have occasional memory problems which can be frustrating, while those with memory impairments can often experience a greatly reduced quality of life. Augmenting memory has the potential to make normal individuals more effective, and those with significant memory problems to have a higher general quality of life. Current technologies are now making it possible to automatically capture and store daily life experiences over an extended period, potentially even over a lifetime. This type of data collection, often referred to as a personal life log (PLL), can include data such as continuously captured pictures or videos from a first person perspective, scanned copies of archival material such as books, electronic documents read or created, and emails and SMS messages sent and received, along with context data of time of capture and access and location via GPS sensors.
PLLs offer the potential for memory augmentation. Existing work on PLLs has focused on the technologies of data capture and retrieval, but little work has been done to explore how these captured data and retrieval techniques can be applied to actual use by normal people in supporting their memory. In this paper, we explore the needs for augmenting human memory from normal people based on the psychology literature on mechanisms about memory problems, and discuss the possible functions that PLLs can provide to support these memory augmentation needs. Based on this, we also suggest guidelines for data for capture, retrieval needs and computer-based interface design. Finally we introduce our work-in-process prototype PLL search system in the iCLIPS project to give an example of augmenting human memory with PLLs and computer based interfaces
The Emerging Nature of Participation in Multispecies Interaction Design
Interactive technology has become integral part of daily life for both humans and animals, with animals often interacting with technologized environments on behalf of humans. For some, animals' participation in the design process is essential to design technology that can adequately support their activities. For others, animals' inability to understand and control design activities inevitably stands in the way of multispecies participatory practices. Here, we consider the essential elements of participation within interspecies interactions and illustrate its emergence, in spite of contextual constraints and asymmetries. To move beyond anthropomorphic notions of participation, and consequent anthropocentric practices, we propose a broader participatory model based on indexical semiosis, volition and choice; and we highlight dimensions that could define inclusive participatory practices more resilient to the diversity of understandings and goals among part-taking agents, and better able to account for the contribution of diverse, multispecies agents in interaction design and beyond
Recommended from our members
Interactions Between Forms of Memory: When Priming Hinders New Episodic Learning
Human memory consists of multiple forms, including priming and explicit memory. Although considerable evidence indicates that priming and explicit memory are functionally and neuroanatomically distinct, little is know about when and how these different forms of memory interact. Here, behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) methods were used to examine a novel and counterintuitive hypothesis: Priming during episodic encoding may be negatively associated with subsequent explicit memory. Using an experimental design that exploited known properties of spacing or lag effects, the magnitudes of behavioral and neural priming during a second study episode were varied and the relation between these magnitudes of priming during re-encoding and performance on a subsequent explicit memory test was examined. Results revealed that greater behavioral priming (reduced reaction times) and neural priming (reduced left inferior prefrontal brain activation) during re-encoding were associated with lower levels of subsequent explicit memory. Moreover, those subjects who demonstrated greater behavioral and neural priming effects during re-encoding following a long lag tended to demonstrate the least benefit in subsequent explicit memory due to this second study episode. These findings suggest that priming for past experiences can hinder new episodic encoding.Physic
Recommended from our members
Memory for Emotional Simulations: Remembering a Rosy Future
Mental simulations of future experiences are often concerned with emotionally arousing events. Although it is widely believed that mental simulations enhance future behavior, virtually nothing is known about the mnemonic fate of these simulations over time or whether emotional simulations are especially well-remembered. We used a novel paradigm, combining recently developed methods for generating future event simulations and well-established memory testing procedures, to examine the retention of positive, negative, and neutral simulations over multiple delays. We found that with increasing delay, details associated with negative simulations become more difficult to remember than details associated with positive and neutral simulations. We suggest that these delay-by-emotion interactions reflect the mnemonic influence of fading affect bias, where negative reactions fade more quickly than positive ones, resulting in a tendency to remember a rosy simulated future. We also discuss implications for affective disorders such as depression and anxiety.Psycholog
Recommended from our members
Auditory Priming within and across Modalities: Evidence from Positron Emission Tomography
Previous neuroimaging studies of perceptual priming have reported priming-related decreases in the extrastriate cortex. However, because these experiments have used visual stimuli, it is unclear whether the observed decreases are associated specifically with some aspect of visual perceptual processing or with more general aspects of priming. We studied within-and cross-modality priming using an auditory word stem completion paradigm. Positron emission tomography (PET) images were obtained during stem completion and a fixation task. Within-modality auditory priming was associated with blood flow decreases in the extrastriate cortex (bilateral), medial/ right anterior prefrontal cortex, right angular gyrus, and precuneus. In cross-modality priming, the study list was presented visually, and subjects completed auditory word stems. Cross-modality priming was associated with trends for blood flow decreases in the left angular gyrus and increases in the medial/right anterior prefrontal cortex. Results thus indicate that reduced activity in the extrastriate cortex accompanies within-modality priming in both visual and auditory modalities.Psycholog
Recommended from our members
Conscious Processing During Retrieval Can Occur in Early and Late Visual Regions
Previous evidence has suggested a functional-anatomic dissociation between conscious and nonconscious processing during retrieval where early visual regions BA17/18 are associated with nonconscious processing and late visual regions BA19/37 are associated with conscious processing. However, evidence for this dissociation has only been observed using a limited number of experimental paradigms. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we tested the hypothesis that conscious processing during retrieval can occur in BA17/18 using memorial paradigms that recruited processing in these early visual regions. During the encoding phase of Experiment 1, abstract shapes with colored and oriented internal lines were presented to the left and right of fixation. During the retrieval phase, old shapes and new shapes were presented at fixation and participants classified each item as âold-leftâ, âold-rightâ, or ânewâ. The contrast of spatial memory-hits>spatial memory-misses (with accurate item memory) produced activity in BA17/18. During the encoding phase of Experiment 2, abstract shapes with colored and oriented internal lines were presented at fixation. During the retrieval phase, old shapes, changed shapes (with the same outline but different colored and oriented internal lines), and new shapes were presented at fixation and participants made an old-new classification during runs with a specific retrieval orientation or a non-specific retrieval orientation. Critically, the contrast of old-hits>old-misses during specific retrieval orientation produced activity in BA17/18. The results of the present experiments support the hypothesis that conscious processing during retrieval can occur in BA17/18.Psycholog
Recommended from our members
When True Recognition Suppresses False Recognition: Evidence from Amnesic Patients
False recognition occurs when people mistakenly claim that a novel item is familiar. After studying lists of semantically related words, healthy controls show extraordinarily high levels of false recognition to nonstudied lures that are semantic associates of study list words. In previous experiments, we found that both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesic patients show reduced levels of false recognition to semantic associates, implying that the medial temporal/diencephalic structures that are damaged in amnesic patients are involved in the encoding and/or retrieval of information that underlies false recognition. These data contrast with earlier results indicating greater false recognition in Korsakoff amnesics than in control subjects. The present experiment tests the hypothesis that greater or lesser false recognition of semantic associates in amnesic patients, relative to normal controls, can be demonstrated by creating conditions that are more or less conducive to allowing true recognition to suppress false recognition. With repeated presentation and testing of lists of semantic associates, control subjects and both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesics showed increasing levels of true recognition across trials. However, control subjects exhibited decreasing levels of false recognition across trials, whereas Korsakoff amnesic patients showed increases across trials and non-Korsakoff amnesics showed a fluctuating pattern. Consideration of signal detection analyses and differences between the two types of amnesic patients provides insight into how mechanisms of veridical episodic memory can be used to suppress false recognition.Psycholog
Recommended from our members
Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?
Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects
Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour
Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participantsâ beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/RoedigerâMcDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participantsâ belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving
- âŠ