Game theory for collaboration in future networks

Cooperative strategies have the great potential of improving network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. This new paradigm in terms of network management, however, requires a novel design and analysis framework targeting a highly flexible networking solution with a distributed architecture. Game Theory is very suitable for this task, since it is a comprehensive mathematical tool for modeling the highly complex interactions among distributed and intelligent decision makers. In this way, the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g. content providers, cloud providers, home providers, brokers, network providers or users) should be found to optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure. The authors discuss in this chapter several Game Theory models/concepts that are highly relevant for enabling collaboration among the diverse players, using different ways to incentivize it, namely through pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight several related open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information games in this area.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Game theory for cooperation in multi-access edge computing

Cooperative strategies amongst network players can improve network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. Game Theory is very suitable for these emerging scenarios, since it models high-complex interactions among distributed decision makers. It also finds the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g., content providers, cloud providers, edge providers, brokers, network providers, or users). These management policies optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure with a fair utilization of their resources. This chapter discusses relevant theoretical models that enable cooperation amongst the players in distinct ways through, namely, pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information scenarios. These upcoming scenarios are associated to computing and storage at the network edge, as well as, the deployment of large-scale IoT systems. The chapter finalizes by discussing a business model for future networks.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Who should pay for forwarding packets?

We present a game-theoretic study of hybrid communication networks in which mobile devices can connect to a base station, The maximal number of allowed hops might be bounded in order to guarantee small latency. We introduce hybrid connectivity games to study the impact of selfishness on this kind of infrastructure. Mobile devices are represented by selfish players, each of which aims at establishing an uplink path to the base station minimizing its individual cost. Our model assumes that intermediate nodes on an uplink path are reimbursed for transmitting the packets of other devices. Depending on the model, the reimbursements can be paid either by a benevolent network operator or by the senders of the packets using micropayments via a clearing agency that possibly collects a small percentage as commission. Our main findings are these: If there is no constraint on the number of allowed hops on the path to the base station, then the existence of equilibria is guaranteed regardless of whether the network operator or the senders pay for forwarding packets. If there is an upper bound on the number of allowed hops on the uplink path, then the existence of equilibria depends on who pays for forwarding packets. If the network operator pays, then the existence of equilibria is guaranteed only if at most one intermediate node is allowed. If the senders pay for forwarding their packets, then equilibria are guaranteed to exist given any upper bound on the number of allowed hops. Our equilibrium analysis gives a first game-theoretic motivation for the implementation of micropayment schemes in which senders pay for forwarding their packets. We further support this evidence by giving an upper bound on the "price of anarchy" for this kind of hybrid connectivity game that is independent of the number of nodes but depends only on the number of hops and the power gradient