Durable Goods Cpmpetition in Secondary Electronic Markets

We develop a game-theoretic framework to investigate the competitive implications of consumer-to-consumer electronic marketplaces, which promote concurrent selling of new and used goods. In many e-marketplaces, where suppliers cannot directly use second-hand goods for practicing inter-temporal price discrimination, the threat of cannibalization of new goods by used goods become significant. We examine conditions under which it is optimal for suppliers to operate in such markets, explaining why used-goods markets may not be predatory for them. While a monopolist supplier is worse off in the presence of a secondary market, competition can in fact make it better off. The presence of used-goods markets provides an active outlet for some consumers to sell their second-hand goods. Such sales lead to an increase in their disposable income. This increased income can then be used to buy an additional new good. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our model predicts the reduction in the price of new goods when there are used-goods markets. We highlight the strategic role that used goods commission plays in determining optimal profits. Overall, for a wide range of parameters, there is an increase in social welfare from establishing such secondary markets

The Economics of Privacy

This chapter reviews economic analyses of privacy. We begin by scrutinizing the “free market” critique of privacy regulation. Welfare may be non-monotone in the quantity of information, hence there may be excessive incentive to collect information. This result applies to both non-productive and productive information. Over-investment is exacerbated to the extent that personal information is exploited across markets. Further, the “free market” critique does not apply to overt and covert collection of information that directly causes harm. We then review research on property rights and challenges in determining their optimal allocation. We conclude with insights from recent empirical research and directions for future research.

Trade Reform and Gender in Mozambique

This paper uses an economywide model to study the impact of trade policy reform on male and female labor in Mozambique. The model disaggregates factor markets by skill and gender, and incorporates links between trade reform, product prices and wages by gender. The model also includes a detailed treatment of production technology and import protection, and is linked to a top-down microsimulation model of households. We find that trade policy has only a modest effect on gender wage differentials, and conclude that policy concerns with gender imbalances should focus on skill upgrading and sectoral mobility rather than on trade policy.

Globe: Asian Growth and Trade Poles: India, China, and East and Southeast Asia

Using a global general equilibrium trade model, this study analyzes the impact on developing countries, of (1) the dramatic expansion of trade by India, China, and an integrated East and Southeast (E&SE) Asia trade bloc and (2) productivity growth in the region. China is an integral member of the E&SE Asia bloc, with strong links through value chains and trade in intermediate inputs, while India is not part of any trade bloc. The analyses consider the importance of their different degrees of integration into regional and global economies, focusing on potential complementarities and competition with other developing countries.

Anonymous Money, Moral Sentiments and Welfare

Some markets are prone to develop shadow transactions for the purpose of tax avoidance. Moral sentiments control the allocation of consumers between the legal and illicit markets. Such sentiments include self-esteem and social disapproval. The market solution leads to fiscal externality resulting from tax avoidance and highlights the conflict between private opportunism and collective values. Shadow markets may, however, enhance consumer welfare by limiting the pricing power of firms and by controlling tax collection. The paper develops a model of endogenous segmentation of markets between moral and immoral behavior. The legal producer can price the self-esteem of honest people, who can blackmail the legal producer with their option of visiting the illicit market. The model has implications for monetary economics: moral sentiments, tax rates, illegal transactions, and probability of being caught become relevant for the demand for money.moral sentiments, shadow economy, welfare