What majority decisions are possible

Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set (with at least three elements) closed under permutations of the given set. The set is considered the set of alternatives (say candidates for an office). The question is, what are the choice functions c on pairs of this set of the following form: for some (finite) family of ``voters'', each having a preference, i.e., a choice from each pair from the given family, c{x,y} is chosen by the preference of the majority of voters. We give full characterization

What majority decisions are possible with possible abstaining

Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters". The question is, what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? For the problem as stated, a complete characterization was given in \citet{shelah2009mdp}, but here we allow each voter to abstain. There are four cases.Comment: 23 page

The Limits of Legitimation. Preconditions for Conflict Resolution by Majority Rule in the European Union

Expanding the domain of majority rule is widely seen as desirable for the European Union. But the functioning of majority rule depends on preconditions that are seldom taken into account. The basic precondition is that overruled minorities accept majority decisions instead of exiting the voting unit. The specific problem of applying majority rule in the European Union is that overruled minorities at the European level are majorities at the nation-state level. By distinguishing between three dimensions of conflicts – content, time and space – the article analyses under what conditions it is possible to expect minorities to accept majority decisions, thus enabling the resolution of conflict by majority rule at the European level

Naïve, Resolute or Sophisticated? A Study of Dynamic Decision Making

Dynamically inconsistent decision makers have to decide, implicitly or explicitly, what to do about their dynamic inconsistency. Economic theorists have identified three possible responses – to act naively (thus ignoring the dynamic inconsistency), to act resolutely (not letting their inconsistency affect their behaviour) or to act sophisticatedly (hence taking into account their inconsistency). We use data from a unique experiment (which observes both decisions and evaluations) in order to distinguish these three possibilities. We find that the majority of subjects are either naïve or resolute (with slightly more being naïve) but very few are sophisticated. These results have important implications for predicting the behaviour of people in dynamic situations.Dynamic decision making, naivety, sophistication, resoluteness, dynamic inconsistencies

Scientific management methods

The world is becoming more and more complex, so do companies. As a consequence, the decisions that managers have to make are increasingly more difficult, since they have to contemplate every single element part of society, such as persons, resources, external environment, etc. Decision making process’ goals are quite simple this days: companies try to reduce risks, to increase the probability of their success, to predict impacts and changes with very low margins of errors, in order to be prepared to every single eventuality and increase their survivability odds. Science was born thousands years ago, and it’s being used to understand the world and how it works. For scientists the only way to do this is by having a rational and credible process of study, what they call scientific method. So, it is possible to define two different types of decisions, some as being supported by a rational and credible analysis, in other words by a scientific process; and other decisions by being supported by managers’ feelings, intuition, experience. This research aims to provide deeper understanding about management decisions and their rationality or lack of it, by looking into the subject of business research methods and its presence in management. The research conclusion is that decisions are becoming more rational since the majority of managers are using rational and scientific tools to support their choices. The study also suggests that companies don’t use mathematical and statistical tools as much, which makes their prediction analysis to have higher margins of errors.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

“Finding the \u27Public\u27 in \u27Public Disrepute” – Would the Cultural Defense Make a Difference in Celebrity and Sports Endorsement Contract Disputes? - The Case of Michael Vick and Adrian Peterson

This article will explore this issue by engaging in case studies of the Vick and Peterson scandals to see what would have happened had the two men taken their claims against Nike to court. Part One will discuss the cases in more depth and elaborate on how they might be viewed through the lens of cultural relativity theory and the cultural defense. Part Two will elaborate on what morals clauses are and the legal standards courts use to enforce them. In addition to examining the Mendenhall decision, several other court cases will be discussed, each of which places differing levels of emphasis on how much evidence is needed to meet the public disrepute requirement. Except for the judge in the Mendenhall case, all of the judges in these additional cases were white. This is mentioned because it is possible that the race of the judge may bear some relation to the level of openness they may have to entertaining the cultural defense. Part Three will apply the aforementioned legal standards to the Vick and Peterson cases, with special attention paid to the extent to which courts discussed in Part Two might be open to entertaining the cultural defense in these kinds of disputes. Part Four will contain my conclusion, which is that most judges will probably not give extra weight to the cultural defense in situations of the type discussed here. There will be a range of approaches to how courts might define public disrepute in these cases, but the overall outcome will be the same. On one side will be a small number of judges, like the judge in Mendenhall, who require both sides to produce detailed evidence to show if expressed minority viewpoints favoring talent outweigh viewpoints that disfavor talent. However, since white football fans outnumber blacks, this will mean that black talent like those discussed here won\u27t benefit from the cultural defense. On the other side will be judges who base their decisions on their own personal take on what the majority of people do (or should) think about the matter. In the main case discussed here where such an approach took place, the judge ruled against talent. Thus, regardless of the rationale for the decision-making expressed in these cases, most talent in these kinds of situations will lose. Nevertheless, there may still be some judges and endorsement company managers who do want to take into account the social dimensions that give rise to the cultural defense in the interests of fairness. My conclusion at the end of the paper will suggest some possible approaches they can adopt to achieve this result

Populist Jurisprudence?:Examining Selected Case Law of the Polish Constitutional Court After 2016

Since the parliamentary elections in 2015 and the subsequent change in the personal composition of the Polish Constitutional Court, this institution is in crisis. The Court, once one of the main guardians of the rule of law and a model for the constitutional judiciary in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, is criticized. Judges are accused of lack of proper appointment and party subordination. Court activities are perceived as part of illiberal democracy and populist constitutionalism, that is, introducing majority rule by “switching off” the checks and balances mechanisms by democratically elected parties and groups. However, what is often overlooked in this type of analysis is the more internal perspective of jurisprudence and legal reasoning. What kind of decisions does the “populist” constitutional court issue? How does it justify its decisions? The paper will discuss three cases of the Polish Constitutional Court. The first case is from 2017 and concerns the right of assembly in connection with the introduction of a special category of “cyclical assemblies”. The second, of 2019, is the so-called “printer case”, which concerned the possibility of refusing to provide a service for reasons of conscience (a refusal to print a poster because of opposition to “LGBT promotion”). The third case is the controversial ruling narrowing access to abortion from 2020. The aim of the analysis is to answer the question of whether the current jurisprudence of the Court is the breaking or continuation of the previously dominant liberal constitutionalism. I will be particularly interested in whether these decisions introduce any changes at the level of possible rights holders (legal subjects), the introduction of a new or changed scope of existing rights, and new ways of resolving conflicts between rights

Populist Jurisprudence?:Examining Selected Case Law of the Polish Constitutional Court After 2016

Since the parliamentary elections in 2015 and the subsequent change in the personal composition of the Polish Constitutional Court, this institution is in crisis. The Court, once one of the main guardians of the rule of law and a model for the constitutional judiciary in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, is criticized. Judges are accused of lack of proper appointment and party subordination. Court activities are perceived as part of illiberal democracy and populist constitutionalism, that is, introducing majority rule by “switching off” the checks and balances mechanisms by democratically elected parties and groups. However, what is often overlooked in this type of analysis is the more internal perspective of jurisprudence and legal reasoning. What kind of decisions does the “populist” constitutional court issue? How does it justify its decisions? The paper will discuss three cases of the Polish Constitutional Court. The first case is from 2017 and concerns the right of assembly in connection with the introduction of a special category of “cyclical assemblies”. The second, of 2019, is the so-called “printer case”, which concerned the possibility of refusing to provide a service for reasons of conscience (a refusal to print a poster because of opposition to “LGBT promotion”). The third case is the controversial ruling narrowing access to abortion from 2020. The aim of the analysis is to answer the question of whether the current jurisprudence of the Court is the breaking or continuation of the previously dominant liberal constitutionalism. I will be particularly interested in whether these decisions introduce any changes at the level of possible rights holders (legal subjects), the introduction of a new or changed scope of existing rights, and new ways of resolving conflicts between rights