22 research outputs found
ZMAC+ – An Efficient Variable-output-length Variant of ZMAC
There is an ongoing trend in the symmetric-key cryptographic community to construct highly secure modes and message authentication codes based on tweakable block ciphers (TBCs). Recent constructions, such as Cogliati et al.’s HaT or Iwata et al.’s ZMAC, employ both the n-bit plaintext and the t-bit tweak simultaneously for higher performance.
This work revisits ZMAC, and proposes a simpler alternative finalization based on HaT. As a result, we propose HtTBC, and call its instantiation with ZHash as a hash function ZMAC+. Compared to HaT, ZMAC+ (1) requires only a single key and a single primitive. Compared to ZMAC, our construction (2) allows variable, per-query parametrizable output lengths. Moreover, ZMAC+ (3) avoids the complex finalization of ZMAC and (4) improves the security bound from Ο(σ2/2n+min(n,t)) to Ο(q/2n + q(q + σ)/2n+min(n,t)) while retaining a practical tweak space
ZMAC: A Fast Tweakable Block Cipher Mode for Highly Secure Message Authentication
We propose a new mode of operation called ZMAC allowing to construct a (stateless and deterministic) message authentication code (MAC) from a tweakable block cipher (TBC). When using a TBC with -bit blocks and -bit tweaks, our construction provides security (as a variable-input-length PRF) beyond the birthday bound with respect to the block-length and allows to process bits of inputs per TBC call. In comparison, previous TBC-based modes such as PMAC1, the TBC-based generalization of the seminal PMAC mode (Black and Rogaway, EUROCRYPT 2002) or PMAC_TBC1k (Naito, ProvSec 2015) only process bits of input per TBC call. Since an -bit block, -bit tweak TBC can process at most bits of input per call, the efficiency of our construction is essentially optimal, while achieving beyond-birthday-bound security. The ZMAC mode is fully parallelizable and can be directly instantiated with several concrete TBC proposals, such as Deoxys and SKINNY. We also use ZMAC to construct a stateless and deterministic Authenticated Encryption scheme called ZAE which is very efficient and secure beyond the birthday bound
Masked Iterate-Fork-Iterate: A new Design Paradigm for Tweakable Expanding Pseudorandom Function
Many modes of operations for block ciphers or tweakable block ciphers do not require invertibility from their underlying primitive. In this work, we study fixed-length Tweakable Pseudorandom Function (TPRF) with large domain extension, a novel primitive that can bring high security and significant performance optimizations in symmetric schemes, such as (authenticated) encryption.
Our first contribution is to introduce a new design paradigm, derived from the Iterate-Fork-Iterate construction, in order to build -to--bit (), -bit secure, domain expanding TPRF. We dub this new generic composition masked Iterate-Fork-Iterate (mIFI). We then propose a concrete TPRF instantiation ButterKnife that expands an -bit input to -bit output via a public tweak and secret key. ButterKnife is built with high efficiency and security in mind. It is fully parallelizable and based on Deoxys-BC, the AES-based tweakable block cipher used in the authenticated encryption winner algorithm in the defense-in-depth category of the recent CAESAR competition. We analyze the resistance of ButterKnife to differential, linear, meet-in-the-middle, impossible differentials and rectangle attacks. A special care is taken to the attack scenarios made possible by the multiple branches.
Our next contribution is to design and provably analyze two new TPRF-based deterministic authenticated encryption (DAE) schemes called SAFE and ZAFE that are highly efficient, parallelizable, and offer bits of security, where denote respectively the input block and the tweak sizes of the underlying primitives.
We further implement SAFE with ButterKnife to show that it achieves an encryption performance of 1.06 c/B for long messages on Skylake, which is 33-38% faster than the comparable Crypto\u2717 TBC-based ZAE DAE. Our second candidate ZAFE, which uses the same authentication pass as ZAE, is estimated to offer a similar level of speedup. Besides, we show that ButterKnife, when used in Counter Mode, is slightly faster than AES (0.50 c/B vs 0.56 c/B on Skylake)
Attaques Génériques sur des BBB MACs
International audienc
Elastic-Tweak: A Framework for Short Tweak Tweakable Block Cipher
Tweakable block cipher (TBC), a stronger notion than standard
block ciphers, has wide-scale applications in symmetric-key schemes. At a high level, it provides flexibility in design and (possibly) better security bounds. In multi-keyed applications, a TBC with short tweak values can be used to replace multiple keys. However, the existing TBC construction frameworks, including TWEAKEY and XEX, are designed for general purpose tweak sizes. Specifically, they are not optimized for short tweaks, which might render them inefficient for certain resource constrained applications. So a dedicated paradigm to construct short-tweak TBCs (tBC) is highly desirable. In this paper, as a first contribution, we present a dedicated framework, called the Elastic-Tweak framework (ET in short), to convert any reasonably secure SPN block cipher into a secure tBC. We apply the ET framework on GIFT and AES to construct efficient tBCs, named TweGIFT and TweAES. These short-tweak TBCs have already been employed in recent NIST lightweight competition candidates, LOTUS-LOCUS and ESTATE. As our second contribution, we show some concrete applications of ET-based tBCs, which are better than their block cipher counterparts in terms of key size, state size, number of block cipher calls, and short message processing. Some notable applications include, Twe-FCBC (reduces the key size of FCBC and gives better security than CMAC), Twe-LightMAC Plus (better rate than LightMAC Plus), Twe-CLOC, and Twe-SILC (reduces the number of block cipher calls and simplifies the design of CLOC and SILC)
Elastic-Tweak: A Framework for Short Tweak Tweakable Block Cipher
Tweakable block cipher (TBC), a stronger notion than standard block ciphers, has wide-scale applications in symmetric-key schemes. At a high level, it provides flexibility in design and (possibly) better security bounds. In multi-keyed applications, a TBC with short tweak values can be used to replace multiple keys. However, the existing TBC construction frameworks, including TWEAKEY and XEX, are designed for general purpose tweak sizes. Specifically, they are not optimized for short tweaks, which might render them inefficient for certain resource constrained applications. So a dedicated paradigm to construct short-tweak TBCs (tBC) is highly desirable. In this paper, we present a dedicated framework, called the Elastic-Tweak framework (ET in short), to convert any reasonably secure SPN block cipher into a secure tBC. We apply the ET framework on GIFT and AES to construct efficient tBCs, named TweGIFT and TweAES. We present hardware and software results to show that the performance overheads for these tBCs are minimal. We perform comprehensive security analysis and observe that TweGIFT and
TweAES provide sufficient security without any increase in the number of block cipher rounds when compared to GIFT and AES. We also show some concrete applications of ET-based tBCs, which are better than their block cipher counterparts in terms of key size, state size, number of block cipher calls, and short message processing. Some notable applications include, Twe-FCBC (reduces the key size of FCBC and gives better security than CMAC), Twe-LightMAC Plus (better rate than LightMAC Plus), Twe-CLOC, and Twe-SILC (reduces the number of block cipher calls and simplifies the design of CLOC and SILC)
Tight Security of Cascaded LRW2
At CRYPTO \u2712, Landecker et al. introduced the cascaded LRW2 (or CLRW2) construction, and proved that it is a secure tweakable block cipher up to roughly queries. Recently, Mennink presented a distinguishing attack on CLRW2 in queries. In the same paper, he discussed some non-trivial bottlenecks in proving tight security bound, i.e. security up to queries. Subsequently, he proved security up to queries for a variant of CLRW2 using -wise independent AXU assumption and the restriction that each tweak value occurs at most times. Moreover, his proof relies on a version of mirror theory which is yet to be publicly verified. In this paper, we resolve the bottlenecks in Mennink\u27s approach and prove that the original CLRW2 is indeed a secure tweakable block cipher up to roughly queries. To do so, we develop two new tools: First, we give a probabilistic result that provides improved bound on the joint probability of some special collision events; Second, we present a variant of Patarin\u27s mirror theory in tweakable permutation settings with a self-contained and concrete proof. Both these results are of generic nature, and can be of independent interests. To demonstrate the applicability of these tools, we also prove tight security up to roughly queries for a variant of DbHtS, called DbHtS-p, that uses two independent universal hash functions
ZCZ - Achieving n-bit SPRP Security with a Minimal Number of Tweakable-block-cipher Calls
Strong Pseudo-random Permutations (SPRPs) are important for various applications. In general, it is desirable to base an SPRP on a single-keyed primitive for minimizing the implementation costs. For constructions built on classical block ciphers, Nandi showed at ASIACRYPT\u2715 that at least two calls to the primitive per processed message block are required for SPRP security, assuming that all further operations are linear. The ongoing trend of using tweakable block ciphers as primitive has already led to MACs or encryption modes with high security and efficiency properties. Thus, three interesting research questions are hovering in the domain of SPRPs: (1) if and to which extent the bound of two calls per block can be reduced with a tweakable block cipher, (2) how concrete constructions could be realized, and (3) whether full -bit security is achievable from primitives with -bit state size.
The present work addresses all three questions. Inspired by Iwata et al.\u27s ZHash proposal at CRYPTO\u2717, we propose the ZCZ (ZHash-Counter-ZHash) construction, a single-key variable-input-length SPRP based on a single tweakable block cipher whose tweak length is at least its state size. ZCZ possesses close to optimal properties with regards to both performance and security: not only does it require only asymptotically calls to the primitive for -block messages, but we also show that this figure is close to the minimum by an PRP distinguishing attack on any construction with tweak size of bits and fewer than calls to the same primitive. Moreover, it provides optimal -bit security for a primitive with -bit state and tweak size
Full Indifferentiable Security of the Xor of Two or More Random Permutations Using the Method
The construction (bitwise-xor of outputs of two independent -bit random permutations) has gained broad attention over the last two decades due to its high security. Very recently, Dai \textit{et al.} (CRYPTO\u2717), by using a method which they term the {\em Chi-squared method} ( method), have shown -bit security of when the underlying random permutations are kept secret to the adversary. In this work, we consider the case where the underlying random permutations are publicly available to the adversary. The best known security of in this security game (also known as {\em indifferentiable security}) is -bit, due to Mennink \textit{et al.} (ACNS\u2715). Later, Lee (IEEE-IT\u2717) proved a better -bit security for the general construction which returns the xor of () independent random permutations. However, the security was shown only for the cases where is an even integer. In this paper, we improve all these known bounds and prove full, {\em i.e.,} -bit (indifferentiable) security of as well as for any . Our main result is -bit security of , and we use the method to prove it
Proof of Mirror Theory for a Wide Range of
In CRYPTO\u2703, Patarin conjectured a lower bound on the number of distinct solutions satisfying a system of equations of the form such that , are pairwise distinct. This result is known as \emph{`` Theorem for any \u27\u27} or alternatively as \emph{Mirror Theory for general }, which was later proved by Patarin in ICISC\u2705. Mirror theory for general stands as a powerful tool to provide a high-security guarantee for many blockcipher-(or even ideal permutation-) based designs. Unfortunately, the proof of the result contains gaps that are non-trivial to fix. In this work, we present the first complete proof of the theorem for a wide range of , typically up to order . Furthermore, our proof approach is made simpler by using a new type of equation, dubbed link-deletion equation, that roughly corresponds to half of the so-called orange equations from earlier works. As an illustration of our result, we also revisit the security proofs of two optimally secure blockcipher-based pseudorandom functions, and -bit security proof for six round Feistel cipher, and provide updated security bounds