US assessments of Japanese ground warfare tactics and the Army’s campaigns in the Pacific theaters, 1943-45: lessons learned and methods applied

The article examines the evolution of US intelligence assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army's tactical methods during the Pacific War, and explains how the resulting perceptions influenced the development of American doctrine for fighting the Japanese. It argues that US evaluations of the Japanese were characterized primarily by the need to gain a realistic understanding of enemy fighting capabilities, coupled with a realization of the need to improve the army's techniques for fighting a successful campaign

Dismantling the ‘Lesser Men’ and ‘Supermen’ myths: US intelligence on the imperial Japanese army after the fall of the Philippines, winter 1942 to spring 1943

During the opening stages of the Pacific War, between December 1941 and spring 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared unstoppable. US forces in the Philippines, despite their efforts, could not hold out against the enemy advance, and by April the last vestiges of their resistance at Bataan and Corregidor became untenable. The intelligence obtained during the initial encounters provided the US defense establishment with undeniable reasons to conclude that Japanese ground forces possessed a high level of tactical skill, and assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army tended to exaggerate the latter’s capabilities

A Failure of Policy: How U.S. Leaders Neglected to Shape, Lead, and Leverage Intelligence Concerning Japan During the Interwar Period, 1918-1941

This dissertation explores the perspective and performance of U.S. intelligence professionals and the intelligence organizations in which they served concerning Japan during the interwar period, the timespan ranging approximately from the conclusion of World War I in November 1918 through the entry of the United States into World War II in December 1941. Research for this dissertation focused predominantly on official and other primary documents, including U.S. intelligence reports and memoranda; intercepted, decrypted, and translated Japanese cablegrams; personal letters by and concerning U.S. intelligence professionals; and other primary source materials related to intelligence professionals and services available via the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Some of these official and other primary documents were available from a number of online repositories providing access to U.S. intelligence documents concerning Japan during the interwar period. The published memoirs of particular key intelligence professionals, who focused particularly on Japan, and other actors, also proved important primary resources to completing this dissertation. Secondary sources augmented and occasionally corroborated the events related in the primary documents and memoirs. U.S. intelligence professionals produced intelligence informing U.S. civilian and military leaders of the increasing competition between U.S. and Japanese national interests and commercial objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to Japan’s perspective concerning the growing impasse. Particular intelligence professionals, whose exploits and experiences focusing particularly on Japan during the interwar period, provided an important foundation for this dissertation. These intelligence professionals took seriously the increasing threat that Japan posed to U.S. interests. For approximately two decades, they acquired intelligence from Japanese counterparts; defended U.S. interests against Japanese counterintelligence threats; and endeavored to influence their Japanese counterparts, often intelligence professionals and officers in Japan’s armed services, into reducing their concern regarding U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly regarding Japan. In the end, war arrived in the form of a widespread and shocking series of Japanese attacks and invasions by sea, air, and land, reaching as far east as the waters just off of the California coast and targeting U.S., British, and Dutch military bases and colonies. The most famous aspect of the Pacific War’s start was the multiple air and sea attacks against Pearl Harbor and other U.S. military installations in the Hawaiian Islands, which sank of the U.S. Pacific fleet, claimed 2,403 lives, and caused the United States to declare war against Japan. Although some U.S. civilian and military leaders realized that war was increasingly likely as negotiations with Japan failed to yield solutions to U.S.-Japanese disagreements, the United States remained unprepared for war with Japan. Ultimately, the failure of U.S. leaders to use intelligence resources at their disposal and to empower intelligence collectors, in order to prepare the United States for a war with Japan, constituted a comprehensive leadership failure, rather than an intelligence failure

Collegiate Codebreakers: Winthrop, Women, and War

During World War II, college-aged women from across the nation filled United States Army and Navy secretive cryptanalysis facilities to help win the war. For many women, colleges facilitated involvement in codebreaking. Through information gathered in oral histories, this thesis primarily explores war related programs at American colleges and the young women that became cryptanalysts. Academic institutions, like Winthrop College, became the nuclei for colligate codebreakers. They acted as early crypt education centers, through the offering of cryptology classes, functioned as recruitment centers, and operated as essential training hubs. While in school, young women were saturated by a climate of war and secrecy as campuses became militarized during this period. Their careers in academia and moral character came into account when cryptanalysis sectors began searching for loyal workers. While working as codebreakers for the United States government, women experienced a degree of freedom and witnessed a change in their position. In the name of the war effort and patriotic ideologies, female cryptanalysts broke codes and tested the strength of American ciphers. From college campuses to Army and Navy facilities, young women played essential roles in the war effort

America\u27s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan

During the time President Truman authorized the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, the United States was preparing to invade the Japanese homeland. The brutality and the suicidal defenses of the Japanese military had shown American planners that there was plenty of fight left in a supposedly defeated enemy. Senior military and civilian leaders presented Truman with several options to force the surrender of Japan. The options included the tightening of the naval blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan, invasion, a negotiated peace settlement, and the atomic bomb became an option, once bomb became operational. Truman received recommendations, advice and proposals from civilian and military leaders within the first two months of taking office after President Roosevelt died. Only after meeting with the senior leadership to discuss the various options did Truman authorize the planning and execution of the invasion of Japan. However, the extremely large casualty estimates presented by the Chiefs of Staff remained a concern for Truman, especially in the wake of the bloody battles on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. These estimates became the driving factor for Truman’s ultimate decision to use the new weapon against Japan and to end the war before anymore Americans service members died unnecessarily. The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan was only Truman’s decision to make. All the other leaders provided their recommendations and advice based on the events that shaped the brutalities of the war in the pacific. At no time did Truman receive advice on not using the atomic bomb. Critics and military leaders’ disapproval of his decision came after the war had ended. To this day, Truman’s decision remains a controversial topic among scholars and will continue to be a source of debate well into the future

The war on words : the Office of Censorship in World War II

The purpose of this paper is to report on the results of research of the United States Office of Censorship from the birth of that office in 1941 to its timely death in 1945. Jim Heath, in his article, “Domestic America during World War II: Research Opportunities for Historians,” provided the impetus for the research that has resulted in this paper. Professor Heath states that most histories of World War II have relegated the American domestic scene to a secondary place in the process of reporting on the more exciting diplomatic and military aspects of the period. He suggests that historians analyze the various published histories of the many short-lived bureaucratic offices necessitated by the contingencies of World War II. One of these offices was the U.S. Office of Censorship

The Battle of Malaya: The Japanese Invasion of Malaya as a Case Study for the Re-Evaluation of Imperial Japanese Army Intelligence Effectiveness During World War II

The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II is based almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers. The view presented is one of complete incompetence by the West. Little attention has been paid to any successes the Japanese intelligence organizations achieved. In fact, the majority of Anglo-American historians have instead focused on the errors and unpreparedness of the Allies as the cause of their early failures. This view is completely dismissive of Japanese intelligence efforts. The majority of the research does not take into account the extensive preparations and training the Japanese intelligence organizations and military undertook in the lead up to World War II. This information calls into question the assertion that Allied failures were the primary provenance of the early Japanese successes. This study focuses on the Japanese intelligence efforts from 1930 to 1942. It will analyze the events leading up to and the Invasion of Malaya. This was a pivotal event at the opening of World War II, and was a decisive Japanese victory. Previously, the success of Japanese forces during this, and other, event has been credited to failures in Allied intelligence and preparedness. Western sources at large have claimed that Japanese intelligence as a whole was faulty. This project will argue that in fact Japanese intelligence units were highly skilled and contributed greatly to Japanese successes. It was as a result of severe organizational deficiencies and failures that appeared in the latter half of the war that Japan eventually would fall behind in the intelligence war

James Jones\u27s Codes of Conduct

Though his work was celebrated by his contemporaries and remains highly lauded by scholars of war fiction, James Jones\u27s novels are already at risk of falling outside the mainstream canon of 20th Century American literature. My dissertation project proposes an intensive examination of James Jones\u27 three volume war trilogy, From Here to Eternity, The Thin Red Line, and Whistle, collectively considered by eminent critic Paul Fussell to be the finest work to emerge from the Second World War. Jones\u27 trilogy is a mainstay within the overall genre of war fiction, yet it has been afforded relatively little critical attention by mainstream critics. Scholarship on Jones\u27 work has heretofore focused on his general body of work with one critical examination of the Eastern philosophical influences on his early work. While critics have examined individual works within the trilogy as stand-alone works, no extensive scholarly study has been done on the trilogy as a whole. Jones initially intended From Here to Eternity to cover the entire scope of the trilogy\u27s time period, but later split them into three related works. From Here to Eternity covers Army life pre-Pearl Harbor, The Thin Red Line follows the same character archetypes into combat, and Whistle describes the post-Guadalcanal return of the first war wounded to hospitals in the states. The particular focus of my dissertation will be on deciphering the unwritten codes that govern the behavior of Jones\u27 characters in addition to the written A.R.s (Army Regulations) and how they change through the three phases of combat covered over the course of the trilogy (pre-combat, combat, and post-combat). At each stage of combat, the behavior of Jones\u27 characters is guided by a variety of unofficial codes that govern appropriate and inappropriate behavior with regards to conduct in the Army and between the sexes. My goal is to prove that examining these unwritten `codes of conduct\u27 will contribute greatly towards understanding Jones\u27 construction of masculine behavior and determining the makeup of what traits constitute an archetypical Jonesian Protagonist

Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes: David Sissons and D Special Section during the Second World War

During the Second World War, Australia maintained a super-secret organisation, the Diplomatic (or `D’) Special Section, dedicated to breaking Japanese diplomatic codes. The Section has remained officially secret as successive Australian Governments have consistently refused to admit that Australia ever intercepted diplomatic communications, even in war-time. This book recounts the history of the Special Section and describes its code-breaking activities. It was a small but very select organisation, whose `technical