Medieval Theories on the Conceivability of the Impossible: a Survey of Impossible Positio in Ars Obligatoria during the 13th-14th Centuries

During the 13th century, several logicians in the Latin medieval tradition showed a special interest in the nature of impossibility, and in the different kinds or ‘degrees’ of impossibility that could be distinguished. This discussion resulted in an analysis of the modal concept with a finesse of grain unprecedented in earlier modal accounts. Of the several divisions of the term ‘impossible’ that were offered, one became particularly relevant in connection with the debate on ars obligatoria and positio impossibilis: the distinction between ‘intelligible’ and ‘unintelligible’ impossibilities. In this article, I consider some 13th-century tracts on obligations that provide an account of the relation betweenimpossibility and intelligibility and discuss the inferential principles that are permissible when we reason from an impossible – but intelligible – premise. I also explore the way in which the 13th-century reflection on this topic survives, in a revised form, in some early 14th-century accounts of positio, namely, those of William of Ockham, Roger Swineshead and Thomas Bradwardine

Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2.

A volume on early-fourteenth century logic and semantics, focusing primarily on the theories of signification and supposition (including ampliation), along with connotation-theory and the theory of mental language. The main authors discussed are Ockham, Burley, Peter of Ailly and, to some extent, Gregory of Rimini, although other people are treated too. Ch. 2 contains a "Thumbnail Sketch of the History of Logic to the End of the Middle Ages." There is an Appendix with a chronological table of names (and comments), and another Appendix of short primary texts that are discussed in the book

The Art of Doubting in <i>Obligationes Parisienses</i>

Recent studies on obligationes tend to focus on the specific type of positio. This emphasis has led to a neglect of the less standard types, including dubitatio. While some claim that dubitatio is merely a trivial variant of positio, we show that the dubitatio rules given in the 13th-century treatise Obligationes Parisienses are by no means trivial and in fact lend themselves to a somewhat peculiar system of dialogue. Dubitatio in this treatise shares many aspects with dubitatio in two other 13th-century treatises, by William of Sherwood and Nicholas of Paris. We use these similarities to shed some light on the history of dubitatio in general and the interpretation of the Parisienses rules in particular

The Art of Doubting in <i>Obligationes Parisienses</i>

Recent studies on obligationes tend to focus on the specific type of positio. This emphasis has led to a neglect of the less standard types, including dubitatio. While some claim that dubitatio is merely a trivial variant of positio, we show that the dubitatio rules given in the 13th-century treatise Obligationes Parisienses are by no means trivial and in fact lend themselves to a somewhat peculiar system of dialogue. Dubitatio in this treatise shares many aspects with dubitatio in two other 13th-century treatises, by William of Sherwood and Nicholas of Paris. We use these similarities to shed some light on the history of dubitatio in general and the interpretation of the Parisienses rules in particular

Obligations, Sophisms and Insolubles

The focus of the paper is a sophism based on the proposition ‘This is Socrates’ found in a short treatise on obligational casus attributed to William Heytesbury. First, the background to the puzzle in Walter Burley’s traditional account of obligations (the responsio antiqua), and the objections and revisions made by Richard Kilvington and Roger Swyneshed, are presented. All six types of obligations described by Burley are outlined, including sit verum, the type used in the sophism. Kilvington and Swyneshed disliked the dynamic nature of the responsio antiqua, and Kilvington proposed a revision to the rules for irrelevant propositions. This allowed him to use a form of reasoning, the “disputational meta-argument”, which is incompatible with Burley’s rules. Heytesbury explicitly rejected Kilvington’s revision and the associated meta-argument. Swyneshed also revised Burley’s account of obligations, formulating the so-called responsio nova, characterised by the apparently surprising thesis that a conjunction can be denied both of whose conjuncts are granted. On closer inspection, however, his account is found to be less radical than first appears

Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism

The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, there was an overwhelming consensus among Christian thinkers that some form of mind-body (or soul-body) dualism is true of human beings. Recently, that consensus has eroded, and with it the availability of a shared body of knowledge about spiritual formation. Some Christian physicalists argue that dualism is incompatible with central elements of spiritual formation. Neuroscientist Warren Brown and psychologist Brad Strawn offer the only substantive account of spiritual formation from the view of Christian physicalism and its accompanying objections to dualism. It is on their arguments that this chapter focuses. We argue that Brown and Strawn fail to support their incompatibility thesis. Additionally, we argue that Christian physicalism stands in tension with important philosophical and theological foundations of Christian spiritual formation. In doing so we offer a specific form of dualism, the bodily soul view, and explain how this view illuminates the importance of embodiment, our neurological and social development, and hence the important physical aspects of Christian spiritual formation

Spartan Daily, January 30, 1936

Volume 24, Issue 71https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/2399/thumbnail.jp