Race Audits

The U.S. Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence suffers from a stunning lack of imagination where possibilities for meaningful local government involvement in combating structural racial inequality are concerned. Cases such as Parents. and Ricci limit dramatically the freedom that localities have to address racial inequity within their borders. Instead of constraints on local efforts in the race context, Professor Lenhardt argues that what we need, if persistent racial inequalities are ever to be eliminated, is greater innovation and experimentation. In this article, Professor Lenhardt thus introduces an extra-judicial tool called the race audit, which would permit individual cities or a regional coalition of localities voluntarily to determine the extent to which their governmental systems and policies create, enable, or perpetuate inequitable conditions for racial minorities. This tool, grounded in the tenets of structuralism, breaks from traditional audit mechanisms in the race context by eschewing a singular focus on intentional discrimination. Instead, it seeks to uncover the specific structural mechanisms that generate cumulative racial disadvantage across domains, time and generations by, inter alia, being attuned to the spatial dimensions, meaning, and operation of race in the United States. The race audit’s main goal – which falls outside the reach of most existing tools for measuring discrimination – would be achieved through the work of a “community of inquiry” consisting of academics, philanthropic organizations, non-profits and civil rights groups, governmental agencies, and business leaders charged with assessing the segregative effects of the locality’s policies and programs. The race audit process, whose results might be similar to those produced by truth and reconciliation commissions, would produce a counter-narrative about race in metropolitan areas whose telling would have numerous benefits, including generating more effective remedies for addressing structural discrimination, and promoting democratic conversations about equality and what is necessary to secure belonging at the local level. Most of all, the race audit would make apparent the deep potential cities have for being important “equality innovators.” designed to identify the sources of persistent racial inequality that can be productively deployed by localities. This tool, grounded in the tenets of structuralism, eschews a singular focus on intentional discrimination. Instead, it seeks to uncover the specific structural mechanisms that create cumulative racial disadvantage across domains, time, and generations by, inter alia, being attuned to the spatial dimensions, meaning, and operation of race in the United States. The race audit process, in addition to highlighting the capacity of localities to be important change agents, would help produce a counternarrative about race and the seeming naturalness of the racial segregation and disadvantage now evident in urban and suburban areas alike. The Author contends that, in doing so, the race audit would identify better, more effective strategies for alleviating structural racial inequality. Situating the race audit proposal in a larger project on the commitments underlying civil rights advocacy more broadly, she highlights the potential that the race audit and other innovative tools might have to spur democratic conversations about race and the conditions necessary for belonging at the local level; generate a thicker, more substantive account of equality than has thus far been forthcoming in U.S. Supreme Court cases; and reconcile the perceived tensions between notions of equality and liberty in the area of race

Audits and inspections are never enough: a critique to enhance food safety

Internal and external food safety audits are conducted to assess the safety and quality of food including on-farm production, manufacturing practices, sanitation, and hygiene. Some auditors are direct stakeholders that are employed by food establishments to conduct internal audits, while other auditors may represent the interests of a second party purchaser or a third-party auditing agency. Some buyers conduct their own audits or additional testing, while some buyers trust the results of third-party audits or inspections. Third-party auditors, however, use various food safety audit standards and most do not have a vested interest in the products being sold. Audits are conducted under a proprietary standard, while food safety inspections are generally conducted within a legal framework. There have been many foodborne illness outbreaks linked to food processors that have passed third-party audits and inspections, raising questions about the utility of both. Supporters argue third-party audits are a way to ensure food safety in an era of dwindling economic resources. Critics contend that while external audits and inspections can be a valuable tool to help ensure safe food, such activities represent only a snapshot in time. This paper identifies limitations of food safety inspections and audits and provides recommendations for strengthening the system, based on developing a strong food safety culture, including risk-based verification steps, throughout the food safety system

Strategic Communications Audits

Nonprofit organizations are now continuously being challenged to be more strategic in their communications efforts. Communications activities must add up to more than a series of isolated events such as the dissemination of an occasional publication or press release. Being strategic requires that nonprofits be more deliberate, innovative, savvy, and less reactive in their communications practice. Nonprofits are encouraged to regard communications as essential to their overall success and integrate it throughout their organizations.1As a result of this movement, an array of new tools, resources, and trainings have been developed to help organizations better understand the concept of strategic communications, develop their own communications strategies, and evaluate them for both accountability and learning purposes. But while nonprofits are learning how to develop strategies and are gaining a better understanding of their importance, questions remain about their actual follow through in practice and nonprofits' overall capacity to implement their strategies given their relative inexperience in this field and the many priorities, including communications, that often compete for scarce organizational resources

Mandatory Vote Count Audit

Voters, candidates, citizens and election officials want high confidence in the integrity of the election process by subjecting electronic vote counts to independent manual audits; and by making reports available with which to evaluate rates of voter turnout, voting equipment allocation, under-votes, over-votes, spoiled ballots, voting equipment failure, absentee ballots, uncounted ballots, and provisional ballots. This bill requires routine independent audits of vote count accuracy and requires the release to vote count auditors of records and information necessary to verify the integrity of the vote count audits and to evaluate voter service levels

Better Auditing for Better Contracting: Eight Recommendations to Reform the Defense Contract Audit Agency and Other Federal Government Audit

Examines why the DCAA's audits of government contractors sometimes fail. Proposes reforms to strengthen oversight, including giving auditors authority to subpoena contractor records and shifting from limited to risk-based audits and random checks

The Cost of Worker Misclassification in New York State

[Excerpt] This study uses data based on audits performed by the NYS Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Division during the four-year period 2002-2005. Audits were performed on firms in certain industries, and data was extrapolated statewide for these industries only, based on given employment information. Using general and specific audits conducted during the four year period 2002-2005, it is estimated that 39,587 New York employers (of about 400,732) in audited industries misclassified workers each year as independent contractors. Of these, approximately 5,880 employers, or 14.9%, were in the construction industry

Food Safety Audits, Plant Characteristics, and Food Safety Technology Use in Meat and Poultry Plants

Food safety technology can increase a company’s capacity to prevent a foodborne contamination. A food safety audit—a quality control tool in which an auditor observes whether a plant’s processing practices and technologies are compatible with good food safety practices—can indicate how effectively food safety technology is being used. Fast food restaurants, grocery stores, and other major customers of meat and poultry processing plants conduct their own audits or hire auditors to assess the soundness of a plant’s processing operation. Meat and poultry plants can also audit themselves as a way to help maintain process control. In this report, we document the extent of food safety audits in meat and poultry processing plants. We also examine the associations between the use of audits and plant size, firm structure, and food safety technology use. Results show that larger plants, plants subject to food safety audits, and plants that are part of a multiplant firm use more food safety technology than other plants. Plants subject to both plant-hired and customer-hired audits had greater technology use than single (plant- or customer-hired) audit plants.Meat and poultry processing, safety standards, product recalls, food safety technology, food safety audits, Agribusiness, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Industrial Organization, Livestock Production/Industries,

The Effects of Communication Among Taxpayers on Compliance

Taxpayer audits are thought to have a direct deterrent effect on the individuals actually audited. In addition, audits are believed to have an indirect deterrent effect on individuals not audited as these individuals learn (or are told) about the audits of other taxpayers. However, the effects on compliance of the ways in which taxpayers learn about - and communicate among themselves - audit rates are not known. In this study, we use laboratory experiments to examine the effects of three types of information and communication on compliance. In all sessions, each subject knows the probability of audit and the results of their own audit (if any). In our base case session, each subject knows only the result of his or her audit, and subjects receive no information about audit results of other subjects. In a second treatment (termed "official" communication), subjects are also told by the experimenter the actual number of audits conducted during a period. In a third treatment (or "unofficial" communication), subjects are offered the opportunity to send a "message" to the other participants about their audit experience. Our preliminary results indicate that "unofficial" communication has a strong indirect effect that increases compliance, but that "official" communication may not encourage voluntary compliance