10,306 research outputs found
Arrovian juntas
This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems
on three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have,
of course, Arrow's classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the
classification of all such voting systems as dictatorial hierarchies. If we
leave the traditional realm of complete orderings, the picture changes. Here we
consider the more general setting where alternatives may be incomparable, that
is, we allow orderings that are reflexive and transitive but not necessarily
complete. Instead of a dictator we exhibit a junta whose internal hierarchy or
coalition structure can be surprisingly rich. We give an explicit description
of all such voting systems, generalizing and unifying various previous results.Comment: 22 pages, 1 figur
Arrovian juntas
This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems on three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have, of course, Arrow's classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the classification of all such voting systems as dictatorial hierarchies. If we leave the traditional realm of complete orderings, the picture changes. Here we consider the more general setting where alternatives may be incomparable, that is, we allow orderings that are reflexive and transitive but not necessarily complete. Instead of a dictator we exhibit a junta whose internal hierarchy or coalition structure can be surprisingly rich. We give an explicit description of all such voting systems, generalizing and unifying various previous results.rank aggregation problem; Arrow's impossibility theorem; classification of arrovian voting systems; partial ordering; partially ordered set; poset; dictator; oligarchy; junta
Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results
We model Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's multiwinner voting systems as
a certain resource allocation problem. We show that for many restricted
variants of this problem, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions,
there are no constant-factor approximation algorithms. Yet, we also show cases
where good approximation algorithms exist (briefly put, these variants
correspond to optimizing total voter satisfaction under Borda scores, within
Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's voting systems).Comment: 26 pages, 1 figur
Coalitional power indices applied to voting systems
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple games
just consider parties, players or voters. Here, we also consider games with a priori unions, i.e., coalitions
among parties, players or voters. We measure the power of each party, player or voter when there are coalitions
among them. In particular, we study real situations of voting systems using extended ShapleyâShubik
and Banzhaf indices, the so-called coalitional power indices. We also introduce a dynamic programming to
compute them.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version
Accuracy: The fundamental requirement for voting systems
There have been several attempts to develop a comprehensive account of the requirements for voting systems, particularly for public elections. Typically, these approaches identify a number of "high level" principals which are then refined either into more detailed statements or more formal constructs. Unfortunately, these approaches do not acknowledge the complexity and diversity of the contexts in which voting takes place. This paper takes a different approach by arguing that the only requirement for a voting system is that it is accurate. More detailed requirements can then be derived from this high level requirement for the particular context in which the system is implemented and deployed. A general, formal high level model for voting systems and their context is proposed. Several related definitions of accuracy for voting systems are then developed, illustrating how the term "accuracy" is in interpreted in different contexts. Finally, a context based requirement for voting system privacy is investigated as an example of deriving a subsidiary requirement from the high level requirement for accuracy
Applying Block Chain Technologies to Digital Voting Algorithms
Voting is a fundamental aspect to democracy. Many countries have advanced voting systems in place, but many of these systems have issues behind them such as not being anonymous or verifiable. Additionally, most voting systems currently have a central authority in charge of counting votes, which can be prone to corruption. We propose a voting system which mitigates many of these issues. Our voting system attempts to provide decentralization, pseudoanonymity, and verifiability. For our system, we have identified the requirements, implemented the backbone of the system, recognized some of its shortcomings, and proposed areas of future work on this voting system
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