Don’t tell us: the demand for secretive behaviour

The matter studied here is how, and with what implications, people may decide that they do not want to be let into secrets that concern them. They could get the information at no cost but they refuse to know. The reasoning is framed in terms of principals and agents, with the principals assumed not to want to know the agents’ secrets. For convenience, the context chosen for the exposition is mainly that of voters as principals and the government or the office-holders as agents. After some exploration of the motivations underlying the attitude of the principals, the paper focuses on the case when neither total secrecy nor total disclosure prevails. The demand for partial secrecy is analysed with the help of two models, one devoted to ongoing processes and the other to past events. Finally the paper discusses some of the ways the “don’t tell us mechanism” may interact with two others: “thinking about something else” and “low issue salience”.secrets, transparency, asymmetric information, voluntary ignorance, voting

Did the NSA and GCHQ Diminish Our Privacy? What the Control Account Should Say

A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases

Politics Goes Mobile

Analyzes survey findings on the use of cell phones to follow or participate in the 2010 elections including receiving updates from or contributing money to campaigns, sharing information on voting stations, and monitoring election results by demographics

Spartan Daily November 6, 2012

Volume 139, Issue 38https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/1354/thumbnail.jp

Russians Back Protests, Political Freedoms and Putin, Too

Presents survey findings about Russians' reaction to the December 2011 parliamentary and March 2012 presidential elections and subsequent protests, attitudes toward democracy, and views of leaders, nationalism, and Russia?s global image

Power And Global Economic Institutions

What is the relationship between states\u27 economic power and their formal political power in multilateral economic institutions? Why do we see variation in states\u27 formal political power across economic institutions of the same era? In this book, Ayse Kaya examines these crucial under-explored questions, drawing on multiple theoretical traditions within international relations to advance a new approach of \u27adjusted power\u27. She explains how the economic shifts of our time, marked by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China and other emerging economies, have affected and will impact key multilateral economic institutions. Through detailed contemporary and historical analyses of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G20, and the International Trade Organization, Kaya shows that the institutional setting mediates the significance of the underlying distribution of economic power across states. The book presents both case studies and key statistics